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RETHINKING LEADERSHIP AND 

"WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT" 

NATIONAL SECURITY REFORM: 

PROBLEMS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS 

Joseph R. Cerami 

Jeffrey A. Engel 

Editors 



May 2010 

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CONTENTS 

Foreword v 

1 . Will What We Think We Know About 
Leadership and "Whole of Government" 
Reform Kill the Prospects for Effective 

and Ethical Change? 1 

Joseph R. Cerami 

2. Leadership, National Security, and Whole 
of Government Reforms: The Project 

on National Security Reform (PNSR) 

Perspective 29 

James R. Locher III 

3. Leadership as Practical Ethics 49 

Joel H. Rosenthal 

4. Transforming Intelligence Analysis: 

"The Tail That Wags the Dog" 73 

Richard H. Immerman 

5. Reforming the National Security Process 

in a Globalizing World Ill 

James Goldgeier 

6. A Fine Balance: The Evolution of the 

National Security Adviser 127 

Andrew Preston 

7. Leading the Next Phase of Homeland 
Security Intelligence: Providing Better 
Definitions, Roles, and Protections 149 

Geoffrey S. French 



in 



8. Winning Hearts and Minds: From Slogan 

to Leadership Strategy 165 

Todd L. Pittinsky 

9. Change Is Hard . . . But Even Small Steps 
Matter 187 

Jeffrey A. Engel 

About the Contributors 209 

The George Bush School of Government 

and Public Service, Texas A&M University 217 

The Scowcroft Institute of International 

Affairs 218 

About the Strategic Studies Institute 219 



IV 



FOREWORD 

On June 24, 2009, The Bush School of Government 
and Public Service and The Scowcroft Institute of 
International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and 
the U. S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Insti- 
tute (SSI), conducted a conference on "Leadership 
and Government Reform" in Washington, DC. Two 
panels discussed Leader Development in Schools of 
Public Affairs and Leadership, National Security, and 
"Whole of Government" Reforms. 

This conference marked the fourth in a series that 
the Bush School has conducted with the SSI. The first, 
"The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations," was 
held in 2006; the second, "The Interagency and Coun- 
terinsurgency Warfare," in 2007. In March 2008, the 
Bush School conducted a colloquium in College Sta- 
tion, Texas, focused on "Reform and the Next Presi- 
dent's Agenda," which looked forward to the Novem- 
ber 2008 election. That conference was also sponsored 
by the nonpartisan Project on National Security Re- 
form, which includes retired Lieutenant General 
Brent Scowcroft as a member of its Guiding Coalition 
that originally included several key members of the 
Obama administration. 

The June 24 conference theme continued the dis- 
cussion about the need for changes in leader develop- 
ment and whole of government reform — even more 
reform than the post-World War II changes accom- 
plished by the 1947 National Security Act and the 
1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation. The chapters here 
examine whether and to what extent it is possible to 
boldly and fundamentally improve the alignment, 
coordination, integration, and interoperability among 
the government's national security agencies. 



The panelists and authors have reflected on the na- 
ture of external, internal, and transnational threats to 
U.S. security, and the needs for changes in developing 
people, organizations, and institutions to more effec- 
tively, efficiently, and ethically improve the U.S. Gov- 
ernment's capacity to address the need for change. In 
essence, the authors in this book share the belief of 
many in the international and public affairs communi- 
ty, such as Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
that the world is changing in fundamental ways, and 
our traditional models for understanding America's 
role do not appear to be working very well. 1 A new 
era of reform is needed for this new age, in response 
to which the panelists, in their detailed remarks 2 and 
subsequent papers, offer suggestions to reform the 
United States' national security system to meet 21st 
century threats, while simultaneously developing the 
leaders who can implement a serious and broad-scale 
reform agenda. 

The SSI joins the coeditors of this volume in thank- 
ing the Bush School staff members for their superb ef- 
forts in planning and executing the conference, and in 
preparing this volume. Beth Roberts, Mary Hein, Mat- 
thew Upton, Joe Dillard, and Laura Templeton pro- 
vided the excellent support needed for the conference 
planning and execution. They were joined by Lindsey 
Pavelka, who also contributed to the initial SSI confer- 
ence Colloquium Brief. Matt Henderson video-taped 
the DC conference and edited the videos which have 
been posted on the Bush School and the SSI website. 
Ethan Bennett provided research assistance and his 
considerable writing skills in preparing the chapters 
presented in this volume. We thank them and the 
Bush School's former Dean, Lieutenant General Rich- 
ard A. Chilcoat (USA, Ret.), Interim Dean, Dr. A. Ben- 



VI 



ton Cocanaugher, Executive Associate Dean, Dr. Sam 
Kirkpatrick, and Master's Degree Program Directors, 
Dr. Charles Hermann and Dr. Jeryl L. Mumpower, for 
their leadership in promoting a significant and con- 
tinuing partnership with the SSI. 



iim$?^£L 





DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. 

Director 

Strategic Studies Institute 



ENDNOTES - FOREWORD 

1. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the 
World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy, New 
York: Basic Books, 2008, p. viii. 

2. For Leadership and Government Reform conference pan- 
elists' videos on June 24, 2009, see bush.tamu.edu/DC2009/ '. 



CHAPTER 1 

WILL WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW 

ABOUT LEADERSHIP AND 

"WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT" REFORM 

KILL THE PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTIVE AND 

ETHICAL CHANGE? 1 

Joseph R. Cerami 2 

The end of man is knowledge, but there is one thing 
he can't know. He can't know whether knowledge 
will save him or kill him. He will be killed, all right, 
but he can't know whether he is killed because of 
the knowledge which he has got or because of the 
knowledge which he hasn't got and which if he had 
it, would save him. . . . for the end of man is to know. 



Robert Penn Warren 
All the King's Men 3 

On June 24, 2009, the Bush School of Government 
and Public Service and Scowcroft Institute of Interna- 
tional Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the Stra- 
tegic Studies Institute at the U. S. Army War College, 
conducted a conference on "Leadership and Govern- 
ment Reform" in Washington, DC. One of two panels 
discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public 
Affairs," the second discussed "Leadership, National 
Security, and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." 

The Bush School's mission statement emphasizes 
preparing principled leaders for public service, lead- 
ership for people, organizations, and institutions 
that serve the public interest. To think more broadly 
about leadership and government reform, the panels 
were challenged to think about the whole of govern- 



ment rather than leadership at the top, or solely on the 
role of presidential leadership. The aim was to think 
more about government reform and leadership from 
the top, middle and entry levels. 

The authors of this book share the viewpoint of 
many in the international and public affairs commu- 
nity that the world is changing, and our theories, con- 
cepts, and practices for understanding America's role 
and implementing effective and ethical policies do not 
seem to be working very well. 4 Is a new era of reform 
needed for this new age? Can we offer concrete as well 
as theoretical suggestions to reform the U.S. national 
security system to meet 21st century threats? Do we 
also know how to develop the kind of effective and 
ethical leaders who can make such reforms work? The 
chapters in this volume address these pressing and 
timely issues. 

PANEL 1: INTRODUCTION -LEADER 
DEVELOPMENT IN SCHOOLS OF PUBLIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

In introducing the first panel, Dr. Joseph Cerami 
commented on the Bush School graduate program's 
approach to leader development, an approach tai- 
lored for a school of public and international affairs. 
One guiding idea is that leadership education is in- 
tegrated into the 2-year program and not viewed as 
a stand-alone activity. The Bush School emphasizes 
leadership and teamwork starting with its admissions 
process and candidate interview weekend and during 
new student orientation week. Every master's can- 
didate takes a core graduate-level leadership course. 
These activities early in the Bush School experience 
contribute to establishing class identities and reinforce 



a commitment to personal and professional leader de- 
velopment. 

From there, the School supports student efforts 
through individual learning and leader development, 
and recommends that students design their course 
work to provide a base of knowledge and skills as a 
foundation for their desired career paths. These ef- 
forts are guided by coaching from faculty advisers, 
and supplemented with the opportunities to interact 
frequently with a diverse group of experienced prac- 
titioners, faculty experts, and visiting speakers. The 
students' final core course is a team-based Capstone 
research project under faculty direction for a real- 
world client. 

In addition to course work, the Bush School also 
emphasizes two additional layers, including experien- 
tial learning through leadership positions in the stu- 
dent government association, public service organiza- 
tion, intramurals, internships, and community service. 
The third layer includes personal development or self- 
study. Ms. Lindsey Pavelka, the Assistant Leadership 
Director, directs an assessment center whose menu of 
tools for improving self-awareness includes online as- 
sessments of personality profiles (Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator), individual learning styles, a personal as- 
sessment of management skills, personal values as- 
sessments, and emotion intelligence. 

The Panelists: Erik Patashnik, Joel Rosenthal, and 
Todd Pittinsky. 

Panel 1 included three individuals who are deep- 
ly concerned with education, leader development, 
public policy, international affairs, and ethics. Their 
publications, teaching, and — very importantly — their 



institutions, are all committed to promoting the cause 
of student development and public service. 

Dr. Eric Patashnik has written extensively on 
government reform, performance, and public admin- 
istration and management. Dr. Patashnik discussed 
his work as Associate Director in establishing the 
Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy at the 
University of Virginia, where they believe there is an 
academic component for integrating leadership and 
public policy. In the course of the Batten School's dean 
search, he compiled a list of ideas their finalists shared 
about the need for integrating leadership and public 
policy. Those ideas emphasized efforts to: 

1. Feature courses that bring together leadership 
and public policy through successful and failed 
cases of change management and innovation, 

2. Emphasize leadership across policy networks, 

3. Understand a variety of leadership roles along 
with the significance of context and leading at 
different organizational levels, 

4. Focus on leadership successes rather than just 
distilling lessons from failures, 

5. Teach folio wership skills, emphasizing listen- 
ing, feedback, and challenging behaviors, 

6. Think about leadership in a number of courses, 
not just one course, and weave leadership 
studies throughout the curriculum, 

7. Break down the concept of leadership into 
discrete, teachable skills (speaking, writing, 
missions, crisis, negotiations, etc.), 

8. Recognize differences in backgrounds of 
students by differentiating the curriculum, 

9. Reimagine the field of leadership by engaging 
with other social science disciplines, 

10. Consider leadership in student admissions 
selection criteria, and 



11. Define leadership broadly so all faculty and 
students can see their connections to the field. 

Dr. Todd Pittinsky is the Research Director for 
Harvard Kennedy School's Center for Public Leader- 
ship. The Center for Public Leadership (CPL) webpage 
notes that the Center is: 

Dedicated to excellence in leadership education 
and research. . .by creating opportunities for re- 
flection and discovery for students, scholars, and 
practitioners from different disciplines, sectors, 
cultures, and nations [thus promoting] a dynamic 
exchange of ideas. 

Pittinsky introduced his research on leading across 
boundaries and intergroup leadership. He suggested 
that by focusing on collective identity, i.e., taking a 
group of different individuals and finding common- 
alities between them, groups will discover ways to in- 
tegrate their strengths rather than focusing solely on 
who they are as individuals. He elaborated on collec- 
tive identity, emphasizing the abundance of knowl- 
edge about the repulsion of different groups, but 
the lack of knowledge about the groups' attraction. 
Todd suggested that society has a natural tendency 
to think in terms of categories, looking at differences 
as "us and them." He encouraged the idea of leading- 
by-uniting, and the advantages of looking at shared 
identities or commonalities between seemingly very 
different groups. 

The third panelist was Dr. Joel Rosenthal of the 
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. 
The Carnegie Council has been hosting U.S. Army War 
College small group visits to Carnegie, New York, and 
conducts faculty workshops there on Humanitarian 
Interventions and other topics regarding the military, 



international affairs, and ethical leadership. As its 
webpage says, "The Carnegie Council is the world's 
leading voice promoting ethical leadership on issues 
of war, peace, and global social justice." Rosenthal ex- 
plored the connection between ethics and leadership, 
suggesting that there is a need for schools of public 
affairs to follow the suit of other professional schools, 
like business, medicine, etc., which offer separate 
courses on ethics. Rosenthal set the stage for ethics 
as a process of reflection about how we should live — 
our values, standards, and principles — then shared 
what he referred to as three-dimensional ethics. The 
first dimension, ethics as choice, emphasized the role 
individuals who have autonomy in an organization 
play in setting ethical standards. The second dimen- 
sion, systems and social arrangements, determines 
the kinds of choices individuals make. The third di- 
mension, the opportunity to imagine and implement 
new social arrangements, provides an unconventional 
way of thinking about ethics. Referring to a previous 
panelist's comments and the Bush School's mission of 
preparing principled leaders, Rosenthal prompted the 
question: "What is principled leadership?" He sug- 
gested three ideas at its core: (1) pluralism, an appre- 
ciation for diversity while exercising what is common 
in the human condition, (2) principles of rights, what 
he referred to as the "rock bottom moral argument," 
and (3) fairness. In summary, Rosenthal emphasized 
the importance and moral obligation we have to con- 
tinuously discuss and study ethics, which he suggests 
should be seen as "the rudder and keel — the things 
that keep one moving forward and in the right direc- 
tion." 



PANEL 2: INTRODUCTION -LEADERSHIP, 
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND WHOLE OF 
GOVERNMENT REFORM 

The second panel, led by Dr. Jeffrey Engel, the 
Interim Director of the Scowcroft Institute of Inter- 
national Affairs, explored the role of leadership and 
whole of government reform in the areas of national 
security, homeland security, foreign policy, and intel- 
ligence. Surely there has been no lack of attention to 
these areas of government since September 11, 2001 
(9/11), and indeed since the end of the Cold War that 
preceded it. The current Obama administration made 
national security reform, both in tone and in practice, 
one of the signatures of its electoral campaign. As sev- 
eral speakers noted, however, such emphasis on re- 
form was meant more for public consumption than for 
actual bureaucratic reorganization, which is hardly a 
new phenomenon in American electoral politics. The 
panelists charged with addressing this vital topic of 
national security reform included academics, practi- 
tioners, historians, and contemporary policy analysts. 

The Panelists: Geoffrey French, James Goldgeier, 
Richard Immerman, and Andrew Preston. 

The panel began with Mr. Geoffrey French, Analyt- 
ic Director of Security Risk for CENTRA Technology, 
Inc., a leading contractor in the area of homeland secu- 
rity and risk analysis for the U.S. Government, partic- 
ularly for the Departments of Homeland Security, De- 
fense, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. French 
opened the discussion of leadership, national security, 
and government reform by focusing on homeland se- 
curity and intelligence. He emphasized the need to 



consolidate current forums and functions and avoid 
duplicating mechanisms for information sharing. He 
suggested focusing on fusion centers as the forum 
for information exchange and the need for common 
terminology to connect homeland security and intel- 
ligence agencies. In concluding his arguments, French 
emphasized the notion that if homeland security intel- 
ligence exists, then so too should the nation improve 
its homeland security counterintelligence. 

Next to speak was Dr. James Goldgeier of the 
George Washington University's Elliot School of Inter- 
national Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations, 
who addressed the role of ideology and worldview in 
shaping American foreign policy since the end of the 
Cold War. He also discussed the way that worldview 
in turn framed the range of possible avenues of reform 
for the Clinton, George W. Bush, and now Obama ad- 
ministrations. Goldgeier' s comments on international 
security were supported by his recent research focus 
on the transition from the end of the Cold War to the 
post-Cold War periods. In particular, he mentioned 
contending ideas on America's post-Cold War role. 
Examples included the debate between the 1992 draft 
Defense Planning guidance of Richard Cheney and 
Paul Wolfowitz, and the January 1993 State Depart- 
ment document by Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger 
about the significance of the global economy and the 
need to develop a National Economic Council to com- 
plement the work of the National Security Council 
(NSC). Goldgeier also addressed the need for training 
public and international affairs professionals in the 
new forces at work in economics, energy, and cyber 
policy areas. 

Dr. Richard Immerman of Temple University, and 
more recently of the Directorate of National Intelli- 



gence, then spoke on the myriad ways academic and 
intellectually -informed ideas about how reform with- 
in the intelligence community (in particular following 
9/11 and the Iraq War) did or did not succeed in prac- 
tice. His lesson: given that reform is hard, even for 
the most well-intentioned, we should be giving more 
attention to current history to critically examine the 
details of intelligence reform. He provided a narrative 
on what he evaluates as an important reform effort 
undertaken by the Director of National Intelligence, 
focussing on institutional initiatives. In particular, he 
reinforced the significance of the initiatives by Tom 
Fingar of the Directorate of National Intelligence, who 
challenged the intelligence analytical community to 
reform, embrace change, and lead the development of 
a community of intelligence analysts. Fingar' s guiding 
assumption was that there would always be gaps in 
analysis; therefore, the intelligence community need- 
ed analysts with the judgment to help bridge those 
gaps. In addition, he suggested that the intelligence 
community needed educational reforms to address 
critical thinking skills and standards. Also needed was 
a library of national intelligence to provide a knowl- 
edge base of all reports. Other initiatives included de- 
signing an A-Space, classified, social network to join 
all officials in the analysis and collection agencies for 
collaboration. Immerman concluded with the optimis- 
tic assessment that, through diligent effort and despite 
long-standing bureaucratic inertia and opposition to 
collaboration and change, reform is indeed possible if 
leaders desire it and persist in pressing the issue. 

Dr. Andrew Preston of Cambridge University 
concluded the panel. As a leading historian of the Mc- 
George Bundy era at the NSC and thus of reforms in 
the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy 



administrations, Preston is uniquely positioned to 
comment on the similarity of reformist impulses now 
and in the past. His conclusion: a more recent per- 
spective on reform, specifically that orchestrated by 
Brent Scowcroft during his second term as National 
Security Adviser (under George H.W. Bush) provides 
the preferable model by which other reformers might 
learn. Preston addressed concerns about the NSC, in 
particular the National Security Adviser, who is of- 
ten cited as needing reform. The speaker pointed out 
that every president tries to reform the system, but 
stressed that he does not see a need for reform now. 
In fact, he emphasized how current administrations 
are strikingly similar to that of Bundy's NSC during 
the Kennedy administration, which he believes "got 
it right." He mentioned the key Bundy innovation as 
being the heightened significance of the presidential 
advisory role (in addition to managing the national 
security policy process). The speaker also recognized 
the Bundy concept of the NSC operating like a small 
State Department, a practice perfected by Scowcroft, 
whom Preston assesses as unquestionably the most ef- 
fective national security adviser in U.S. history. 

THE CHAPTERS 

This anthology continues the conference discus- 
sions on the topic of whole of government reform and 
the role graduate policy programs in public and in- 
ternational affairs play in preparing emerging leaders 
to participate in ongoing reform processes. There is a 
large amount of literature on reform and innovation 
efforts. Much of the research describes the obstacles 
to whole system reforms in the public and private 
sectors. In the private sector, John Kotter of Harvard 



10 



Business School informs us that most large-scale trans- 
formations fail. 5 Kotter points out that "powerful mac- 
roeconomic forces are at work" and will continue to 
push organizational change. Overall, his assessment 
of change management efforts is not encouraging: 

To date, major change efforts have helped some 
organizations adapt significantly to shifting con- 
ditions, have improved the competitive standing 
of others, and have positioned a few for a far bet- 
ter future. But in too many situations the improve- 
ments have been disappointing and the carnage 
has been appalling, with wasted resources and 
burn-out, scared or frustrated employees. 6 

In the government sector, public management 
scholars continue to assign Charles Lindblom's classic 
article, "The Science of 'Muddling Through" (1959). 
Lindblom compares what he calls root (rational-com- 
prehensive) and branch (successive limited compari- 
sons) to "describe policy formulation . . . for complex 
problems." 7 Lindblom concludes that in the "rough" 
policymaking process, the branch approach is the way 
to go: "Policy-making is a process of successive ap- 
proximation to some desired objectives in which what 
is desired itself continues to change under reconsid- 
eration." 8 To a seasoned practitioner, does change 
through successive approximation sound like more 
practical advice than going for reforming the whole of 
government? Has the base of our knowledge been ex- 
panded to the point that we know more about leading 
and change than the past research of Lindblom and 
Kotter suggest? In sum, what do we know now that 
gives us greater confidence in our ability to change or 
even transform national security organizations and 
policymaking processes in a single decisive stroke 



11 



as opposed to an open-ended process of continuous 
incremental adjustments? While acknowledging the 
inherent complexities in light of the turbulence in in- 
ternational, domestic, and transnational issues facing 
the U.S. Government in the coming decades, the fol- 
lowing chapters are more positive about recent, ongo- 
ing, and future reform efforts than is suggested by the 
classic research of Kotter, Lindblom, and others. 

James Locher's chapter provides a perspective on 
national security reform (PNSR) that has, in large part, 
sparked the whole of government initiative. 9 Locher 
pulls no punches in criticizing an outdated national 
security system that is ineffective in responding to 
current threats. Drawing on research from more than 
300 experts, PNSR's December 2008 report, "Forging 
a New Shield," emphasizes the lack of a systems ap- 
proach for developing strategies; a limited capability 
for effective complex contingency operations; limited 
flexibility and untimely decisionmaking and analysis; 
and lack of overall unity of effort among policymakers 
and agencies. 

Locher identifies five persistent government prob- 
lems in the current national security system: 

1. Autonomous agencies (the Stovepipe 
Syndrome) defy a unity of effort approach. 

2. Major areas of NSC responsibilities are not 
under the NSC adviser's authority. 

3. The White House is overburdened by 
centralized issue management that is made 
necessary by a lack of interagency coordination 
and integration. 

4. Resources are not aligned with strategic 
objectives due to the agency focus on human 
capital and budget resources. 

5. The structure of congressional committees 
causes a focus on parts of the process, thus 



12 



failing to provide legislative initiatives for a 
whole of government approach. 

This list of deficiencies, as well as ideas for address- 
ing them, is presented in more detail in the Forging a 
New Shield report that includes historical case studies 
adding depth to our understanding of the long-term 
and persistent nature of these problems in U.S. histo- 
ry. 10 In sum, PNSR's way ahead includes efforts to bet- 
ter integrate the U.S. instruments of national power as 
well as to create and empower leaders throughout the 
national security system. 

In assessing the early Obama administration, 
Locher sees forward movement in pursuing the re- 
form agenda. He notes that the national and homeland 
security functions have been integrated in the NSC. 11 
Locher advises that the President create flexible, col- 
laborative teams for decentralized management 
through interagency panels. In addition, PNSR recom- 
mends empowering leaders through human capital 
incentives for interagency service. To lead the neces- 
sary reforms, Locher calls for creating an executive 
secretary on the NSC staff to form a human capital 
advisory board; assist the president in creating inter- 
agency teams; establish a national security profes- 
sional corps that provides incentives for interagency 
rotation; and create a central staff for developing and 
coordinating interagency professional education, 
training, and certification programs. In contrast to 
Lindblom, Locher cites the 9/11 Commission Report 
stressing that Americans should not settle for ad hoc, 
incremental change. 

Joel Rosenthal's chapter focuses on leadership as 
practical ethics. He emphasizes the central role of eth- 
ics in leadership education and training for anyone 
with careers in public and international affairs. He 



13 



also urges fighting the minimalist approach of equat- 
ing ethics with mere legal compliance, making the case 
for developing a deep understanding of values, stan- 
dards of ethical behavior, principles that guide choice, 
and norms, expectations, ethical claims, and contexts. 
While noting Isaiah Berlin's warning that normative 
inquiry is a nonperfectionist's art, he offers a practi- 
cal, three-dimensional approach to ethical reasoning, 
including (1) understanding decisonmakers as ethical 
actors; (2) systems that define the range of choices that 
address an ethical analysis of the existing rules of the 
game, as well as practicable norms and expectations; 
and (3) a conviction that ethical reasoning can improve 
the situation, and that analysts and decisonmakers can 
do better in addressing the inevitable dilemma of all 
real world situations where values come into conflict. 
Rosenthal claims a realist international relations 
worldview in terms of ethics that are grounded in a 
sense of how things really work, or practical ideas and 
actions that are built on a foundation of supporting 
values. In short, ethical leadership includes a perspec- 
tive of enlightened self-interest. To assist in ethical 
thinking, Rosenthal constructs an ethical framework 
that includes three overarching principles: pluralism, 
rights, and fairness. Building on the legacy of moral 
realist Reinhold Niebuhr, Rosenthal points out that his 
approach is not Utopian, but rather views individual 
interests in "terms of complex, interdependence, in- 
ternational norms and global responsibilities." 12 Cre- 
ating an ethics factor for inclusion in the wide variety 
of decision matrices and other analytical tools remains 
wise, if time-consuming, projects for analysts, plan- 
ners, and decisonmakers. When was the last a time an 
options paper, think piece, or course-of-action analysis 
included a discussion of the pros and cons of various 



14 



options in terms of whether one option is more ethi- 
cal than another as a selection criterion? Rosenthal's 
ethical realism provides an important approach to 
consider both for educating emerging leaders in ethi- 
cal thinking, and for using ethics to raise important 
questions about the selection criteria in policy and de- 
cisionmaking. 

Todd Pittinsky's chapter addresses what we know, 
or donotreally know, about whatitmeans to" win hearts 
and minds." Pittinsky asks fundamental questions 
about the nature of what is commonly termed a "soft 
power" approach to addressing current and diverse is- 
sues such counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, dem- 
ocratization, and global warming. In brief, he asks 
whether we know what an approach for winning 
hearts and minds can do, who can do it, and what 
can be done? He also portrays understanding hearts 
and minds as a fundamental leadership task. The es- 
sence of leadership in winning hearts and minds, in 
this view, is to guide people who may not normally or 
necessarily want to follow. This would include, for ex- 
ample, leading defeated opponents such as Germany 
and Japan after World War II. 

Reflecting generally on the past 50 years of social 
science research on group behavior, Pittinsky points 
out that related studies have focused on overcom- 
ing biases and discriminatory practices, especially in 
the U.S. social context. In other words, research has 
focused on getting groups to hate each other less but 
not on suggesting ways to persuade them to like each 
other more. He introduces the term "allophilia," or 
the study of how to generate positive feelings about 
groups that are different from one's own. Pittinsky 
points out the need for many more cross-national 
studies to examine the potential for building effective 



15 



practices for winning hearts and minds across cul- 
tures and in a variety of contexts, including conflict 
and post-conflict environments. 

In examining the next phase of homeland security 
intelligence, Geoffrey French commends the impor- 
tance of better definitions, roles, and protections, es- 
pecially in overcoming the pre-9/11 breakdowns be- 
tween foreign and domestic intelligence. In the case of 
homeland security legislation, Congress has been very 
active in initiating legislation that the homeland se- 
curity and intelligence communities are still interpret- 
ing and implementing. The legislative package that 
French cites includes the USA Patriot Act of 2001, the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Intelligence Re- 
form and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, and the Im- 
plementation Recommendations of the 9/11 Commis- 
sion Act (the 9/11 Act) of 2007. In addition, Congress 
has mandated new agencies such as the Department of 
Homeland Security and the National Counterterror- 
ism Center. Perceiving even more complexity, French 
notes the difficulties involved in applying homeland 
security reforms in light of the wide array of stake- 
holders involved, including foreign, military, and 
homeland intelligence agencies; the federal-state-local 
government agencies; tribal governments; the owners 
and operators of the nation's mostly privately-held 
critical infrastructure; and the public. 

French offers several suggestions to address 
homeland security reform, including the need for a 
framework for information sharing that includes stra- 
tegic, risk-based decisionmaking analytical tools and 
a homeland security-based research and reporting 
structure similar to the military's intelligence prepara- 
tion of the battlefield in order to analyze a wide variety 
of threats to the U.S. homeland. These threats include 



16 



cases of terrorist and criminal intelligence networks 
that seek to infiltrate U.S. agencies operating overseas, 
as well as within the United States. Therefore, he urg- 
es the development of the field of U.S. homeland secu- 
rity counterintelligence to thwart the efforts of foreign 
intelligence agents, terrorists, and criminal gangs. 

In French's assessment of ongoing homeland se- 
curity initiatives, he notes two reform phases in the 
post-9/11 period. Phase I included the immediate leg- 
islative and organizational reforms that filled the gap 
between domestic and foreign intelligence. He grades 
Phase I as being largely completed, while allowing that 
a degree of organizational overlap remains in clarify- 
ing the roles and responsibilities of the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investiga- 
tion, and the National Counterterrorism Threat Cen- 
ter. No doubt those relations will continue to evolve 
over time. French believes that we are now in Phase 
II with the need to clarify the mechanisms for collec- 
tive processing and sharing of intelligence; to improve 
communications for risk-based decisionmaking across 
government agencies at all levels; and to generate new 
organizations and programs for counterintelligence 
support and protection. The immediate leadership 
challenge is to complete timely changes for reforms 
without the heedless urgency and sometimes erratic 
approaches caused by the panicky fear of a future 
homeland security disaster. Reform without the sky- 
falling platform of another 9/11 requires leadership 
that embraces homeland security professionals, Con- 
gress, and government agencies, as well as public or- 
ganizations and citizens. Effective homeland security 
reform that is not driven for its own sake and not by 
the specter of a second 9/11 "failure" remains a chal- 
lenge, especially as memories of 9/11 fade after what 



17 



will soon be 10 years without an attack on U.S. terri- 
tory. 

Turning to American foreign policy, James Gold- 
geier addresses the need for reform in a globalizing 
war. Building on his previous research on the transi- 
tion between the Cold War and the early post-Cold 
War decade of the 1990s, he points out the end of the 
distinctions between the high politics issues of super- 
power relations, nuclear deterrence, containment, and 
crisis management on one hand, and the low politics 
of third world development, international economics, 
and environmental issues on the other. 

Goldgeier highlights the struggle to define the 
direction for the post-Cold War guiding strategy by 
contrasting two competing visions at the end of the 
George H. W. Bush administration. He compares di- 
vergent world views in the January 1993 draft Defense 
Planning Guidance document that outlined the need 
for U.S. primacy in Europe and Asia, with a State De- 
partment transition memorandum that highlighted 
the new security challenges of transnational threats. 
So the stark choice between a traditional great power 
approach to international politics and that of a fresh 
perspective on the nature of globalization, especially 
in international economics and humanitarian inter- 
ventions, faced the incoming Clinton administration. 
The latter approach fit the Clinton worldview, and 
Goldgeier argues that from that point forward, prob- 
ably more so than at any time since the post-World 
War II Marshall Plan, the United States embarked on a 
foreign policy that was mainly about economic policy. 
That decision in turn led to the formation of the Na- 
tional Economic Council, with a new more important 
international role for Treasury Secretaries with Wall 
Street and economic backgrounds as exemplified by 



18 



Robert Rubin and Larry Summers. In the international 
context, Goldgeier also points to the ascendancy of 
international economic organizations, such as the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund, over bilateral ties. In sum, 
during the Clinton era, international economic insti- 
tutions came to trump national security and foreign 
policy agencies, while international and domestic eco- 
nomic issues came to trump national security policy. 

In the post-9/11 era of the George W. Bush ad- 
ministration, Goldgeier sees a redirection back to the 
predominance of national security issues and the de- 
cline in the status of such Treasury Secretaries as Paul 
O'Neill and John Snow along with the relative decline 
in clout and influence of the National Economic Coun- 
cil. This shift in foreign policymaking continued until 
the financial meltdown of 2008. Goldgeier sees the 
pendulum for the Obama administration as swinging 
back towards the Clinton worldview. Evidence of this 
can be seen in a memorandum by Obama national se- 
curity adviser, Retired Marine Corps General James 
Jones, echoing Locher's concerns that the national 
security organizations' ability to respond to global 
challenges is "inadequate or deficient." Jones empha- 
sizes the nature of emerging transnational threats, the 
significance of international economics, as well as the 
need for expanding the whole of government's poli- 
cymaking capacity. Goldgeier highlights the current 
NSC needs for all cabinet and related agencies to have 
someone in the front office with an NSC portfolio to 
work more directly at the NSC staff level; a cyber czar; 
a new China policy that integrates strategic and eco- 
nomic issues; and a deputy national security adviser 
for international economic affairs. 

Goldgeier's early assessment is that the Obama 
administration has shifted back to the Clintonian ap- 



19 



proach to international leadership and will reform 
the NSC by reorienting policy priorities and recon- 
necting international political and economic affairs. 
This in turn will require agency chiefs such as Secre- 
taries of State George Schultz and James Baker with 
economics and business experience. At the same time, 
for balanced policymaking, Goldgeier sees the need 
for national security experts to work at Treasury and 
the National Economic Council and other traditional 
domestic policy venues. 

On a final note, Goldgeier points out a need for 
students and policymakers grounded in the interdisci- 
plinary knowledge of political science and economics 
to supply the current and next generation of strategic 
leaders. He wonders who will write today's equiva- 
lent of Bernard Brodie's post- World War II classic, 
Strategy in the Missile Age. 13 Given the rise of Asia, ter- 
rorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), climate 
change, and energy as issues of political economy, is 
educational reform also needed in schools of public 
and international affairs? Do our policy schools know 
how to create the interdisciplinary studies, such as 
international political economy, that are necessary to 
best prepare emerging leaders to think clearly about 
strategy in a global age? 

Richard Immerman provides the most optimistic 
narrative of change in his treatment of knowledge 
management. His case study of the transformation 
of intelligence analysis provides a first-hand account 
of his service from 2007 through 2008 as Assistant 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic 
Integrity and Standards, and as Analytic Ombudsman 
for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 
As in homeland security reforms post-9/11, Congress 
initiated reform efforts through the 2004 Intelligence 



20 



Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The chapter 
follows Immerman' s panel remarks, tracing the ef- 
forts at analytic transformation within the intelligence 
community through education, training, and develop- 
ment of a community of analysts. 

Immerman characterizes these reform efforts as 
"commonsensical," commending the committed lead- 
ership and creative approaches. The role of the first 
Deputy Director for National Intelligence is high- 
lighted, as is the significance of harnessing informa- 
tion technology and social networking to improve the 
quality of intelligence analysis. Immerman points out 
that though those initial efforts had to overcome pow- 
erful institutional and cultural challenges, the initial 
results are promising. Adapting similar approaches 
in other functional areas to bring together commu- 
nities of experts in real time through education and 
networking appears to be a commonsensical, but it is 
an uncommon approach across agencies. Overcoming 
the obstacles that hinder greater interagency coordi- 
nation remains a challenge as is pointed out in numer- 
ous case studies of national security policymaking 
throughout U.S. history. 

Andrew Preston provides a history of the role of 
the national security adviser. He agrees with many 
who point out that the national security adviser serves 
as the pivot point in all policymaking and in the policy 
apparatus itself. His main point is that there is an in- 
herent tension between the main roles of the national 
security adviser, who on one hand should serve as an 
honest broker in channeling ideas and recommenda- 
tions to the President and the NSC, while on the other 
serving at times as a policy advocate. 14 Preston in 
Chapter 6 of the present anthology characterizes this 
as a "delicate balancing act." 



21 



To provide historical context, Preston highlights 
the McGeorge Bundy approach under the Kennedy 
administration as a model, much like that of Brent 
Scowcroft in the post-Iran Contra era. In sum, the na- 
tional security adviser must be a thinker and a doer, 
an intellectual and a bureaucrat. Balancing those roles 
and assisting the President in fulfilling his national 
security roles, however, requires more than a wise na- 
tional security adviser, he must also be an active one. 

Preston devotes significant attention to the nation- 
al security top team, attributing the success of Brent 
Scowcroft to the efforts of an engaged foreign policy 
President, George H. W. Bush, as well as an effective 
deputy, such as Robert Gates. 15 His assessment is that 
Scowcroft unquestionably ranks as the most effective 
national security adviser in U.S. history. Preston's 
early take on the Obama administration is that if cur- 
rent National Security Adviser James Jones ignores 
the "delicate balance," emphasizing policy manage- 
ment to the exclusion of policy advocacy, he runs the 
danger of becoming marginalized in national security 
affairs. 

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 

Taken as a whole, the conference panels and the 
following chapters argue on behalf of the need for 
government reform. Simultaneously, they argue that 
collective leadership and individual and group leader 
development require further emphasis — especially in 
such areas as political economy, information sharing, 
and ethics — for any reform to have true meaning. The 
United States wields the world's largest national secu- 
rity structure. It is spending more on defense than the 
rest of the world combined in this first decade of the 



22 



21st century, plus a prodigious amount (though not 
wholly publicly divulged) on intelligence and home- 
land security. While the weight and size of these pro- 
grams naturally compel critiques, no thoughtful ob- 
server disputes the need for a sizable national security 
apparatus. Yet, by and large, as reformers inside and 
outside of government point out, America's post 9/11 
security agencies and institutions retain their Cold 
War design. Even with the Cold War having ended 
more than 20 years ago, the 1947 National Security Act 
remains the defining charter of the nation's security 
system. 16 

To address the topic of leadership and government 
reform, the panelists and the chapters focus on these 
main research questions: 

1. Are graduate programs in schools of public and 
international affairs paying sufficient attention 
to the study of leadership and the development of 
leaders for public service careers? In particular, 
how are policy schools at the University of 
Virginia, Harvard University, and Texas 
A&M University finding new ways to educate 
future leaders, promote interdisciplinary 
leadership research, and provide a foundation 
of knowledge and skills for the next generation 
of government reformers? 

2. Given recent advances in leadership studies, 
what more remains to be done to improve the 
ethical education of current and future leaders? 

3. To what extent should further attention be paid 
to the interpersonal and group dynamics of 
leaders at the nation's highest levels, including 
the President and his/her upper echelon 
national security team, whose conscientious 



23 



direction remains vital to any meaningful 
reform and functioning of the nation's security 
apparatus? How can we draw on history to 
enlighten such studies of the present and future? 
While large scale, whole of government reform 
is regarded as desirable by many scholars and 
contemporary students of national security 
policy, is it more reasonable to assume that 
absent a new confrontation on the order of the 
Cold War or a crisis rivaling the terrorist attacks 
of 9/11, incremental change and continuous 
improvement offer more probable approaches 
to reform? 

4. Have the reforms enacted since the 2001 attacks 
made significant improvements in transforming 
the nation' s security apparatus from its Cold War 
framework? While the authors in this anthology 
and most experts generally agree that more 
must be done to improve homeland security, 
intelligence sharing, and counterintelligence 
coordination, the key concern is if this is 
possible without simultaneously infringing 
on civil liberties protections for citizens? Do 
advances in information technology especially 
offer opportunities for further integration of 
the nation's far-flung intelligence community? 
Should similar effort be made to increase the 
alignment and coordination among homeland 
security operatives at the local, state, and 
federal level, while paying due attention 
to the increasing role of cyber security; 
environmental concerns; and economics, trade, 
and development? 

5. Is it possible to approach reform efforts in ways 
that cannot be politicized? Does past experience 



24 



show that true transformation typically occurs 
not with the aid of foresight, but rather in 
rash response to a new, unforeseen threat? 
Do the post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods 
offer examples of bi-level national security 
system restructuring processes, with major 
reform efforts first, and with a second level of 
improvements then pursued at a slower but 
more sustainable pace? 

6. Is it true that partisanship in this realm 
can lead only to hasty results of the kind 
unlikely to prevent future attacks? Is it 
possible for reformers to operate in a spirit of 
nonpartisanship in security affairs so that true 
reform might withstand the knee-jerk desire to 
enact immediate reform in the aftermath of a 
future attack? 

7. Is real reform best done strategically, progres- 
sively, and through leadership that combines 
expertise and experience with a spirit of change 
in a manner that is best described as incremental 
change? Or is whole of government or whole 
system reform the necessary path to effective 
change? 

The following chapters add to the reform knowl- 
edge base by addressing these questions. The panelists 
and authors have reflected on the nature of external, 
internal, and transnational threats to U.S. security, and 
the need for changes in developing people, organiza- 
tions, and institutions to more effectively, efficiently, 
and ethically enhance the U.S. Government's capacity 
to address the need for change. In essence, the authors 
in this book share the belief of many in the interna- 
tional and public affairs community, such as Brent 



25 



Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski, that "the world is 
changing in fundamental ways, and . . . our traditional 
models for understanding America's role don't work 
very well." 17 A new era of reform is needed for this 
new age. The panelists, in their detailed remarks 18 and 
subsequent chapters, offer a host of concrete and theo- 
retical suggestions to reform the U.S. national security 
system to meet 21st century threats, while simultane- 
ously developing the kind of learned, broadly under- 
standing, and ethical leaders with the knowledge and 
character necessary to make such reforms work. 19 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1 

1. A summary of many of the ideas in this introduction were 
included in a Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) Colloquium Brief, 
by Joseph R. Cerami, Jeffrey A. Engel, and Lindsey K. Pavelka, 
available from the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. 
army.mil. 

2. The author thanks the SSI for conducting the Leadership 
and Government Reform conference and for publishing this vol- 
ume. Professor Douglas Lovelace and Dr. Robin Dorff have pro- 
vided invaluable advice, support, and friendship for many years. 
The SSI staff (Ms. Marianne Cowling, Ms. Rita Rummel, Colonel 
John Dabrowski, and Dr. James Pierce) has always been gracious 
and patient in providing editorial support in publishing confer- 
ence reports. 

3. Robert Penn Warren, All The King's Men (Restored Ed.), 
New York: Harcourt, Inc., 2001, p. 13. 

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the 
World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy, New 
York: Basic Books, 2008, p. viii. 

5. John P. Kotter, Leading Change, Boston, MA: Harvard Busi- 
ness School Press, 1996. 



26 



6. Ibid., pp. 2-3. 

7. Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," 
Jay M. Shafritz and Albert C. Hyde, eds., Classics of Public Admin- 
istration, Third Ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Com- 
pany, 1992. Reprinted with permission from Public Administra- 
tion Review. 

8. Ibid., p. 232. 

9. More information regarding the Project on National Secu- 
rity Reform is available from iuwzu.pnsr.org/index.asp. In addition, 
Locher presented a keynote address, "Leadership and the Na- 
tional Security Reform Agenda," at a March 20, 2008, symposium 
at a SSI-Bush School conference on "Leadership and National Se- 
curity Reform: The Next President's Agenda." Locher's overview 
on the PNSR project can be found in the Colloquium Report co- 
edited by Joseph R. Cerami, Robin Dorff, and Lisa M. Moorman, 
October 2008, available from www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army. 
mil. 

10. Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, 
Arlington, VA: November 2008, available from www.pnsr.org/ 
data/files/pnsr _forging_a_new_shield_report.pdf. 

11. For more details on the NSC structure and functions, see 
also Presidential Policy Directive-1; "Organization of the Nation- 
al Security Council System," Washington, DC: The White House, 
February 13, 2009. 

12. See Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History (with 
a new Introduction by Andrew J. Bacevich), Chicago, IL: Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 2008 (1952). The book jacket blurb by 
Senator Barack Obama says: "[Niebuhr] is one of my favorite 
philosophers. I take away [from his works] the compelling idea 
that there's serious evil in the world, and hardship and pain. And 
we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate 
those things. But we shouldn't use that as an excuse for cynicism 
and inaction." 

13. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (The RAND 



27 



Corporation), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959. 

14. Paul Nitze points to tension as the basis for practical 
thinking in international politics. He draws his inspiration from 
the Greek philosopher Heraclitus's assertion that "truth and 
beauty were to be found in the tension between opposites." Paul 
H. Nitze, Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and 
Theory of Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, p. 15. 

15. A similar account of the effectiveness of the Bush-Scow- 
croft-Gates national security team in comparison to other admin- 
istrations is in David J. Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside 
Story of the National Security Council and The Architects of American 
Power, New York: Public Affairs, 2005. 

16. Douglas T. Stuart. Creating the 'National Security State: A 
History of the Law That Transformed America, Princeton, NJ: Princ- 
eton University Press, 2008. 

17. Brzezinski and Scowcroft, p. viii. 

18. For Leadership and Government Reform conference pan- 
elists' videos on June 24, 2009, see bush.tamu.edu/DC2009/ '. 

19. For an interesting comparison of the ways that people 
and ideas matter in national security policy and decisionmak- 
ing, see the contrasting accounts of the war in Iraq provided by 
Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of 
Two Iraq Wars, New York: Simon & Shuster, 2009; and Douglas J. 
Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War 
on Terrorism, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008. 



28 



CHAPTER 2 

LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL SECURITY, 
AND WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT REFORMS: 
THE PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
REFORM (PNSR) PERSPECTIVE 

James R. Locher III 

Reformers have the idea that change can be 
achieved by brute sanity. 

— George Bernard Shaw 1 

The national security system of the United States is 
outdated and ineffective in responding to the threats 
that our country faces today. Terrorism, nuclear pro- 
liferation, natural disasters, failed states, piracy, pan- 
demics, and cyber security attacks present a hydra of 
unpredictable and disparate threats. The 21st century 
security environment differs significantly from that of 
the Cold War era which molded and refined current 
U.S. capabilities. This complex system needs urgent 
repair, restructuring, and modernization. 

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) 
arose to meet this challenge. It has carried out the most 
comprehensive study of the national security system 
in American history. This endeavor involved more 
than 300 experts from think tanks, universities, federal 
agencies, law firms, and the business community. In 
December 2008, PNSR published Forging a New Shield, 
which details the deficiencies of the current system 
and provides ambitious but necessary and viable rec- 
ommendations for rescuing it. 



29 



FLAWS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 

The current national security system was created 
in the aftermath of World War II, when President 
Harry Truman signed the National Security Act of 
1947. This structure, though never optimal, worked 
tolerably well in meeting the core challenges of the 
Cold War. Nonetheless, the current national security 
system was optimized to overcome post-World War 
II threats. In the 21st century, it has shown its age. 
The United States has repeatedly failed to integrate 
diplomatic, military, economic, and other elements of 
national power adequately, primarily because various 
national security organizations are poorly structured 
to collaborate. We need a new system that is guided 
by a unified set of goals, integrated in the effective 
pursuit of these goals, and led by leaders unhindered 
by wasteful interagency competition or bureaucracy. 

Bradley Patterson, a long-time participant in White 
House operations, describes the importance of inter- 
agency cooperation in national security policymaking 
and execution: for example, assume that the President 
is going to travel to Moscow to try to persuade the 
Russian President to collaborate on a missile defense 
arrangement. Military options and background must 
be elicited from Defense; diplomatic repercussions 
evaluated by State; assessments on Russian capabili- 
ties will come from the intelligence community; while 
the White House National Security Council (NSC) 
staff will assemble the material. 2 As this example il- 
lustrates, some national-level organizations have their 
own domains of expertise; others, like the NSC, inte- 
grate their efforts — or are supposed to. 

Unfortunately, the current system offers insuffi- 



30 



cient incentives for such interagency cooperation. Each 
agency typically uses its capabilities and resources to 
pursue its own goals and projects. The resultant sys- 
temic inability to create and support centrally estab- 
lished missions forces an overburdened President to 
oversee tasks which could be more efficiently man- 
aged elsewhere. 

PNSR's comprehensive analysis of past case stud- 
ies of national security decisions and policies indicates 
that: 

• The U.S. national security apparatus lacks an 
effective system for developing strategies that 
connect available resources, desired end states, 
and implementation procedures. 

• Complex contingencies are undertaken with- 
out requisite capabilities. 

• Rigid plans inhibit performance in the field, 
and decisions are too rarely timely, disciplined, 
or supported by adequate problem analyses. 

• Disunity of effort predominates at a cost of lost 
American lives, resources, and power. 3 

To take one example, inadequate interagency co- 
operation created critical vulnerabilities before the im- 
pending September 11, 2001 (9/11) debacle. In 2000, a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent investigat- 
ing the bombing of the USS Cole discovered a connec- 
tion to al-Qaeda by way of a terrorist organizer named 
Khallad and a meeting of operatives in Malaysia. Mul- 
tiple requests to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
for more information on Khallad by the agent were 
denied. Had this information been forthcoming, the 
agent would have learned that two meeting attendees 
were indeed al-Qaeda operatives living in the United 
States. Instead, our national security system prevent- 



31 



ed information critical to America's safety from reach- 
ing the people who needed it most. As a direct result, 
more than 2,000 people lost their lives on American 
soil. 4 

And these problems still persist! Recent congres- 
sional testimony on the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan— a key institution for 
winning this vital conflict — notes that: 

[T]he mission has not been clearly defined. There 
is a lack of unity of command resulting in a lack of 
unity of effect. Funding is not consolidated . . . and 
funding streams are extremely confusing. Selection, 
skill sets . . . and training of PRT personnel continue 
to be problematic. Metrics do not exist for determin- 
ing if PRTs are succeeding. 5 

There are five overarching explanations for the 
failures of the 1947 system as it operates today. First, 
gross systemic imbalance impedes policy integration 
because autonomous government entities are coupled 
with weak integration mechanisms. Second, the vari- 
ous national security elements are not managed as a 
cohesive system but are addressed as discrete compo- 
nents. Third, lower levels of government lack strong 
integration tools, forcing management responsibili- 
ties onto an overburdened White House. Fourth, the 
current security apparatus lacks an effective system 
for developing strategies that connect available re- 
sources, desired end states, and implementation pro- 
cedures. Fifth, as currently organized, Congress is not 
equipped to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
U.S. national security missions; rather, it narrowly 
oversees individual policies and the discrete compo- 
nents of the system. 



32 



Problem #1: Autonomous Agencies Resist a Whole 
of Government Approach to Missions. 

The negative effects of interagency fratricide 
are readily apparent. Bureaucratic decisionmaking 
mechanisms fail to produce timely unified strategic 
guidance. Individual agencies typically lack the abil- 
ity to compel action, while interdepartmental authori- 
ties are often ambiguous. Institution-specific values 
prevail since a sense of interagency culture remains 
limited. Information sharing is not the norm. Commu- 
nications predominately follow vertical channels. Dis- 
organized, nonexistent, or otherwise flawed strategies 
result from these conditions. 

Of course, agencies and departments wish to main- 
tain their autonomy, but a successful national effort 
requires interagency cooperation in achieving solu- 
tions. While each individual organization occupies its 
own silo, vertically organized and largely separated 
from other government entities, U.S. national secu- 
rity problems are horizontal; they span departmental 
borders, requiring whole of government responses. 
Henry Kissinger once described the kind of strategy 
that results from this separation by capabilities: "It is 
as if in commissioning a painting, a patron would ask 
one artist to draw the face, another the body, another 
the hands, and still another the feet, simply because 
each artist is particularly good in one category." 6 

Although intelligence threats are aimed at the 
United States as a whole, most agencies conduct coun- 
terintelligence (CI) operations as discrete functions of 
their own agendas. Domestic and overseas CI threats 
are treated as separate jurisdictions, despite the fact 
that from the point of view of a foreign attacker, these 



33 



targets are closely related. In fact, each federal depart- 
ment or agency that deals with sensitive material has 
its own in-house CI office, with little coordination 
between them. Even with the establishment of a Na- 
tional Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to create 
and enforce a common counterintelligence doctrine, 
separate jurisdictions for CI activities and reluctance 
to share personnel have weakened the ability of the 
NCIX to affect tactical operations. In turn, frustrations 
with an ineffectual NCIX simply lead the federal agen- 
cies to reinforce their own separate CI offices. 7 

Problem #2: Components of National Security Are 
Not Managed as a System. 

The U.S. national security system is arguably the 
largest organizational decisionmaking system in the 
world. 8 The national security agencies can bring a 
wealth of experience, vision, and tools to bear on se- 
curity challenges, but more often than not, the mecha- 
nisms to integrate the various dimensions of national 
security policy and to translate that policy into inte- 
grated programs and actions are extremely weak, if 
they exist at all. Components of the system are dis- 
persed throughout the federal government, state and 
local entities, in overseas missions, and within the pri- 
vate sector. Yet, no overarching strategy connects the 
various parts. The Departments of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and Justice compete over terrorism prevention 
and response; Departments of Energy and DHS com- 
pete over preparing cities against nuclear or radiologi- 
cal attack as well as over which agency should have 
primary responsibility to safeguard U.S. bioterrorism 
research facilities from rogue employees. This kind of 
competition is a symptom of weak or failed integra- 



34 



tion. Without unified strategic direction, the system 
lacks unity of purpose. 

The former National Security Council and Home- 
land Security Council staffs, now collectively known 
as the National Security Staff, are the President's main 
instruments of integration. Unfortunately, collectively 
they are too limited in size and authority to overcome 
these problems. Weak integrating mechanisms such 
as these are dominated by strong functional organiza- 
tions that control policy implementation. 

Although the National Security Advisor (NSA) is 
institutionally positioned to promote interagency col- 
laboration and efficient policy implementation, the 
incumbent often lacks the authority to achieve these 
ends since mechanisms for delegating presidential au- 
thority are also inadequate. Despite the importance of 
mid-level officials below the NSC level in addressing 
urgent national security decisions, such interagency 
authorities are similarly anemic. As a result, key ac- 
tors work around established interagency processes to 
execute policy. 

Direct and sustained presidential engagement 
can sometimes overcome these problems and achieve 
successful policy development, implementation, and 
outcomes. At the same time, the national security sys- 
tem's excessive reliance on presidential leadership 
reflects and exacerbates the weak nature of existing 
interagency mechanisms. In the absence of direct and 
constant presidential intervention, the development 
and implementation of integrated national security 
strategies become problematic as policy coherence 
suffers under the weight of bureaucratic infighting. 

This stalemate creates excessive veto opportuni- 
ties. It encourages a search for consensus decisions 
based on the least common denominator, typically 



35 



yielding policies that favor slow, incremental, and 
middle-of-the road courses of action. The Bay of Pigs 
fiasco is a telling example. The CIA's original "Trini- 
dad Plan" for the Cuban operation, developed under 
President Eisenhower, was reviewed and approved, 
albeit unenthusiastically, by a committee of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). President Kennedy's initial hesi- 
tance to support the proposal was further reinforced 
by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who thought that the 
spectacular operation could not successfully conceal 
U.S. involvement. Pursuant to Kennedy's guidelines, 
the CIA quickly reorganized the attack. The Agency 
selected the Bay of Pigs as the new landing site and 
formulated what became known as Operation ZA- 
PATA. Operation ZAPATA was considered by the 
CIA and JCS to be less optimal than the Trinidad Plan, 
though this judgment was unknown to the President 
at the time. Strategic changes continued even once 
the operation was underway in an effort to meet vari- 
ous agency concerns. Thus, what began as a poorly 
planned attack progressed to a poorly integrated ad 
hoc invasion. 

Frustrated with the impediments to developing in- 
tegrated strategies, policymakers often bypass estab- 
lished decisionmaking mechanisms and employ in- 
formal structures and processes. Excluding key actors 
from decisionmaking occurred during the Iran-Contra 
affair, the Iraq war, and other crises, contributing to 
suboptimal policy choices. The widespread use of in- 
formal structures comes at the expense of interagency 
accountability and integration. Without delineated 
policy processes, leadership is difficult. 



36 



Problem #3: An Overburdened White House Is 
Forced to Centralize Issue Management. 

The paucity of effective policy integration pro- 
cesses forces an overburdened White House to man- 
age many national security efforts. According to one 
calculation, more than 29 agencies or special groups 
report directly to the President. 9 Such an over-central- 
ized leadership structure does not allow for effective 
integration. The President does not have the time to 
become intimately involved in the management of 
multiple agencies. Yet, he or she is ultimately respon- 
sible for making decisions based on their findings. 

The nature of the presidential office and reliance 
on political appointees discourages a whole of govern- 
ment approach. In this system, even the President's 
personally appointed cabinet members more effec- 
tively represent their specific departmental interests 
than the President's agenda. The commander in chief 
often favors the counsel of close advisors over that of 
cabinet officials. This mistrust causes many decisions 
to be made in the Oval Office without a more inclusive 
perspective. 

In an effort to delegate authority, past Presidents 
have turned to one of two ineffective methods of inte- 
grated policy administration: appointing a lead agen- 
cy or a lead individual. The lead agency approach 
generally results in other agencies providing insuf- 
ficient support for common efforts. Typically, lead 
agency really means sole agency as no one will follow 
the lead if its directions substantially affect their orga- 
nizational equities. Former NSA Zbigniew Brzezinski 
observed that: 



37 



Integration is needed, but this cannot be achieved 
from a departmental vantage point. No self-respect- 
ing Secretary of Defense will willingly agree to have 
his contribution, along with those of other agen- 
cies, integrated for presidential decision by another 
departmental secretary — notably, the Secretary of 
State. And no self-respecting Secretary of State will 
accept integration by a Defense Secretary. It has to 
be done by someone close to the president, and per- 
ceived as such by all the principals. 10 

Likewise, a lead individual ends up depending on 
his or her relationship with the President and influ- 
ence with the White House. A senior participant said 
that one reason for this is, "It's very hard to have any 
player be both a player and the referee. The assistant 
secretary of state comes to the meeting to chair it and 
to represent the State Department. This puts him in an 
extremely difficult position, particularly when other 
agencies have equal or greater equities." 11 A lead indi- 
vidual is sometimes called a czar. A Washington say- 
ing about czars observes, "The barons ignore them, 
and eventually the peasants kill them." 12 

Neither of these faulty solutions has de facto or de 
jure authority to command agencies or departments. 
The result tends to be a breakdown in communication 
and a lack of concerted effort. 

Problem #4: Resources Are Not Aligned with 
Strategic Objectives. 

The allocation of resources is a good litmus test 
for effective leadership management. Budgeting for 
national security activities is integrated with strategy, 
assessment, planning, policy guidance, and evalua- 
tion only when leaders demand that this connection 



38 



prevails. All too often, strategies and policies are de- 
veloped without consideration of available resources. 
Leaders frequently pursue strategies without resourc- 
es adequate to implement them effectively. This prac- 
tice wastes time and money by misleading leaders 
about the capabilities at their disposal. 

A related problem is that budget processes and 
human resource systems are agency focused. The na- 
tional security system provides resources for national 
security functions, not national missions. As a result, 
resource allocation processes do not provide the full 
range of required capabilities. They also do not per- 
mit the system to surge in response to emergencies, 
or allow sufficient resource flexibility in response to 
changing priorities. Resources cannot simply migrate 
between departments when needed. 

In most cases, budgets are developed and ap- 
propriated along departmental lines. Resources are 
then received and disbursed through departmental 
capabilities. In many cases, interagency centers and 
activities are under-resourced due to these depart- 
ment-focused allocation systems, which tend to favor 
core agency needs and priorities. Even when there is 
a central organization or individual in charge of coor- 
dinating interagency efforts, that leader often has little 
control over resources. Instead, his role in securing 
financial support for a mission is reduced to encour- 
aging individual agencies to pick up the costs. Small 
bureaucratic bodies (such as the National Counterin- 
telligence Executive in its early years) face challenges 
recruiting the best and the brightest people despite 
the importance of their missions since career paths 
within such groups — especially opportunities for ad- 
vancement—are naturally limited. In addition, civil- 
ian agencies that are not traditionally associated with 



39 



overseas activities tend to have difficulty contributing 
personnel to such missions. 

Furthermore, the individual departments are rare- 
ly, if ever, offered incentives for funding interagency 
activities, resulting in limited integrated efforts. An 
agency will frequently respond to another agency's 
request for a concerted effort by asking who will fi- 
nance the joint work. An article in the Foreign Service 
Journal notes that "establishing the teams in Iraq has 
been challenging, in part because of high-level wran- 
gling between State and the Defense Department over 
who would provide security, support, and funding. 
No memorandum of understanding was in place to 
delineate each agency's responsibilities." 13 In this 
manner, focus is shifted from planning and execution 
and towards questions of financial responsibility. This 
approach is counterproductive to the process of estab- 
lishing an integrated national security system. 

When President Clinton wanted to send police to 
restore order in Haiti in 1994, several members of the 
NSC met to coordinate a response to the situation. 
The Department of Justice member said his depart- 
ment lacked money. Other members pointed out that 
their departments lacked trained police. Ultimately, 
the Army was the only capable, well-funded agency 
willing to provide personnel and resources. The Army 
sent a full division and a contingent of Special Forces, 
even though they were ill-suited for police work. The 
United Nations (UN), which eventually took control 
of the mission, requested that the Special Forces re- 
main in Haiti, but the Army withdrew them as quickly 
as possible. 



40 



Problem #5: Congress Cannot Provide a Whole of 
Government Approach Due to a Focus on the Parts. 

As presently organized, Congress oversees each 
agency and program individually, with committees 
directly corresponding to the structure of the execu- 
tive branch agencies. No committee has oversight 
jurisdiction over the whole national security system, 
its core missions, or interagency operations. Instead, 
the committees for defense, foreign policy, and other 
executive branch agencies strictly divide the subject 
matter pie, leaving a large gap in oversight of inter- 
agency operations. In the case of China policy during 
the Clinton administration, Chinese trade, diplomatic, 
defense, and human rights issues were each debated 
in separate committees, with no congressional com- 
mittee devoted to overseeing whether each of these 
policies fit into a cohesive strategy. 

The ways in which the legislative branch allocates 
funds and conducts oversight reinforce existing sys- 
temic deficiencies, making improvements in perfor- 
mance more difficult. The foreign policy agencies fail 
to receive current congressional guidance, revised 
authorities, and timely funding. Restrictions on allo- 
cating or shifting funds frequently create problems. In 
1993, a 4-month delay in obtaining congressional ap- 
proval for a police training program in Somalia led to 
program failure since U.S. trainers were already slated 
to be withdrawn. On a larger scale, earmarking limita- 
tions in 1996 constrained U.S. Agency for Internation- 
al Development's (USAID) ability to respond proac- 
tively to the signing of a peace agreement between the 
government of the Philippines and the Moro National 
Liberation Front. 



41 



THE WAY AHEAD 

How to successfully restructure the U.S. national 
security system to address these weaknesses? First, 
it is imperative to integrate more effectively the ele- 
ments of American power through a whole of govern- 
ment approach. Second, the United States will need to 
create and empower superior leadership throughout 
the national security structure. These steps are in- 
separable. Superior leaders are needed to achieve the 
improved system integration as well as to accomplish 
other necessary reforms. 

The project report Forging a New Shield describes 
how a successful national security system depends 
on the integration of all U.S. Government entities. 
Achieving such unity requires strong leadership at all 
levels of government, not just at the presidential level. 
A stable and effective national security system relies 
on interagency cooperation in planning, strategy, and 
implementation. Achieving enduring success requires 
a comprehensive strategy that draws together all the 
resources of the U.S. Government and that has enough 
public support to endure from election to election and 
from administration to administration. 

Achieving Integration Through a Whole of 
Government Approach. 

President Barack Obama began this process of 
integration on May 26, 2009, when he merged the 
Homeland Security Council and National Security 
Council staffs into a single National Security Staff. 
In line with a PNSR recommendation, the President 
stated: "Homeland Security is indistinguishable from 
National Security — conceptually, and functionally, 



42 



they should be thought of together, rather than sepa- 
rately." 14 

PNSR advises that NSC members should not be 
prescribed statutorily. Rather, the President should 
have the flexibility to fashion the appropriate team for 
the situation at hand. While a core set of personnel 
should remain to ensure continuity, participation in 
each meeting should be discretionary, allowing mem- 
bers to choose the meetings that demand their particu- 
lar expertise. In this way, the President can hold joint 
meetings among experts in different fields to discuss — 
for example, international security, economic security, 
and homeland security issues— while still ensuring 
that council members uninvolved in a particular issue 
do not attend unnecessarily. During the confirmation 
process for NSC principals, senators should ensure 
that nominees are dedicated to working as a part of 
a highly collaborative system and fully committed to 
supporting missions at the national level. This team 
will establish the vision which the rest of the national 
security system should seek to implement. 

The missions formulated by the President and NSC 
must be executed in a similar spirit of collaboration. 
The goal should be to unify the efforts of each com- 
ponent of the national security system and decentral- 
ize the management of issues. The process must begin 
by shifting away from departmental-specific groups 
towards interagency panels or teams. Teams should 
be created to focus on presidential priority concerns. 
Some of the best examples of successful interagency 
teams are the two Joint Interagency Task Forces in- 
volved in counternarcotics. According to Scott Feil, 
these interagency task forces "bring together domes- 
tic and foreign policy agencies and departments with 
various authorities, thus providing effective counter- 



43 



drug operations based on core competencies, authori- 
ties, and resources of the respective agencies." 15 

Empowering Leaders. 

National security success depends on establish- 
ing a good structure and process, but having superior 
human capital is even more important. Yet, few if 
any incentives currently exist for men and women to 
serve on interagency teams. Potential new incentives 
to ensure collaboration could include expanded joint 
or combined agency training, more opportunities for 
professional education in the entire range of U.S. na- 
tional security activities, and rotations and exchanges 
between agencies. 

Web-based collaboration sites, meetings, and town 
hall events could help facilitate these incentives and 
interagency activities. These activities could be co- 
ordinated by the executive secretary of the NSC, ad- 
vised by a Human Capital Advisory Board. A cadre 
of National Security Executives (NSEs) appointed by 
the President would have formal authority over inter- 
agency teams. The NSEs should be highly respected 
individuals who are experts in their specialty areas 
and known for their leadership abilities. A National 
Security Professional Corps should be created to re- 
cruit and retain qualified personnel. 

Promotion incentives must also be established to 
encourage employees within the system to adopt a 
whole of government mindset. Individuals who have 
served in interagency roles or rotated through multi- 
ple agencies or departments should be granted signifi- 
cant credit during promotion evaluations. In addition, 
an interagency assignment should be a prerequisite 
for anyone wishing to be promoted to a senior rank. 



44 



The existing National Security Education Consortium 
(established by Executive Order 13434) should serve 
as the foundation for developing a comprehensive 
professional education and training program. This 
program will focus on nurturing skills and a positive 
culture throughout the system. 

Although many practitioners agree with the 
problem analysis and recommendations put forth by 
PNSR, they question whether such comprehensive 
reforms are possible. The 9/11 Commission report 
noted, "Americans should not settle for incremental, 
ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations 
ago for a world that no longer exists." 16 We at PNSR 
definitely agree! 

The legislative and executive branches must re- 
spond to the new challenges that the 21st century 
presents to the national security system. In a world 
of increased globalization, unpredictable terrorist at- 
tacks, pandemics, and weapons of mass destruction, 
the United States cannot continue to rely on the sys- 
tem designed by lawmakers in 1947. Maintaining the 
old system in the face of a new environment is anach- 
ronistic and irresponsible. Reforming the system by 
removing impediments to better performance and 
eliminating recurring problems with due attention 
to their causes is long overdue. Achieving strong na- 
tional security leadership through a holistic approach 
is crucial for addressing the weaknesses of the current 
system. PNSR is eager to support the Obama adminis- 
tration, Congress, the Strategic Studies Institute of the 
U.S. Army War College, and others seeking to ensure 
Americans' security in the 21st century. 



45 



ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2 

1. George B. Shaw, Famous Quotes and Authors, available 
from www.famousquotesandauthors.com/authors/george_bernard_ 
shaw_quotes.html. 

2. Bradley H. Patterson, To Serve the President: Continuity and 
Innovation in the White House Staff, Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2008, p. 38. 

3. For the specific cases documenting these conclusions, see 
Richard Weitz, ed., Project on National Security Reform: Case Stud- 
ies, Vol. 1, Washington, DC: Project on National Security Reform, 
2008, available from zuww.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20case%20stud- 
ies%>20vol.%,201.pdf 

4. James R. Locher III, "The Most Important Thing: Legisla- 
tive Reform of the National Security System," Military Review, 
May-June, 2008, available from www.pnsr.org/data/images/mili- 
tary_review_article.pdf. 

5. Forging a New Shield, Washington, DC: Project on National 
Security Reform, 2008, p. 151, available from www.pnsr.org/data/ 
files/pnsr%>20forging%>20a %>20nezv % 20 shield.pdf. 

6. Ibid., p. 155. 

7. Michelle Van Cleave, "The NCIX and the National Coun- 
terintelligence Mission: What Has Worked, What Has Not, and 
Why," Richard Weitz, ed., Project on National Security Reform: 
Case Studies, Vol. 1, Washington, DC: Project on National Secu- 
rity Reform, 2008, pp. 59-130. 

8. Forging a New Shield, p. 221. 

9. Ibid., p. vii. 

10. Ibid., p. 139 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. 



46 



13. Ibid., p. 247. 

14. "Organizing for Homeland Security and Counterter-ror- 
ism," Presidential Study Directive-1, The White House, February 
23, 2009, available from zvww.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-l.pdf. 

15. Scott R. Feil, "The Failure of Incrementalism: Interagency 
Coordination Challenges and Responses," Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jay W. Boggs, eds., The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007, pp. 
308-310. 

16. The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, July 22, 2004, p. 399. 



47 



CHAPTER 3 

LEADERSHIP AS PRACTICAL ETHICS 

Joel H. Rosenthal 

What does one need to know to be a leader in the 
field of public policy? I want to argue for the centrality 
of ethics as a basic component of leadership training 
for anyone pursuing a career in public and interna- 
tional affairs. 

If you are a student, please take a moment to ask 
yourself what you have learned about ethics in your 
time in the classroom. If you are a teacher or admin- 
istrator, consider what your curriculum covers in 
this regard. We know that medical students engage 
medical ethics, law students study legal ethics, busi- 
ness students take on business ethics, military officers 
study military ethics, and so on. So let's ask ourselves, 
what should students and aspiring leaders in public 
affairs know about ethics to be considered profession- 
als competent to practice? 

By ethics, I do not mean simply compliance with 
law. Compliance is, of course, an essential part of eth- 
ics. But it is only a beginning. Compliance is a floor, a 
minimum upon which to build. Many actions in gov- 
ernment, business, or private life comply with the law 
but are not optimal from an ethical perspective. Exam- 
ples are all around us. British members of parliament 
may not have broken laws when they used expense 
accounts to bill taxpayers for lifestyle enhancements 
such as moat cleaning, the upkeep of expensive second 
homes, or the rental of adult movies. But surely this 
kind of behavior was wrong. In more serious policy 
matters, it may well be that most of our major banks 



49 



and financial institutions were in full compliance with 
the law when it came to the management of credit 
default swaps and derivative trading. Yet something 
went very wrong in the area of risk and responsibil- 
ity. There are many things we can do and still be in 
compliance with law — but some of them are wrong. 
Ethical reasoning helps us make these distinctions. 

The discipline of ethics begins with Socrates' ques- 
tion: How should one live? Ethics is about choice. 
What values guide us? What standards do we use? 
What principles are at stake, and how do we choose 
between them? An ethical approach to a problem will 
inquire about ends (goals) and means (the instruments 
we use to achieve these goals), and the relationship 
between the two. 

Ethical reasoning is the process of raising aware- 
ness of moral claims and applying principles to aris- 
ing circumstances. Ethical reasoning implies an inter- 
rogation of the moral claims that surround us rather 
than a mere listing of dos and don'ts. In a word, ethi- 
cal inquiry is proactive rather than passive. 

The philosopher Simon Blackburn writes that eth- 
ics takes as its starting point that "human beings are 
ethical animals . . . we grade and evaluate, and com- 
pare and admire, and claim and justify. . . . Events 
endlessly adjust our sense of responsibility, our guilt 
and our shame, and our sense of our own worth and 
that of others." 1 

According to Blackburn, ethical inquiry is norma- 
tive in the sense that it suggests "norms." Norms are 
what we consider "expected and required" behavior. 
We all experience functional norms. For example, in 
the United States, drivers stay on the right-hand side 
of the road; in the United Kingdom (UK), drivers keep 
to the left. But we also experience moral norms. A mor- 



50 



al norm would consist of an expectation such as non- 
discrimination in the workplace or the requirement to 
respect the needs of the most vulnerable members of 
society (e.g. children, elderly, and the infirm). Moral 
norms are aspirational and prescriptive rather than 
functional and descriptive — they paint the "ought" 
rather than the "is." It is this type of norm that I want 
to focus on in this chapter. 

A cautionary note is necessary here. Norms, expec- 
tations, and ethical claims depend deeply on context. 
No single normative theory or formula will suffice 
across different types of examples. One of the great 
ethicists of recent memory, Isaiah Berlin, famously 
gave up his Oxford chair in normative theory, so the 
story goes, because he felt he had no single norma- 
tive theory to purvey. Berlin did not pretend to offer 
a grand theory that would meet the test of the many 
different types of cases he was concerned with. 2 

Berlin's work reminds us that normative inquiry is 
a nonperfectionist art. The first lesson of ethics is that 
values overlap and conflict. The single-minded pur- 
suit of any particular virtue can subvert a competing 
virtue. So as we often see, freedom can conflict with 
order, justice with mercy, and truth with loyalty. In 
international affairs, peace may be our goal, but we 
cannot ignore the need to confront aggression. Some 
may chant "no more war." These same people may 
also chant "never again genocide." Sometimes, tragi- 
cally and unavoidably, force is needed to prevent 
harm. Here, and in countless similar examples, we see 
norms clashing. Berlin lets us know that these clashes 
happen more often than not. 



51 



ETHICS IN THREE DIMENSIONS 

Despite our lack of a single theory or formula, Ber- 
lin and others do offer a framework for ethical reason- 
ing. Inspired by Berlin and other pragmatists, I think 
of this framework as ethics in three dimensions. The 
first dimension focuses on the decisionmaker — the 
actor or the agent who makes a choice. We can and 
should evaluate the acts of individuals, be they presi- 
dents, ministers, official representatives, chief execu- 
tive officers (CEOs), community leaders, advocates, 
employees, consumers, or citizens. Each has a role as 
an ethically autonomous actor. 

At first glance, the idea of the autonomous ac- 
tor seems simple and straightforward. However, we 
should bear in mind that identity is fluid, not static. 
Most individuals have multiple identities. For ex- 
ample, a single individual could say: I am British. I 
am a Muslim. I am a woman. I am a professor. I am a 
feminist. Clearly, many sets of values make up a com- 
posite yet single-actor identity in such an example. 
Each element of one's identity plays an important role 
in determining which of one's many values and alle- 
giances may have priority. Claims of national loyalty, 
religious obligation, professional codes of conduct, 
and solidarity around an issue of social justice and 
concern might all come into play. This is the way life 
is actually lived, isn't it? 3 

In addition to single actors, a discussion of moral 
agents must also consider the identity, values, and 
acts of collective actors such as states, corporations, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and inter- 
national organizations. One of the most important 
trends of our time is the growing power of nonstate 
actors — especially multinational corporations. Wal- 



52 



Mart, Microsoft, and other companies of this size and 
scope rival the capacities of many states in terms of 
their economic, political, and social reach. It is there- 
fore both necessary and proper to ask and answer 
questions relating to the moral choices of corporate 
entities. All are moral agents. 

The second dimension of ethics has to do with the 
systems, social arrangements, and conditions that de- 
fine our range of choices. In short, we need to examine 
the "rules of the game" by which we live and make 
decisions. We all live within sets of norms and expec- 
tations—some more fair and just than others. Perhaps 
the best way to illustrate this dimension is to examine 
examples of when "rational" choices within a set of ar- 
rangements yield "bad" or less-than-desirable results. 
In other words, in some systems, when one does the 
"right thing" within the system, the net result is sub- 
optimal. 

Consider consumer behavior when shopping for 
clothes. It usually makes sense to buy the least expen- 
sive shirt available when quality between competing 
options is equal. But because of the supply chain of 
the global economy, that shirt may be produced in a 
sweatshop that runs on child labor. Buying the least 
expensive shirt of equal quality might be rational ac- 
cording to market design— yet the result might be 
ethically troubling. 

This problem exists on many levels of policy and 
institutional design. For example, consider the nucle- 
ar weapons doctrine of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD). The entire strategic framework is based on the 
idea of reciprocal threat. Within this system, to ensure 
stability, the most rational thing to do is to make an 
immoral threat (and be prepared to carry it out). 



53 



Clearly, there is something deeply troubling about 
MAD. It would seem to me to be a worthy goal to try 
to create frameworks and policies where the rational 
thing to do would be more benign than to make a 
threat of MAD. In brief, then, this second dimension 
calls attention to the fact that we live within institu- 
tions, systems, and social arrangements of human 
design. The rules, norms, and conditions of these ar- 
rangements should be subject to ethical evaluation. 

The third dimension of ethics is the assertion that 
we often have the opportunity to improve our situa- 
tion—to do better. One way to think of this is to con- 
sider a standard ethics scenario like this: My mother 
is sick. I cannot afford medicine. So I steal the medi- 
cine from a pharmacy whose managers will not even 
notice that it is gone. Is stealing the medicine in this 
circumstance the right thing or the wrong thing to 
do? We can discuss this case in terms of my decision 
as a moral agent— whether I am a thief and villain, a 
rescuer and a hero, or both. Ethical questions are fre- 
quently raised as dilemmas such as this one. In many 
situations, there is a genuine need to choose between 
two competing and compelling claims, and ethical 
reasoning can help to sort these out. But we can also 
expand the inquiry to ask a broader question beyond 
the narrow question of whether to steal or not to steal. 
We can also ask: What kind of community denies 
medicine to sick people who cannot afford it? Is there 
something unfair or unethical about this system? 

To further illustrate this third dimension, it is 
useful to note the distinction that Andrew Carnegie 
drew between charity and philanthropy. 4 Charity, ac- 
cording to Carnegie, is the duty to attend to immedi- 
ate and acute human suffering. Charity translates to 
feeding the hungry, tending to the sick and destitute, 



54 



providing relief to victims of natural and man-made 
disasters, and giving shelter to the homeless. Philan- 
thropy is something different — it is an endeavor that 
reaches above and beyond the imperatives of charity. 
Philanthropy explores new ways of living, new ideas, 
and new institutions to improve society. 

While this may sound abstract, Carnegie's philan- 
thropy was specific and practical. He addressed the 
societal-level problem of education by suggesting and 
then providing the infrastructure for two institutions 
we now take for granted: the public library and the 
teacher pension system. Carnegie believed that every 
person should have access to knowledge. Universal 
literacy and educational opportunity would be pos- 
sible by supporting a free public library system which 
he began to do all across the United States, and to a 
much lesser extent, the UK (his place of birth). In his 
lifetime, Carnegie provided funds to build more than 
2,500 public library buildings. 

Carnegie's library venture was an extraordinary 
feat totaling $41 million dollars, easily several billion 
in today's dollars. Yet, tellingly, he asked municipal 
leaders to be partners in the enterprise by provid- 
ing the books and the funds for upkeep. Carnegie 
would build the buildings, but communities would 
be responsible for whatever happened next. Carnegie 
thought that if these institutions had real value, com- 
munities would invest in them rather than merely ac- 
cept them passively as gifts. Similarly, when he decid- 
ed to provide the funds to build Carnegie Hall in New 
York City, he built the structure in all its grandeur, but 
he did not leave an endowment for maintenance. He 
believed that if the music hall had genuine value, its 
patrons — those who benefitted from it — would con- 
tribute to its upkeep. 

Carnegie also created the first teacher pension in- 



55 



stitution — no w known as TIAA-CREF — to help pro- 
fessionalize the vocation of teaching. If teachers were 
undervalued, as some surmised, then here was an in- 
stitution that would contribute to improvement of the 
educational system by supporting teachers. The idea 
was simple, but its ramifications were profound. With 
proper pay and retirement benefits enabled by the 
new pension system, teaching would become a fully 
modern profession. 

Similarly, when it came to politics, Carnegie be- 
lieved that new institutions could improve public 
policy. Specifically, as an advocate for the peaceful 
resolution of international conflicts and disputes, 
Carnegie supported the mediation and arbitration 
movement that grew out of Geneva in the mid-1 9th 
century. Again, the idea was elegant in its simplicity 
and grandeur. Just as we have legal mechanisms to 
arbitrate disputes in domestic society, so too can we 
have mechanisms in international society for the same 
purpose. The concept of international law and orga- 
nization was gaining momentum at the beginning of 
the 20th century — the movement merely needed new 
institutions to give it shape and force. In this spirit, 
Carnegie financed the building of the Peace Palace at 
The Hague in the Netherlands, supported the estab- 
lishment of the International Court of Justice, and lob- 
bied for the establishment of the League of Nations. 
Carnegie devoted much of his philanthropy — and his 
personal energy — to promoting these new institutions 
and the ideas behind them. 

So then the third dimension of ethics expands the 
range of choices we have in front of us. It is about cre- 
ating new possibilities. I like to picture this idea in its 
cartoon form. For me, it is comes to life in the charac- 
ter of Bugs Bunny. The narrative is familiar. Our hero 



56 



gets into trouble and runs away from a threatening 
pursuer. But he is eventually backed into a corner. 
There is no escape. What does he do? He reaches into 
his pocket and miraculously pulls out a pen or mark- 
er. He then proceeds to draw a picture of a window 
on the blank wall. The image of the window becomes 
real. Then he climbs out. Sometimes we do face gen- 
uine dilemmas — and the lines we draw on the wall 
remain lines. But other times we can and should imag- 
ine better options. 

LEADERSHIP AS PRACTICAL ETHICS 

How then, do we connect this understanding of the 
three dimensions of ethics to leadership? Leadership 
is as vast a topic as ethics, so let us begin with some 
simple concepts. In his new book, George Washington 
on Leadership, Richard Brookhiser describes leadership 
as "knowing yourself, knowing where you want to go, 
and then taking others to that new place." 5 There are 
many ways to lead; there are many styles and count- 
less examples to study. One way to focus our analysis 
is to examine in detail the ends/means/consequences 
equation as Brookhiser suggests. This leads to three 
questions: What is the goal? What means will we use 
to get there? And what types of trade-offs and com- 
promises must be made along the way? 

Brookhiser' s observations remind me of one of my 
favorite undergraduate lectures on American political 
history. The lecture was delivered by Professor Frank 
Freidel, a biographer of Franklin Roosevelt (FDR). His 
topic was FDR's leadership style. Professor Freidel 
drew a simple X at the top/center of the blackboard. 
He then drew a zig-zagging line from the bottom of the 
blackboard up to the top. He explained that Roosevelt 



57 



thought of himself as a sailor heading upwind. The 
destination was certain — the fixed point represented 
by the X. Each zig-zag represented a tack back-and- 
forth needed to approach the goal. 

As any sailor knows, when in a sail boat, you cannot 
head directly into the wind. If you try to sail straight 
into the wind, the sails flap around uselessly, the boat 
stalls, and you are unable to move forward. So like 
any experienced helmsman, Roosevelt understood 
the need to tack back and forth. Each tack could mean 
an uncertain and uneasy compromise. Sometimes he 
would have to tack horizontally just to maintain his 
previous gains. Yet each compromise was necessary 
to maintain way against the headwinds that would 
mercilessly beat him back or blow him off course. 

If we accept leadership as goal-driven and com- 
promise-ridden, then we see that ethics should not be 
merely peripheral to any public policy curriculum or 
program of leadership development. Ethics is neither 
a luxury nor a hurdle to be cleared. It is intrinsic to 
decisionmaking and leadership itself. 

In his book, Ethics as Practice, Hugh LaFollette ex- 
plains that ethics, like medicine, is a practical art. 6 Just 
as we study medicine not only to learn about the body 
and its functions, but to make us better by promot- 
ing good health, so too we study ethics not merely for 
philosophical enlightenment, but to improve the qual- 
ity of our lives. Ethics helps us to understand what we 
truly value and how to connect this with the practice 
of our daily lives, our individual choices, and the poli- 
cies of the institutions of which we are a part. 

Pragmatists, like pluralists, argue that the moral 
and the practical are inextricably linked. Let me give 
you an example drawn from the history of my insti- 
tution, the Carnegie Council, which was founded in 



58 



1914 by Andrew Carnegie as one of his peace endow- 
ments. Its purpose then, as it is now, is to serve as an 
educational resource — a center for ideas and action— 
for leaders in the academic and policy communities. 
Writing in 1937 about the future of the peace move- 
ment, my predecessor as leader of the council, Henry 
Atkinson, made this point: 

The reason for the long list of failures [of the peace 
movement] is that the idealism of the idealist is sel- 
dom put into practice. The eminent Boston physi- 
cian Dr. Richardson Cabot, speaking of ethics, said, 
"Most of what used to be called goodness has right- 
ly fallen into disrepute because it is inefficient. As I 
see it, ethical diagnosis, like physical diagnosis, has 
a practical end." 7 

In citing Dr. Cabot, Atkinson understood that eth- 
ics is intrinsic to what we do, not extrinsic. No project 
is sustainable if it is built on faulty assumptions. Noth- 
ing good, and certainly nothing great, can be built 
upon ignorance, misperception, or misplaced ideal- 
ism. A moral commitment without a sense of realism, 
a sense of how things actually work, is a recipe for 
disaster. Also, any practical scheme without a sense 
of the values that must support it is equally doomed. 

Ethics and leadership are therefore best under- 
stood as a realist endeavor. Realists focus on power 
and interests as the key elements of human behavior. 
The Athenian generals in Thucydides' great history, 
The Peloponnesian War, are often quoted as the author- 
ity on this point: "The strong do what they will and 
the weak do what they must." We neglect this basic 
insight about power at our own peril. 

Yet with this point made, sophisticated realists 
will also understand that while the drive for power 
and the maximizing of interests explains much, the 



59 



concept of interest is often more than just the accumu- 
lation and exertion of power. Interests are not always 
obvious. They can be complex, diverse, and hard to 
isolate. There are also obvious limits to power. Thucy- 
dides and his realist disciples, Nicollo Machiavelli and 
Thomas Hobbes, were quick to recognize that some 
outcomes cannot be achieved by brute force alone, 
and that the exertion of power always raises the spec- 
ters of overreach and corruption. In understanding the 
complexities of power, realists are perhaps the best 
proponents of the concept of enlightened self-interest. 
Simply put, enlightened self-interest begins with our 
own needs, yet it also takes into account the needs and 
interests of others. 

Any good realist will tell you that taking into ac- 
count the interests of others is not altruism. Rather, it 
is realism at its best. In her book, Moral Clarity, Susan 
Neiman writes: "Hobbes . . . imagines a state of nature 
whose wild hordes are just rational enough to stop 
their rush toward doomsday by agreeing to obey any 
sovereign who will prevent further war." 8 Neiman re- 
minds us through the example of Hobbes that even in 
the darkest, crudest version of the war of all against 
all, some notion of rationality prevails. Limits are 
recognized. Cooperation becomes possible by yield- 
ing to the overarching power of the Leviathan. In the 
Hobbesian state of nature, conflict has its limits and 
cooperation around enlightened self-interest, albeit in 
a limited form, is a strategy for survival. 

Recent literature in evolutionary biology and neu- 
roscience investigates the notion that enlightened 
self-interest may be hard-wired as a matter of natural 
selection and the instinct to survive. Robert Wright's 
book, Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny, explores 
the idea that human history and interaction can be 



60 



best explained by observing non-zero sum, win-win, 
cooperative arrangements rather than zero-sum, win- 
ner-take-all competitions. He writes: 

In zero-sum games, the fortunes of the players are 
inversely related. In tennis, in chess, in boxing, 
one contestant's gain is another's loss. In non-zero 
games, one player's gain needn't be bad news for 
the other(s). . . .You can capture history's basic tra- 
jectory by reference to a core pattern: New tech- 
nologies arise that permit or encourage new, richer 
forms of non-zero-sum interaction; then (for intelli- 
gible reasons grounded ultimately in human nature) 
social structures evolve that realize this rich poten- 
tial—that convert non-zero sum situations into posi- 
tive sums. 9 

The result is a world of cooperative structures that 
benefit most of the people most of the time. Neurosci- 
ence is beginning to show us that the "will to power" 
may have a companion in "cooperation" as a biologi- 
cal mechanism to enhance prospects for survival. 

The proper discernment of power and interests in 
a globalized and highly interdependent world is no 
small matter. It is the first requirement of leadership. 
The three dimensions of ethics we have just discussed 
provide a framework for this discernment. Once we 
have established our bearings, it is then necessary to 
articulate the core principles of our ethical concern. 
In my experience, there are three core principles that 
have universal resonance, even if interpretations of 
each differ widely according to time, place, and cir- 
cumstance. These principles are: pluralism, rights, 
and fairness. Each principle provides a point of refer- 
ence from which we can rehearse arguments with our- 
selves and others, and then make ethically informed 
decisions. 



61 



AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK: THREE 
PRINCIPLES 

Pluralism begins with appreciation for diversity 
while recognizing what is common in the human ex- 
perience. A value such as self-interest and/ or a moral 
sentiment such as honor or fairness will develop dif- 
ferently according to time, place, and circumstance. 
Yet there is something that binds us — and that "some- 
thing" is the capacity to enter into a value system that 
is not our own. 

Simon Blackburn, James Rachels, and other phi- 
losophers make this point by citing an example from 
Herodotus' Histories regarding funeral customs. 10 We 
know that in some societies the most common funeral 
custom is to bury the dead. In other societies, it is cus- 
tomary to cremate the dead as on a funeral pyre. In 
still others, the custom is to eat (!) the dead. Members 
of each society think that their custom is best, and that 
others are misguided or worse. The point here is not to 
say that one's own customs are always superior. Nor 
is the point the opposite: that all customs are relative 
and are purely matters of convenience. Rather, the 
point of this example is that there is a central truth — 
respect for the dead — that takes different forms in dif- 
ferent circumstances. 

Pluralism's first argument is with monism. Mo- 
nists are purveyors of moral clarity, single-minded 
advocates of a truth as they see it. As such, monists 
adhere to familiar custom and dogma, the validity of 
which is based on faith and will remain beyond hu- 
man reason and reach. Monists neglect the idea that 
our understanding of the truth may change over time, 
especially in light of new information and experience. 



62 



Monists will resist the idea that truths are many, not 
one, and that while we often agree on those verifiable 
observations we call facts, we often do not agree on 
their meaning. Enlightened realists remind us that 
humility is required in the face of conviction. Plural- 
ists remind us that, ironically, the one thing we should 
agree upon is the possibility that we can be wrong. 
The realist and pluralist point of view does not reso- 
nate with monists, who are more comfortable in the 
waters of moral certainty. 

We feel the full weight of pluralism when we view 
a great work of art or read a classic text. Through 
these encounters, we can understand the experiences 
and the value systems of others. We enter into another 
world and experience part of it as others did and do. 
Pluralism is a way to transcend the false dichotomy 
of monism and relativism. Monism holds that "only 
one set of values is true, all others are false." Relativ- 
ism holds that "my values are mine, yours are yours, 
and if we clash, too bad, neither of us can claim to be 
right." 11 Most of us live in that interesting place in be- 
tween—and this is the territory of the pluralist. 

Reinhold Niebuhr has gained much attention re- 
cently as a favorite philosopher of the current Presi- 
dent. This is no coincidence, as President Obama 
has charted a course that veers away from black and 
white, for us or against us, positions favored by Presi- 
dent Bush. Columnist David Brooks captured the 
Niebuhrian spirit in 2002 in an Atlantic magazine ar- 
ticle aptly titled "A Man on a Gray Horse." 12 The true 
moral course, according to Niebuhr, is often found in 
uneasy compromises and in shades of gray. The gray- 
ness of the horse is a reminder that we are far from 
pure; our history shows us that we sometimes act un- 
justly and impurely in our pursuit of justice. Niebuhr 



63 



reminded us that even the "good war" ended with 
the atomic incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Brooks summarizes Niebuhr's point succinctly: "That 
in battling evil the United States would become intoxi- 
cated with illusions about its own goodness." 13 

In addition to the dangers of monism, pluralism 
also addresses the challenges of relativism. Relativism 
is the idea that every moral claim is just as good as any 
other, its well-worn mantra being, "One man's terror- 
ist is another man's freedom fighter." One can try to 
make that argument, but it will not alter the fact that 
terrorism is the random slaying of innocent people. 
Another tired relativist argument is that norms are 
merely the reflection of the interests of the power ac- 
tors who make the rules and stand to gain from their 
enforcement. While one may make this argument too, 
it will not alter the fact that freedom makes no sense 
without order, and that power must be deployed to 
ensure order. Power considerations cannot be wished 
away; and the actions of powerful actors should not 
be dismissed out of hand as morally suspect. 

Pluralists hold firm against cynicism. They con- 
tend that it is both possible and necessary to sort out 
competing claims. Pluralists observe that every soci- 
ety has strongly developed codes of duty and restraint 
that promote some notion of human decency well- 
being. Part of what makes us human is our capacity 
to understand these norms, how they developed, and 
why — even if we strongly disagree with them. This 
open approach enhances the prospects for moral ar- 
gument. 

Isaiah Berlin gives us a classic example of how and 
why pluralism is not relativism. He writes: 

I find Nazi values detestable, but I can understand 
how, given enough misinformation, enough false 



64 



belief about reality, one could come to believe that 
they are the only salvation. Of course they have to 
be fought, by war if need be, but I do not regard the 
Nazis as some people do, as literally pathological or 
insane, only as wickedly wrong, totally misguided 
about the facts, for example, in believing that some 
beings are subhuman, that race is central, or that 
Nordic races alone are truly creative, and so forth. I 
see how, with enough false education, enough wide- 
spread illusion and error, men can, while remaining 
men, believe this and commit the most unspeakable 



Berlin's pluralism is not relativism because he first 
empathizes, he seeks to understand the Nazi world- 
view on its own terms, and then he engages in moral 
argument to refute it. 

Another place to plant the flag against relativism 
is on the high ground of "rights." By rights we mean 
protections and entitlements in relation to duties and 
responsibilities. Rights arguments are put forward 
against arguments of utility. According to rights theo- 
rists from Kant to Jefferson and beyond, there is some- 
thing fundamental about being human (an inalienable 
characteristic) that prohibits any person from being 
treated as something merely useful, as a means to an 
end. 

The source of human rights is an unending de- 
bate. However, I am persuaded by pragmatists like 
Judith Sklar, Amy Guttmann, and Michael Ignatieff 
who argue that in the end, foundational arguments 
may not really matter. 15 Empirical observation of the 
need for human rights and the beneficient work that 
human rights arguments do may be sufficient. After 
all, the mass murders of the 20th century are proof of 
the need for such protection. Think of the body counts 
under the regimes of Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, and 
Mao Tse Tung. The facts of the genocides and gulags 



65 



in such recent memory should be sufficient to make 
the case that protections are needed. Duties to provide 
protection therefore follow. 

Rights claims raise questions about assignment of 
responsibilities that are not always clear. One way to 
think about assignment of responsibilities is to consid- 
er rights claims in terms of perfect and imperfect obli- 
gations. Perfect obligations are specific and direct. For 
example, we have the perfect obligation not to torture. 
Imperfect obligations are more general, less specific, 
and inexactly targeted. So in the case of torture, there 
is the requirement "to consider the ways and means 
through which torture can be prevented." 16 

Or perhaps for a better illustration of the distinc- 
tion between perfect and imperfect duties, consider 
the infamous case of Kitty Genovese. Kitty Genovese 
was a 28-year-old woman who lived in Kew Gardens, 
Queens, New York, in 1964. One night on her way 
home, she was stabbed several times by an unknown 
assailant and left to die. Her case became widely 
known because it was alleged that 38 people passed 
her by as she lay dying in the street, and no one helped 
her. Presumably, each of the 38 passers-by thought 
someone else would help, or they did not want to get 
involved. Whatever the precise details, this scenario 
helps to elucidate the point about perfect and imper- 
fect duties. We all share the basic duty not to harm. 
However, we also share the basic duty to disallow the 
conditions of harm, and that when harm is done, to 
mitigate the effects of it. To echo a previous point, the 
exercise of imperfect duty is far from altruism. It is in 
our enlightened self-interest to live in a community 
where people are not left to die in the streets. 

In looking at public policy today, we see several 
obvious cases where both our direct and indirect par- 



66 



ticipation in the mitigation of harms is inevitable. As 
participants in the global economy, the global envi- 
ronment, and global security, we act both directly as 
agents and indirectly as bystanders. When we con- 
sume and travel, we engage in a system that provides 
benefits and places burdens. There is really no place 
to hide. As implicated agents in these social arrange- 
ments, our actions will be judged accordingly. 

The third principle to consider is fairness. Ideas 
about fairness are highly subjective and heavily influ- 
enced by circumstances. As I have written elsewhere 
with my coauthor Ethan Kapstein, one of the most 
useful models for illustrating fairness considerations 
is the Ultimatum Game (UG). 17 In the game, two play- 
ers have the opportunity to divide a pot of money. A 
Proposer (P) makes an offer to a Respondent (R) over 
how a pot of money should be divided. R can either 
accept P's offer — in which case the money is divided 
as P proposed — or R can reject the offer, in which case 
both players walk away with nothing. 

The classic rational actor model of behavior pre- 
dicts that, in such cases, the split might be something 
along the lines of 99:1; that is, P would offer R one unit 
while keeping 99 for himself. Since we can usually 
count on profit-maximizing behavior, this division 
makes both parties better off if unequal; there is no 
rational reason for R to reject it since R would receive 
nothing. Maximization strategies therefore lead to un- 
equal divisions of a given pie. 

But behavioral economists, repeating the UG in a 
variety of countries and under a variety of conditions, 
have observed a puzzling result. When Rs are offered 
an amount they consider to be unfair they reject it— 
they would prefer nothing to something. Indeed, real- 
izing that unfair offers are likely to be rejected, Ps rou- 



67 



tinely offer about one-half the pot at the outset, and 
when asked why they do so they normally answer 
that "this seems fair." 

Researchers have drawn several significant find- 
ings from the UG, all of which are relevant to the 
study of moral considerations in world politics. First, 
Ps adopt moral reasoning or other-regarding behav- 
ior out of their self-interest. Ps who do not care about 
what others think must nonetheless fear rejection of an 
unfair offer and the absence of any payoff whatsoever. 
The adoption of "fairness considerations" is therefore 
efficiency enhancing to the extent that it leads to an 
agreement and thus an increase in welfare for both of 
the agents. 18 

Second, P's concern with achieving an equitable or 
fair result arises in part from uncertainty about how R 
will respond to P's offer. If P knows that R will will- 
ingly accept the greedy offer, P will be much more 
inclined to propose a lopsided division. Not knowing 
R's response beforehand, P offers the amount that in- 
tuitively seems to be fair (i.e., equal division). 

Returning to our theme of enlightened self-inter- 
est, fairness and reciprocity suggest that what is good 
for you often turns out to be what is good for others 
involved. This is the nature of complex problems and 
decisions. Taken to the global level, individual inter- 
ests must be seen in terms of complex interdependence, 
international norms, and global responsibilities. 

LEADERSHIP FOR REALISTS 

While I hope these remarks have given you posi- 
tive ideas about leadership, I also hope they have not 
promised too much. It is important to close with a 
sense of realism that reminds us of the limits of human 



68 



achievement and the dangers of assuming harmonious 
outcomes. Good intentions are never enough. Leaders 
must always attend to consequences. Moral impera- 
tives often conflict. Leaders must make difficult and 
imperfect choices. The word "utopia" derives from a 
Greek term meaning "no place." Utopia does not ex- 
ist. And as we all know from history, it has been the 
pursuit of utopia — of perfect societies and outcomes — 
that has led to the worst episodes in human history. 

There is much truth in such commonplace sayings 
as "leadership is a foul weather job" and organizations 
"rot from the head down." Burdens placed on leaders 
force them to be visionaries and exemplars — and yet, 
they can never be perfect nor should they aspire to be. 
Ethics plays a central role in navigating through the 
ideal vision and the realities of daily life. Ethics is a 
process, a constant reflection on aspirations and com- 
promises. It is incumbent upon leaders to establish 
their normative vision and to measure their behavior 
accordingly. What are my goals? What are my core 
values? And what trade-offs am I willing to make? 
These questions never go away. 

Management gurus are quick to point out that 
if we are not trying to improve, then we are sure to get 
worse. Commitment to our highest aspirations, open- 
ness, and self-correction is the essence of ethics in lead- 
ership. By suggesting three dimensions as points of 
entry into ethical inquiry — our roles as moral agents, 
as participants in the institutions in which we live, 
and as the architects of new institutions that will de- 
fine our future— I hope I have given you a sense of the 
practical importance of ethics. By suggesting the prin- 
ciples of pluralism, rights, and fairness as the ground 
on which to plant your flag, I hope I have prepared you 
somewhat for your journey toward principled leadership. 



69 



ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3 

1. Simon Blackburn, Ethics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2000. 

2. Ryan Patrick Hanley, "Berlin and History," George 
Crowder and Henry Hardy, eds., The One and the Many, New 
York: Prometheus Books, 2007, pp. 159-180. 

3. Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence, New York: W. W. Nor- 
ton, 2006. 

4. David Nasaw, Andrew Carnegie, New York: Penguin Press, 
2006. 

5. Richard Brookhiser, George Washington on Leadership, New 
York: Basic Books, 2008. 

6. Hugh LaFollette, The Practice of Ethics, Maiden, MA: Black- 
well Publishing, 2007. 

7. Henry Atkinson, Prelude to Peace, New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1937, p. 3. 

8. Susan Nieman, Moral Clarity: A Guide for Grown-Up Ideal- 
ists, Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2008, p. 30. 

9. Robert Wright, Non-Zero: The Logic of Human Destiny, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 2000, p. 5. 

10. James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, Fourth 
Ed., Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003, pp. 16-17. 

11. Isaiah Berlin, "The First and the Last," New York Review of 
Books, May 14, 1997, p. 11. 

12. David Brooks, "A Man on a Gray Horse," Atlantic, 
September 2002, available from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ 
archive/2002/09/a-man-on-a-gray-horse/2558/. 

13. Ibid. 



70 



14. Berlin, p. 10. 

15. Judith Sklar, "The Liberalism of Fear," Nancy L. Rosen- 
blum, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989; and Michael Ignatieff and Amy Gutmann, 
Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 

16. Amartya Sen, "Elements of a Theory of Human Rights," 

Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2004. 

17. Ethan B. Kapstein and Joel H. Rosenthal, "Ethics in In- 
ternational Affairs: An Assessment," in Ethics and International 
Affairs, London, UK: Ashgate, 2009. 

18. Ethan B. Kapstein, Economic Justice in an Unfair World, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006. 



71 



CHAPTER 4 

TRANSFORMING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: 
"THE TAIL THAT WAGS THE DOG" 1 

Richard H. Immerman 2 

Change is hard. We all know that. We also all 
know that organizational change is particularly hard, 
especially if that organization is large and its culture 
entrenched. This is true even if the organization is 
dynamic and successful, as is Microsoft. In such cases 
changes are normatively incremental and take years to 
produce the desired effect, or its approximation. Then 
there are organizations like General Motors (GM). "We 
have vastly underestimated how deeply ingrained are 
the organizational and cultural rigidities that hamper 
our ability to execute," conceded a GM executive in 
1988. His assessment was dead-on, but he probably 
failed to appreciate fully the implications. Two de- 
cades later GM, once the icon of America's managerial 
expertise and industrial might, declared bankruptcy. 3 

Governmental organizations may be the most dif- 
ficult and most resistant to change of all. Not only are 
they often very large, but they normally also have 
well-established standards and procedures and are 
beholden to multiple interests with divergent agendas 
and priorities. Bureaucratic politics in Washington fre- 
quently appear as zero-sum games. Because one orga- 
nization's gains are perceived, and often are, another's 
loss, turf wars are more the rule than the exception. 
The National Security Act of 1947, which established 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and Central Intel- 
ligence Agency (CIA), is an exemplar. Its enactment 
was so tortuous, and it left in its wake so many scars 



73 



and so much dissatisfaction, that in the vital arena of 
national security nothing comparable was attempted 
for a half century. 4 

Because of the tragedy of September 11, 2001 
(9/11), as magnified by the erroneous National Intel- 
ligence Estimate (NIE) on Weapons of Mass Destruc- 
tion (WMD) in Iraq, the momentum for changing how 
the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) goes about its 
business became irresistible. The consensus was that 
the system was broken and had to be fixed — reformed. 
Hence Congress entitled the legislation it passed in 
2004 the "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven- 
tion Act" (IRTPA). 5 

While passed with great fanfare, IRTPA gener- 
ated little enthusiasm. As is uniformly the case with 
such legislation, the devil tends to lie in the details. 
However, in order to expedite passage in the face of 
so many vested interests and conflicting perspectives, 
the IRTPA' s authors finessed most of the details. They 
left authorities, responsibilities, divisions of labor, and 
more (even location) to be decided by future delibera- 
tions and decisions. Placed within the context of re- 
cent history, this "transition-induced dysfunction," to 
quote the always quotable Richard Posner, suggested 
to many observers that the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI) would evolve into one 
more bloated bureaucracy which profligately con- 
sumed resources and critically undermined essential 
"speed and precision." 6 

Worse, ODNI was almost certain to generate turf 
wars not only with the very agencies it was mandated 
to manage but also with the Pentagon behemoth. The 
IRTPA did not endow the DNI with the wherewithal 
to effectively wage these wars. The budget for intelli- 
gence activities that supported the military, for exam- 



74 



pie, remained with the DoD. One veteran of America's 
intelligence establishment constructed a soccer meta- 
phor. He wrote that what the legislation actually did 
was "send more players onto the field and . . . pump 
steroids into those already wearing cleats," thereby 
"adding to the tussles over who is responsible for cov- 
ering which part of the intelligence terrain" even as it 
produced "unrealistic expectations." 7 There would be 
change — but little reform or improvement. 

I subscribed to that view. Even as the IRTPA was 
winding its way through Congress, I was complet- 
ing a brief history of the CIA. I closely examined the 
agency's origins in 1947 and subsequent efforts at re- 
form. While not dismissing the possibility that the leg- 
islation would improve U.S. intelligence capabilities, 
I concluded that historical precedent dictated pes- 
simism. I argued at that time and subsequently that 
the problems that afflicted the U.S. intelligence com- 
munity were so pervasive, and reflected such an array 
of dynamics — political, psychological, and cultural — 
that they were all but impervious to institutional re- 
forms. 8 

Subsequent scholarship, and for that matter much 
of the informed public's opinion, has been largely con- 
sistent with my instinctual prognosis. Enthusiastic as- 
sessments of the performance of any of the Directors of 
National Intelligence (there have already been three), 
the new institutions established under his authority 
(most notably the National Counterterrorism and Na- 
tional Counterproliferation Centers), the products for 
which he is directly responsible (National Intelligence 
Estimates and the President's Daily Brief), or other 
components of his office, have been few and far be- 
tween. Putting aside the vitriolic condemnation of the 
NIE on Iran's nuclear program by conservative Amer- 



75 



icans who have historically perceived America's intel- 
ligence community as challenged in both its politics 
and its competence (in the interest of full disclosure, I 
was a target), 9 even long-time supporters of, and con- 
tributors to, America's intelligence were hardly less 
critical. A former acting CIA deputy director of opera- 
tions in 2008 wrote that the "DNI has become what 
intelligence professors feared it would: an unneces- 
sary bureaucratic contraption with an amazingly large 
staff." 10 The same year another former assistant direc- 
tor of the CIA who served as vice chair of the National 
Intelligence Council and is the current executive di- 
rector of the International Association for Intelligence 
Education, argued that the "dysfunctional structure" 
produced by IRTPA has "fated" the Intelligence Com- 
munity to end up a "failed institution." 11 Bipartisan 
assessments by congressional committees and even 
the DNI's own Office of the Inspector General have 
been almost as critical. 12 

In 2007, two leading scholars of intelligence pub- 
lished first-rate books on the subject. They reached the 
same verdict: IRTPA might produce improvements, 
but the consequences would be marginal at best. Ac- 
cording to Richard Betts, the fault lay not so much in 
the legislation itself, although it was defective. More 
fundamentally, the intelligence enterprise — collec- 
tion, analysis, production, dissemination, and con- 
sumption—confronts permanent enemies: incomplete 
or ambiguous evidence; severe time and resource con- 
straints; cognitive biases and shortcomings; deception 
and denial; and others. The sum of all the IRTPA re- 
forms may over time contain or push back some of 
these adverse phenomena, although it is too early to 
reach a judgment. But "the enemies of intelligence 
cannot be driven from the field." Consequently, with 



76 



"disillusionment, backlash, and a drop in public sup- 
port for intelligence activity" so prevalent, expecta- 
tions for the reforms should remain low. 13 

Amy Zegart's conclusions are even less sanguine. 
A decade earlier, Zegart had written that those insti- 
tutions most responsible for safeguarding America's 
national security, including the CIA, were "flawed by 
design." 14 Applying her expertise in organizational 
theory and intelligence history to the post-9/11 en- 
vironment, her assessment was sharply critical. She 
writes that the pathologies that afflicted the IC, partic- 
ularly the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), throughout the Cold War, including inherent 
organizational defects, bureaucratic self-interest, and 
fragmentation most prominently, were unaffected 
by the Cold War's termination. Their persistence ex- 
plains "why US intelligence agencies failed to adapt 
to the terrorist threat before September 11, why they 
have not done much better since then, and why they 
are unlikely to improve substantially in the future." 
In her judgment, the "Intelligence Community's worst 
problems endure." Most of the recent reforms have at 
best "created halting progress. Some have made mat- 
ters worse." 15 

There is much to commend in Betts's and Zegart's 
scholarship. No manner of reform can prevent all in- 
telligence failures, and the more difficult the questions 
the IC addresses, the lower will be its batting aver- 
age. Further, the IRTPA reforms were flawed, and to 
some extent by design. Nevertheless, my exposure 
to the inner workings of the IC in 2007-08 provided 
evidence and insight that has escaped notice not only 
by scholars and journalists, but also by IC veterans. 
What I experienced, and what I learned from that ex- 
perience, challenges some of the most basic premises 



77 



of critics of intelligence reform, their reservations con- 
cerning the IRTPA and the establishment of the DNI 
above all. Change within the IC has been uneven, and 
what change there has been has not produced univer- 
sally positive dividends. In a remarkably brief time, 
nevertheless, intelligence analysis has experienced 
genuine reform, some of which is radical and even 
revolutionary. That it has, is one of the ICs best-kept 
secrets. The intent of this chapter is to reveal the na- 
ture of such reform. 

The movement, and it is a movement, to reform 
and thereby improve intelligence analysis goes by the 
name Analytic Transformation. Analytic Transforma- 
tion envelopes a myriad of institutional initiatives, 
beginning with the establishment of a small staff led 
by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Analysis (DDNI/ A) which conceived and implement- 
ed mechanisms and measures that permeate all 16 ele- 
ments of the IC. 16 Yet, more fundamentally, Analytic 
Transformation is a program designed to encourage, 
as much as mandate, analysts to embrace change, hor- 
izontally and vertically throughout the IC workforce. 
Moreover, and at least indirectly, the same encourage- 
ment applies to the collection community itself. The 
program's name should not evoke associations with 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's agenda for 
military transformation while managing the Penta- 
gon. The goal of Analytic Transformation is as simple 
as it is dramatic: "to get the right analysis to the right 
people at the right time, in a form they can use." The 
strategy is equally commonsensical: "to transform the 
analytic component of our community from a federa- 
tion of agencies, or a collection of feudal baronies, into 
a community of analysts." 17 

The principles that underlie this effort are collabo- 
ration and integration. Like the goal itself, the words 



78 



are simple. Still, in the U.S. intelligence community's 
universe, they signal a revolution. While historians of 
American intelligence appropriately focus on the key 
legislative turning points, including but not limited 
to the National Security Act, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, the Intelligence Oversight Act, and, 
of course, the IRTPA, they have all but overlooked 
the executive orders that were no less and in some 
respects more pivotal in the community's evolution. 
Particularly salient is Executive Order (EO) 12333, 
signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981. 
Amended first in 2004 and again in 2008, EO 12333 
allocated power and responsibilities among the agen- 
cies, established lines of authority, and otherwise di- 
rected how the IC should conduct its activities with 
respect to the national intelligence effort. 18 

The impetus for the most recent revision of EO 
12333 is the confusion and conflict among the agencies' 
responsibilities and the lines of authority following 
IRTPA's establishment of the DNI. Because the legis- 
lation failed explicitly to provide the DNI with powers 
required to execute the IRTPA mandates, many of the 
agencies denied that he had them. The amended ver- 
sion attracted attention because it provides a partial 
remedy. It vests the DNI with necessary, albeit not 
yet sufficient, authorities. What has escaped notice 
is the deletion of one sentence from Part 1 [1.1(a)] of 
the original EO 12333 that provided the "philosophy" 
for Analysis: "Maximum emphasis should be given to 
fostering analytical competition among appropriate 
elements of the Intelligence Community." 19 

Doubtless in part because it was populated by 
many veterans and supporters of the CIA's notorious 
Team B exercise, the Reagan administration ardently 
promoted competitive analysis. It assumed that the 



79 



clash of ideas and data produced a kind of dialecti- 
cal process that enhanced the rigor of estimates and 
hence increased the likelihood of their accuracy. The 
IC leadership concurred, blessing competitive anal- 
ysis as a best practice. In fact, however, its value is 
ambiguous; the process is vulnerable to manipulation 
and corruption. What is more, in the IC's competi- 
tive culture, knowledge means power. Thus "analytic 
competition among appropriate elements" is norma- 
tively antithetical to information sharing among ap- 
propriate elements. 20 

The consequences of cultural as well as institu- 
tional and legal barriers to sharing information among 
agencies became excruciatingly evident in post-mor- 
tems on the 9/11 terrorists attacks, which highlighted 
the poor communication between CIA and the FBI 
concerning Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi. 
These blunders by themselves were probably enough 
to induce the IC leadership to supplant competition 
with integration and collaboration as top priorities. 
But the motivation behind Analytic Transformation 
was more basic: the world was very different in 2001- 
04, than in 1981, let alone 1947. 21 The information and 
communication revolutions exponentially increased 
the volume and intricacy of data ("intel"), whether 
open source or not, that analysts must digest, process, 
and interpret. Performing those tasks adequately far 
exceeds the analytical capacity and expertise of any 
single agency, let alone one office within an agency. 

The IC's demographics exacerbate this challenge. 
The size of the IC's workforce eroded steadily follow- 
ing Watergate and the Church/ Pike Committee hear- 
ings in the 1970s. The Reagan years were an exception, 
but the decline accelerated with the peace dividend 
that America purportedly earned by "winning" the 



80 



Cold War. George Tenet committed his tenure as DCI 
to rebuilding it; he had barely begun when 9/11 ar- 
rived. The subsequent hiring frenzy that aimed to 
compensate for this shortfall produced the "greening" 
of the IC. In 2007 some 55 percent of the IC's analysts 
had less than 6 years of experience. Their limited ex- 
pertise demanded greater interdependence. 22 

Then there is the complexity and disruption that 
have accompanied the transition from bipolarity to 
globalization. Attending this transition are new de- 
velopments, challenges, and threats, many of which 
are asymmetrical, many of which arise from nonstate 
actors with transnational reaches, and many of which 
obscure conventional boundaries between foreign 
and domestic. Assessing them in order to understand 
them better, and doing so within the progressively 
more compressed decisionmaking cycles imposed by 
policymakers, require innovative analytic approaches 
that can often benefit from technological advances. Be- 
cause representatives of "Generation Y" now comprise 
a large percentage of the analytic workforce, they are 
more comfortable with, and open to, new techniques 
that enable collaboration and integration. But for ana- 
lysts to collaborate, they must be able to locate one 
another. As late as 2004, when Congress enacted the 
IRTPA, the IC's front office, such as it was, had virtu- 
ally no idea how many analysts it managed, let alone 
on what desks they worked in which home agency. 
Institutional mechanisms needed to be developed for 
identifying analysts across the community who pos- 
sessed the necessary expertise on any given problem. 
Further, their managers, often the graybeards with 
much more limited exposure to advanced technology 
and a cultural aversion to sharing information, had to 
change their outlooks. 



81 



As did the IC's leadership, and in the most fun- 
damental respects. Collectors, most prominently from 
the CIA's Directorate of Operations (now the National 
Clandestine Service) and such elements controlled by 
the Pentagon as the National Security Agency and Na- 
tional Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, had long been 
kings of the intelligence hill. In the IC, like elsewhere 
in Washington, influence follows the money, and an 
analyst costs a pittance compared to an operative in 
search of human intelligence (HUMINT), not to men- 
tion a satellite or ultra-sensitive surveillance system. 
But in the messy environment of the 21st century, the 
value of the analyst took a quantum leap. Regardless 
of the resources committed to collection, and regard- 
less of the instruments and assets available, the volume 
of data that must be collected in an era of globaliza- 
tion guarantees gaps in that collection. Only analysts' 
judgments can bridge those gaps. To arrive at sound 
judgments as expeditiously as possible, moreover, 
analysts require technologies that can facilitate the 
search for and the organization of data, identify com- 
monalities and conflicts, and produce parallel benefits 
that conserve for analysts the time to think. 

These dynamics were foremost on Thomas Fin- 
gar's mind when in 2005 he began work as the first 
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analy- 
sis (dual hatted, he also chaired the National Intelli- 
gence Council). A Stanford Ph.D. in Political Science 
with more than 20 years experience in the IC, Fingar 
had the right credentials. He also had the right track 
record. When Carl Ford fell ill in 2002, Fingar, as his 
principal deputy, assumed the lead of the Department 
of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). 
In October, 2002, the National Foreign Intelligence 
Board (subsequently renamed the National Intelli- 



82 



gence Board) approved the NIE on Iraq's WMD. INR 
was the sole IC element to dissent from the basic judg- 
ment that Iraq harbored concealed WMD and, perhaps 
more important, was engaged in a program to recon- 
stitute its nuclear weapons program. Indeed, it was 
not persuaded that Iraq intended to use the aluminum 
tubes it sought to acquire for centrifuge rotors. What 
is significant is that INR did not contradict the NIE 
assessment. Rather, the INR declared ignorance — that 
there was insufficient evidence to support the NIE's 
judgments. What distinguished INR and Fingar was 
this stout adherence to the most elementary standards 
of analytic tradecraft— to claim as fact only that which 
was known to be fact. That criterion became a hall- 
mark of Analytic Transformation. 23 

That Fingar emerged from the Iraq WMD NIE de- 
bacle with a distinctive reputation for analytic rigor 
made him the appropriate choice to head the reform 
effort. His leadership skills and style made him the 
inspired choice. Fingar's knowledge of the IC — its 
processes, its behavior, its culture — was unsurpassed. 
He appreciated and greatly respected its history and 
its achievements. But intimately familiar with how the 
IC worked, somewhat irreverent in his outlook, and 
innately predisposed to thinking and acting uncon- 
ventionally, he deemed no procedure or custom sa- 
cred and off limits. From his perspective, the norma- 
tive IC performance was not nearly as poor as critics 
charged after 9/11 and the Iraq WMD estimate. These 
snapshots projected a distorted image. Still, there 
were fundamental areas that demanded remediation. 
In combination with that demand, public perception, 
political pressure, and notoriety surrounding the 
9/11 and Iraq WMD commissions generated the kind 
of perfect storm essential to undertaking the reform 



83 



effort. These opportunities to initiate change in a gov- 
ernment institution the size of the IC arise perhaps 
once in a generation, if that. They last at most a couple 
of years. Fingar, a workaholic, refused to waste a mo- 
ment. 

Beginning with little more than a vague mandate, 
Fingar assembled around him a small staff comprised 
of true believers in the urgent need for reform. Some 
were senior intelligence officers, others had contribut- 
ed to the IRTPA, still others were recruited from out- 
side the IC because of their skill sets. Led, encouraged, 
and energized by Fingar, this staff worked intensely 
with him to formulate and then promote what soon 
came to be called Analytic Transformation. 

Fingar and his staff, known collectively by the 
acronym DDNI/A, began at the most elementary 
level — the analysts themselves. The objective was to 
identify those analysts across the IC elements that, be- 
cause of background and expertise, should logically 
collaborate with one another. What they soon learned, 
however, was not simply that these analysts were 
atomized. They were unaccounted for, even within 
their own agencies. Thus as a cornerstone for Analytic 
Transformation, DDNI/A constructed an Analytic 
Resources Catalogue (ARC), a database of informa- 
tion on all IC analysts that indicates each one's ex- 
pertise, experience, and special skills. From the ARC 
evolved the Analysts Yellow Pages, a virtual rolodex 
that enables analysts working on, for example, Iraq or 
WMD, to find the names, phone numbers, and email 
addresses of colleagues who have or have had the 
same or cognate accounts. Such innovations may ap- 
pear pedestrian. But they addressed an insuperable 
impediment to collaboration, and in doing so laid a 
foundation for more dramatic initiatives. 24 






Of these, none were more vital, or counterin- 
tuitively more radical, than training— joint training. 
Analytic training within the IC, as defined by deep 
immersion in the fundamentals of critical analysis, is 
itself largely a 21st-century phenomenon. On March 4, 
2000, George Tenet dedicated the CIA's Sherman Kent 
School for Intelligence Analysis. The legendary Kent 
had proposed its establishment as early as 1953. In 
the almost half-century interim, instruction provided 
by the CIA's Office of Training and Education at "the 
Farm" and elsewhere gave short shrift to critical think- 
ing and structured analytic techniques. The same held 
true at the few other extant "schoolhouses": the De- 
fense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence 
Training Center (JMITC); the National Defense Intel- 
ligence College (chartered in 1962, awards B.S. and 
M.A. degrees); the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Academy; the National Security Agency's National 
Cryptologic School; and, most recently, the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency's Academy. Howev- 
er, not only did their quality and curricula vary, but 
the autonomy of the schoolhouses also reinforced the 
diffusion of IC analysts. They trained separately, in- 
habited separate spaces, and produced their separate 
intelligence products, often from separate sources. 25 

Analysts had to learn to share. They also had to 
develop the trust in one another that sharing and col- 
laboration require. DDNI/A Fingar understood that 
unless an analyst from one element has confidence in 
an analyst from another, she/he will be loath to share 
information with the other person. Without confi- 
dence, moreover, there will be insufficient incentive 
to collaborate, because the quality of the collabora- 
tor's product will be suspect. The answer was joint 
training in a common, indeed a neutral, environment. 



85 



DDNI/A developed, tested, and then managed the 
poorly named Analysis 101, a foundational course in 
the critical thinking, structured techniques, and other 
tradecraft skills that rigorous analysis demands, re- 
gardless of the functional or geographic specializa- 
tion. Following the military aphorism, in Analysis 101 
intelligence analysts train the way they fight — col- 
laboratively. Ironically, many of the uniformed lead- 
ers in intelligence billets resisted this degree of joint 
training at the start of the analysts' careers. Adding 
to this irony, yet reflecting its support for the course's 
aims, the DIA, which has the resources to sustain the 
course, took over its management as the DNI's execu- 
tive agent in October 2008. 26 

Because its purpose is to promote "jointness" as 
well as to train, Analysis 101 (the JMITC added "In- 
troduction to Critical Thinking and Structured Anal- 
ysis" to the title) is based on "standards" — in two 
senses of the word. In the first sense, analysts from 
the different elements receive standard training, build 
a standard vocabulary, and identify standard sets of 
questions. As a consequence, even as they develop a 
greater appreciation for the distinct contributions of 
their home agencies, the experiences they share in the 
classroom with peers from across that IC, especially 
when working in teams on case studies, tear down the 
barriers to future collaboration and promote a com- 
munity ethos. Indeed, they leave the course with a 
list of names from other elements that they trust and 
to whom they can reach out for expertise or contacts. 
Student evaluations and testimonials signal they un- 
derstand the dynamic and the goal. "The Analysis 101 
course supports this new vision and approach," wrote 
one graduate in reference to the emphasis on collabo- 
ration and integration, "by actively promoting future 



86 



interagency cooperation through a constant and con- 
sistent reinforcement of the idea that students from 
these different agencies will work together not only in 
the course but will depend on this new coordination 
model to fully utilize the expertise and resources of 
the different agencies within the IC to solve problems 
of mutual concern." 27 

With regard to the second sense of the word, the 
course also introduces the students to lofty standards 
of critical thinking. Rather than compelling the ana- 
lytic workforce, many of whom had only recently 
graduated from college, to "learn by osmosis," Fingar 
recalled in an article marking Analysis 101's one thou- 
sandth graduate, the course "set[s] the bar high" from 
the beginning of the analysts' careers. It does this by 
focusing its syllabus and pedagogy on precise stan- 
dards of analytic tradecraft. These standards were de- 
veloped, in consultation with an "Action Group" com- 
posed of representatives from all the IC elements, by 
the ODNI's Office of Analytic Integrity and Standards 
(AIS) and put into effect through a directive of the DNI 
applicable to all intelligence agencies. Their products 
as well as those for which Finger and DDNI/A were 
directly responsible (NIEs and PDBs) would be sub- 
ject to the new standards. 28 

The standards — eight in number — reflect and 
promote the "core principles of analytic tradecraft." 29 
Half of these evolved directly from the IRTPA legisla- 
tion and the reports of the 9/11 and Iraq WMD com- 
missions. They include properly describing the qual- 
ity and reliability of the products' sources, explicitly 
expressing uncertainties and qualifying judgments, 
distinguishing between those judgments and the in- 
telligence that informed them, and articulating differ- 
ent yet plausible assessments or interpretations of the 



87 



data. Supplementing these standards are others that 
AIS and its Action Group deemed equally important. 
These concern the relevance to matters of national 
security, the logic of the argumentation, the extent to 
which the product's judgments challenged or revised 
previous ones, and, of course, accuracy. Merely using 
these standards as a checklist when writing reports all 
but assures improvement in their quality, consequent- 
ly engendering the confidence of other analysts and 
as well as consumers in that quality. Moreover, the 
standards serve as cues for the analysts to think more 
attentively and sensitively about their own thinking, 
thereby intensifying its rigor. The students' exposure 
to such structured methods as Analysis of Competing 
Hypotheses and Argument Mapping, accompanied 
by technological tools, intensified that rigor further. 30 
The intention of Intelligence Community Direc- 
tive (ICD) 203 is to sharpen the critical thinking that 
underlies intelligence products; a supplementary ICD 
aimed to increase the transparency of those products. 
ICD 206 requires that analysts provide "consistent 
and structured sourcing information" for all dissemi- 
nated analytic products. 31 In other words, any intel- 
ligence product intended for distribution beyond the 
office that generated it must, like work of the scholarly 
community, include citations of sources, original not 
secondary, on which the products' claims are based. 
ICD 206 mandates that these citations, which must 
take the form of endnotes to avoid interrupting the 
flow of the text and also to facilitate their removal for 
purposes of sanitization, conform to a precise style to 
make certain that they convey to the reader, whether 
another analyst or consumer, the sourcing information 
needed not only for retrieval but also for evaluation. 
Indeed, the ICD encourages analysts to acquire from 



88 



collectors insight into the nature and reliability of the 
source and add this to the note as a source descriptor 
(or when feasible incorporate it into the text). Doing so 
reduces the potential for exaggerating the credibility 
of a judgment based on misleading or deceptive input. 
Further, a source summary statement that concisely 
encapsulates "the key sources of information used 
in the product, addressing such strengths and limita- 
tions of available information, notable inconsistencies 
in reporting, important information gaps, or other fac- 
tors that the producing organization deems relevant," 
must appear conspicuously. Given current training, 
the likelihood of a product relying on outdated intel- 
ligence is remote. That the analyst must now advertise 
this reliance makes this scenario even less likely. Of 
course, extraordinary and mission-critical circum- 
stances might make adherence impractical and even 
impossible. For such cases, the ICD establishes a pro- 
cedure for the IC element to request a waiver, or even 
an exemption for an entire product line. Moreover, if 
for purposes of dissemination a product must be sani- 
tized or downgraded, a fully-sourced version must be 
retained for future reference. 

ICD 203 and 206, which taken together address the 
fundamentals of tradecraft and transparency, are at 
the very heart of Analytic Transformation. Indeed, the 
success of the reform effort will be judged according to 
the effectiveness of the implementation of the two di- 
rectives. The challenges are immense. Those who draft 
intelligence products, and their managers up the line, 
are not all graduates of Analysis 101. They are more 
senior — many are are of long tenure. Their training, 
which in large part came informally through mentors, 
was very different. To many analysts of the old school, 
sourcing, let alone this degree of detailed sourcing, 



89 



takes too much time. Worse, according to their Welt- 
anschauung, sourcing is anathema to the imperative 
that overrides everything else: protecting sources and 
methods. In fact, to adhere to the IC standards virtu- 
ally without exception, IC veterans need to unlearn in- 
grained behavior. Seasoned analysts, Deputy Director 
Fingar came to recognize, had "a difficult time stating 
their assumptions up front, explicitly explaining their 
logic, and, in the end, indentifying unambiguously for 
policymakers what they do not know." While openly 
conceding a gap in information is necessary, it is not 
sufficient. Analysts must learn how to "weigh what 
you know against what you don't know," adds one 
of Fingar' s deputies, and how to "express uncertainty 
and develop confidence levels in the information and 
findings." 32 

As a consequence, the purpose of the IC Analytic 
Standards goes beyond serving as the building blocks 
for Analysis 101. ICD 203 mandated that the Standards 
constitute the "basis for evaluation of the analytic pro- 
duction of the IC, and be included in analysis teaching 
modules and case studies throughout the IC." This 
directive is based on the paragraph in section 1019 of 
the IRTPA requiring the DNI to assign an individual 
or entity the responsibility of regularly performing 
"detailed reviews of finished intelligence products or 
other analytic products by [any] element or elements 
of the intelligence community." The directive pro- 
vides the authority for AIS's evaluation of more than 
a thousand products each over the past 3 years. In do- 
ing so, AIS identified best practices and developed a 
hierarchical scale for each Standard. For example, it 
is good to provide alternative analyses and to clearly 
articulate estimates of probabilities, but it is outstand- 
ing to indicate the signposts that will signal the likely 



90 



evolution of each alternative, especially ones with low 
probability but potentially high impact. Products that 
explicitly assess the depth and reliability of the re- 
porting on which the product depended, gaps in that 
reporting, and the assumptions the analysts used to 
bridge those gaps (not to be confused with the "ex- 
panded methodology" and the subsequent "knowns, 
known unknowns, and unknown unknowns" catch 
phrase attributed to Donald Rumsfeld), receive high 
marks based on multiple standards. 33 

The evaluators then brief the results of these evalu- 
ations to the heads of each of the agencies' training 
units as well as their directors of analysis. They also 
present workshops to different offices. At least as 
significant, throughout 2008 they consulted with 
each IC element in establishing its in-house evalu- 
ation program in order to create a multiplier effect. 
This signal achievement was completed by the fall 
of 2008. The evaluations have become instruments to 
train increasing numbers of senior analysts through- 
out the IC. This training will benefit further from the 
approaching completion of a compendium of best 
practices and lessons learned from the evaluations, to 
be titled Insights into Applying the Intelligence Commu- 
nity's Analytic Standards: A Guide to Best Practices?* 

Has this effort transformed intelligence analysis? 
It is too early to tell, but the signs are encouraging. Al- 
though analysts still stumble, particularly over some 
of the standards, and the training needed to satisfy 
the sourcing requirements has just begun, the evalu- 
ation grades for all types of products are trending in 
the right direction. What is more, the results of the 
few assessments of performance related to the eighth 
Tradecraft Standard appear positive. 35 Accuracy is, 
of course, the gold standard for analysts. Yet, evalu- 



91 



ating accuracy is very hard. The degree of difficulty 
is a variable, as is the required time. If, for example, 
an intelligence-based warning precipitates successful 
preventive or preemptive measures, an accurate pre- 
diction will, of course, be retrospectively inaccurate. 
Nevertheless, based on the small set of studies under- 
taken, there does seem to be a correlation between out- 
standing tradecraft and the accuracy of the product. 
Many future estimates will surely prove to be wrong. 
Still, for intelligence producers and consumers, the 
preliminary results of the evaluations are very good 
news. Perhaps even better news, in the long run, is the 
increased attention paid to tradecraft throughout the 
IC, and the sense of collegiality, even fraternity, that 
this attention has generated. Analysts from across the 
IC proudly wear laminated cards emblazoned with 
the IC Analytic Standards on their lanyards — signal- 
ing their membership in the same "club." This degree 
of team-mindedness is unprecedented in the history 
of U.S. intelligence. 

Identifying collaboration and integration as the 
benchmarks of Analytic Transformation compelled 
DDNI/A Fingar and his staff to tackle impediments 
as fundamental as training and tradecraft but over 
which they exercised less control. In particular, they 
had to confront pervasive information hoarding. "In- 
adequate information sharing is a major impediment 
to effective IC performance," reads the 2008 report on 
the Director of National Intelligence's "Critical Intel- 
ligence Community Management Challenges" by the 
ODNI's Office of the Inspector General. The report 
cites IRTPA's requirement that the DNI enact reforms 
"to ensure maximum availability of and access to in- 
telligence information and to establish policies and 
procedures to resolve conflicts between the need to 



92 



share intelligence information and the need to protect 
intelligence sources and methods." It concludes that 
the DNI has failed to satisfy this requirement. Conse- 
quently, analysts still must rely on "personal relation- 
ships with counterparts to acquire much of their intel- 
ligence data." More pernicious, "Agencies responsible 
for developing collection systems," primarily but not 
exclusively the CIA (HUMINT), NSA (signals intelli- 
gence - SIGINT), and NGA (imagery intelligence - IM- 
INT), continue to control and limit access to data and 
products essential to analysis across the IC." The lack 
of interoperability among many of the IC elements' re- 
spective IT systems exacerbates these problems. 36 

The IG's report is well-founded. Since the coin 
of the realm for intelligence is information, posses- 
sion of it remains pivotal to the IC's internal balance 
of power. Accordingly, the communal ethos has still 
not gained full traction, and individual agencies thus 
remain more predisposed to hoard than to share. 
Consequently, in December 2007, the DNI approved 
an Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum em- 
phasizing that each IC element, and each office and 
individual within each element, has a "responsibility 
to provide" intelligence information to all customers 
(including analysts) who require that information. 
Theoretically, this memorandum renders obsolete the 
"Need to Know" culture that poses such an obstacle 
to sharing. But in practice, the result is far from opti- 
mal. The memorandum states that the responsibility 
to provide information "requires that the IC create the 
appropriate tension to more effectively balance the 
'need to share intelligence' with the requisite 'need 
to protect' sources and methods." Not surprisingly, 
however, given the degree of difficulty, it neither de- 
fines "appropriate tension" nor provides guidance on 



93 



how to achieve that more "effective balance." Predict- 
ably, then, since analysts and collectors are much bet- 
ter trained in the need to protect sources and methods 
than in the secure procedures to share, and that they 
are denied rewards for sharing that even remotely 
counter-balance the penalties for divulging, and that 
they do not receive direction from the DNI or front 
office that if conflicts exist that they should err on the 
side of "need to share," those analysts and collectors 
are understandably conservative in fulfilling their re- 
sponsibility to share. Intelligence agencies have long 
institutional memories, especially regarding when a 
source or method was once compromised. Only a few 
have even begun to record success stories produced 
from information sharing. 37 

So intractable are these problems that the title 
to IC Directive 501 was changed from "Information 
Sharing" to "Discovery and Dissemination or Re- 
trieval of Information within the Intelligence Commu- 
nity." The revised title reflects the ICD's more limited 
scope. It does underscore the principle of "responsi- 
bility to provide," emphasizing that IC elements are 
"stewards," not owners, of information. It also calls 
both raw intelligence and analytic products "national 
assets." Nevertheless, the requirement ensures only 
that information is "discoverable" by "authorized 
personnel." Retrieving and accessing the information 
that is discovered still entails surmounting the many 
obstacles that inhere in a seemingly immutable class- 
ification system. In addition, the discoverability of the 
intelligence, raw and finished, depends on automated 
means that have not yet been fully developed. 38 

DDNI/ A Fingar recognized that information shar- 
ing is integral to Analytic Transformation. But with- 



94 



out the cooperation of other directorates within the 
ODNI and the individual elements that comprise the 
IC, DDNI/A's reach is limited. Nevertheless, Fingar, 
relying heavily on Michael Wertheimer, his assistant 
for Analytic Transformation and Technology, placed 
the promotion of information sharing through both 
attitudinal change and technological innovation at the 
very top of his agenda. The ODNI's Inspector General 
singled out Wertheimer' s efforts as among the very 
few "significant achievements in information shar- 
ing." But to many of the IC elements, Wertheimer is 
"the most dangerous man in U.S. intelligence." 39 

That is because Wertheimer, notwithstanding his 
more than 2 decades of immersion in the IC culture 
as a cryptologist of the NSA, is a risk-taker — one who, 
particularly after 9/11, lost all patience with the vari- 
ous fiefdoms' excessive classification of and monopo- 
lies over intelligence. With the DDNI/A's unqualified 
support, he proclaimed simply that notwithstanding 
the IC's traditions and standard operating procedures, 
"We are going to share more." There is no other option: 
"We can't afford the kinds of mistakes that we're mak- 
ing based on the way we're doing business today," he 
said. Wertheimer prefers the term "Analytic Libera- 
tion" to "Analytic Transformation" because it signals 
"unleashing" the analytic community's potential. 40 

Wertheimer was DDNI/A's point man in the draft- 
ing of ICD 501. He would have preferred a more robust 
directive, and without his contributions, it doubtless 
would have been more limited. Further, Wertheimer' s 
focus has been less on policy, which he could influ- 
ence only moderately, but rather on the architecture 
of information sharing, over which he could exercise 
more authority. This made it feasible for the analysts 
themselves, where the dissemination of information 



95 



and ideas was concerned, to exercise more authority. 
IRTPA requires the creation of a single Information 
Sharing Environment (ISE), which is designed to fa- 
cilitate the dissemination of information particularly 
related to terrorism. For this purpose, there was to 
be a program manager (Chief Information Officer), 
a council, and attendant offices. Implementation has 
proven predictably difficult, and the CIO's office has 
foundered. But Wertheimer's office within DDNI/A 
launched several interrelated initiatives with the po- 
tential to produce extremely far-reaching consequenc- 



es. 41 



Chief among these is the creation of a Library of 
National Intelligence (LNI). In collaboration with the 
CIA, DDNI/A constructed in cyberspace the first au- 
thoritative repository for disseminated intelligence 
throughout the IC, regardless of its classification and 
origin. On deposit in the LNI will be the fully sourced 
versions of all finished intelligence, complemented by 
a finder's guide consisting of a virtual card catalogue 
that is classified at the lowest possible level and con- 
tains summary abstracts of products. As now autho- 
rized by ICD 501, analysts can discover and request ac- 
cess to these products. Whether they can successfully 
access them will depend on individual levels of clear- 
ance and the products' security guidelines. But even if 
denied access, analysts will benefit from knowing the 
existence and dates of analyses on a subject. No less 
important, they will learn whether there has been no 
analysis. Further, an analyst without the appropriate 
clearance can request special access to the product or 
ask for a sanitized version. 

The LNI was launched in November 2007; by the 
end of its first year about half of the elements in the 
IC had taken the measures their internal requirements 



96 



demanded in order to submit products to it. Although 
still undergoing testing, by the beginning of 2009, the 
LNI had in principle achieved the capacity to make 
available some 800,000 products for analysts to share 
across the IC, and it was adding some 20,000 products 
each week. It was also making progress toward meet- 
ing another vital need. Through Catalyst, a data pro- 
gram still under development, key data such as names 
of persons, places, and organizations will be tagged 
(metadata tagging) in such a way that they are search- 
able. This will allow analysts to extract such data from 
the diverse welter of intelligence sources without hav- 
ing to collate and read the individual products and 
their documentary sources. (Metadata tagging will 
also enable the linking of finished intelligence with 
stored raw reporting.) The Catalyst program, there- 
fore, can help the analyst cope with both the volume 
of information and its security restrictions. Further, 
metadata tagging will not only produce additional 
community-wide standards with regard to identify- 
ing attributes, but in conjunction with tracking card 
catalogue requests, it will allow collectors to deter- 
mine which sources are appearing most frequently in 
finished intelligence. This correlation will assist in the 
formulation of research strategies. 42 

Whereas joint training in IC-wide standards is the 
"front end" of the reform cycle for the production of 
intelligence, the LNI is the "back end." In between is 
the analytic process itself— that phase during which 
analysts are producing. This is the phase when collab- 
oration is most vital — and yet most difficult. Analysts 
are sequestered in their respective agencies. To facili- 
tate collaboration among analysts from different agen- 
cies, DDNI/A, inspired by the success of MySpace, 
Facebook, and their web rivals, developed a classified 



97 



"social" networking website. Tested in early 2008, and 
then redesigned dramatically in response to feedback, 
A-Space went on line in September 2008. 

A-Space built on two previous DDNI/ A initiatives. 
Intellipedia, the IC's variant of Wikipedia, began as a 
pilot in 2005, was up and running the next year, and is 
now heavily used. With different editions available in 
Top Secret, Secret, and Unclassified environments, it 
allows tens of thousands of users to collaborate in pro- 
ducing, expanding, and editing articles. What is more, 
because qualified consumers can also access and in- 
deed contribute to Intellipedia, it fosters interaction 
between the IC and its customers. A parallel initia- 
tive was the establishment of communities of interest 
(COIs). These are secure web-based environments in 
which analysts, collectors, and managers from differ- 
ent agencies with common accounts come together 
in a virtual environment to share their ideas — and to 
some extent their data. 

A-Space did not replace either Intellipedia or COIs. 
But to a degree, it synthesized them and thereby took 
each to a higher level of utility. Unlike Intellipedia, 
A-Space is available only to intelligence analysts, and 
even then only to those with a Top Secret/ Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clear- 
ance (a version at least at the Secret level is planned). 
Like both Intellipedia and COIs, the secure workspace 
allows analysts to share ideas and collaborate. But 
unlike the others, A-Space serves as a well-guarded 
gateway to highly classified sources and databases. 
Indeed, access to A-Space is so tightly controlled that 
agencies have received waivers to post data that oth- 
erwise are subject to regulations preven-ting their 
being shared. 43 Analysts can consequently not only 
brainstorm as they develop their thinking, but also ac- 



98 



tually access and share the intelligence as well as the 
expertise that drives that thinking. 

Thus A-Space offers analysts an opportunity, and 
potentially an incentive, to think out loud by post- 
ing their insights and even sourced rough drafts for 
comments by their peers. Colleagues from other agen- 
cies can critique these works in progress, challenging 
key assumptions, offering alternative analyses, even 
drawing attention to supplementary or conflicting 
data. Because of the process of managerial review, the 
coordination required before publication, and the dif- 
ficulty of finalizing prior to a virtual peer review, it is 
unlikely that A-Space will evolve into a site for pro- 
ducing finished intelligence (although this has been 
attempted). But it can play a valuable role in the draft- 
ing phases, as well as offering a forum for exchanging 
views on all matters of tradecraft methodology and 
attendant issues. 44 

It will be beneficial if A-Space is opened to IC's col- 
lection community. Collectors should be familiar with 
analysts' thinking, and vice versa. But even without 
A-Space and other shared environments, the nexus be- 
tween analysis and collection is tightening. In forging 
this relationship, the office of Analytic Mission Man- 
agement (AMM) has played a catalytic role. DDNI/A 
Fingar recognized that the addition of an exploding 
number of nonstate-centered asymmetrical threats to 
the data overload that accompanied the information 
and communication revolutions demanded IC-wide 
conversations among analysts. This addition likewise 
required, as Fingar clearly saw, that collectors partici- 
pate in those conversations. Collectors and collection 
systems could no longer resemble, to use Fingar' s 
metaphor, "vacuum cleaners on steroids," drowning 
analysts in such oceans of data that they cannot pos- 



99 



sibly process it. Moreover, the data collected was not 
necessarily correlated to the most pressing questions 
of the analysts — or the policymakers, warfighters, and 
first responders. To improve the quality of analysis, 
collection had to focus on filling the most vital infor- 
mation gaps. 45 

DDNI/A Fingar charged AMM with tracking the 
allocation of analytic resources across the community 
so as to better align them with high-priority targets. 
Not all IC elements should work the same targets. 
AMM seeks to orchestrate a division of labor driven 
by expertise and capabilities. To order those targets 
hierarchically, moreover, the office also engages in 
collaborative dialogues for the purpose of develop- 
ing the National Intelligence Priorities Framework 
(NIPF). Updated semiannually, the NIPF establishes 
"objectives, priorities, and guidance to the IC to en- 
sure timely and effective collection, processing, analy- 
sis, and dissemination of national intelligence." AMM 
operates both at and below the level of this super- 
structure. On behalf of the DDNI/A, it oversees the 
formulation and revisions of the NIPF. Concurrently, 
it also keeps close tabs on the production process in 
order to assess the quality and coverage of finished in- 
telligence on the highest priority targets, to identify as 
precisely as possible disabling gaps that are impairing 
analyses, and to coordinate with the collection com- 
munity for the purpose of closing those gaps. 46 

AMM's vital role in coordinating the analytic and 
collection communities has become increasingly in- 
stitutionalized. In late 2007, the DNI set up the Na- 
tional Intelligence Coordination Center (NIC-C). The 
deputy directors of both analysis and collection were 
represented on it in order to facilitate their collabora- 
tion. Finally, Analysis and Collection were formally 



100 



joined. Previously they had been linked to some extent 
through the Mission Management system, manifested 
most notably in IRTPA's establishment of the National 
Counterterrorism and National Counterproliferation 
Centers, but also evident in the specific country mis- 
sion managers designated by the DNI on Iran, North 
Korea, and Cuba/Venezuela. AMM essentially pro- 
vided mission management for all other topics — act- 
ing as a liaison between the analysts and collectors. 
However, ICD 207, the directive on the National Intel- 
ligence Council, assigned these responsibilities to the 
NIC's National Intelligence Officers. Because the NIO 
offices have paltry staffs, AMM provides critical sup- 
port. In this capacity, as well as through its responsi- 
bilities to the NIPF and NIC-C, AMM is fundamental 
to implementing another pillar of Analytic Transfor- 
mation: Analysis must drive collection, not the other way 
around. 47 

The establishment of the ODNI is, of course, not a 
panacea, and DDNI/A, which comprises but a small 
percentage of the IC's workforce, resources, and bud- 
get, is but the tail wagging the dog. Predictably, then, 
severe challenges remain. 48 The culture of distinctive- 
ness (often almost mythic in its grip) and competition 
among the elements remain pervasive, often defiantly 
so. The preponderant influence on and within the 
IC of the military, with its tradition of separateness 
and branding that continues to resist the spirit of the 
Goldwater-Nichols reorganization, reinforces this cul- 
ture. 49 The consequences are extremely detrimental 
for information sharing, especially when juxtaposed 
with a reflexive disposition toward secretiveness, and 
the widespread belief that secrets are the key ingre- 
dients of bureaucratic power. Dynamic, even aggres- 
sive, leadership from the DNI is absolutely essential to 



101 



overcome the many sources of resistance. But for rea- 
sons that include an uncertainty about authorities, a 
fear of projecting the image of one more cannibalizing 
institution, and a recognition that all but one of the IC 
elements report to a cabinet-level official, DNI leader- 
ship has been tentative. Michael McConnell's succes- 
sor as DNI, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, "came to the job 
determined to cement the intelligence chief's author- 
ity over 16 disparate spy agencies." The consequence 
has been cold war with the CIA, the outcome of which 
remains undecided. The DNI's directives will prove 
effective only when the elements accept them in spirit 
and in principle as well as practice. 50 

In addition to all these institutional obstacles to re- 
form is their degree of difficulty. Finding the proper 
balance between sharing information and protecting 
sources and methods is hard. Penetrating hard tar- 
gets to collect reliable intelligence is notoriously hard. 
Reaching confident judgments by evaluating what 
is known against what is not known is hard. Find- 
ing accurate answers to the tough as opposed to easy 
questions is hard. Providing smart and experienced 
customers with information and insight beyond what 
they already have is hard. Tailoring intelligence to 
specific customer sets with specific needs and security 
clearances is hard. Intelligence analysis is an art, not 
a science; there is a difference between a puzzle and 
a mystery. The best intelligence can do is narrow the 
boundaries of uncertainty. It cannot eliminate it, and 
thus there will be intelligence failures. Even when an 
estimate gets it right, the judgment is rarely so clear- 
cut as to satisfy a conflicted consumer or persuade 
him or her to reverse course or take decisive action. 51 

Still, the initiatives that have largely gone unno- 
ticed in the public sphere suggest that the intelligence- 



102 



reform glass is half full. The objective of IRTPA is to 
improve the quality of America's national intelligence, 
and its quality has improved. While it would be an ex- 
aggeration to claim that all intelligence reports are now 
based on all sources of information, that is a standard 
to which the IC explicitly aspires. Further, products 
are based on more sources of information, the quality 
and reliability of which are exponentially more trans- 
parent. Analysts make unequivocal both what they 
know and what inferences that they drew from what 
they know in order to provide judgments about what 
they do not know. Without giving an impression of 
false precision, they indicate the confidence levels that 
they have in their inferences and judgments as well as 
articulating alternative scenarios. When there is dis- 
sent or disagreement, the customer is informed of it. 

Even if not perfect, moreover, there is greater col- 
laboration and integration throughout the IC. In ad- 
dition, analysts are now not only authorized but also 
encouraged to reach out to expertise wherever it can 
be located — in universities, in think tanks, in indus- 
try, in the scientific community, and elsewhere, par- 
ticularly if those experts are likely to challenge or- 
thodoxy. 52 The IC still suffers from limited language 
capabilities and insufficient training facilities, but it no 
longer conceals such inadequacies and is committed 
to addressing them. Most fundamental of all, the IC, 
as a community, recognizes that it must improve, and 
the contemporary environment lends great urgency 
to that imperative. In light of the caliber and commit- 
ment of the personnel, that recognition gives cause for 
optimism. 



103 



ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4 

1. Remarks by Dr. Thomas Fingar at the DNI's Information 
Sharing Conference and Technology Exposition, August 21-25, 
2006, available from wwzv.dni.gov/speeches/20060821_2_speech.pdf. 

2. I thank Jeremy Schmidt for his very helpful research, and 
James Marchio, Randall McCall, and Karl Pieragostini for their 
insightful comments and criticism. From September 4, 2007, 
through December 31, 2008, I served as Assistant Deputy Di- 
rector of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Stan- 
dards, and Analytic Ombudsman for the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. Nevertheless, the views expressed in this 
publication are my own and do not imply endorsement by the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence or any other U.S. 
Government agency. 

3. Elmer Johnson quoted in David Brooks, "The Quagmire 
Ahead," New York Times, June 1, 2009. On General Motors as a 
model of good management, see David Farber, Sloan Rules: Alfred 
P. Sloan and the Triumph of General Motors, Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 2002. 

4. Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA, Frederick, MD: Uni- 
versity Publications of America, 1981; David Rudgers, Creating 
the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943- 
1947, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2000. 

5. Public Law 108-458, The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, December 17, 2004; available from travel.state.gov/ 
pdffirtpa2004.pdf 

6. Fred Kaplan, "You Call That a Reform Bill?" Slate, De- 
cember 7, 2004, available from www .slate.com/id/2110767; Joshua 
Sinai, "Countering Terrorism: Reform of Intelligence Not the 
Answer," Washington Times, April 19, 2005; Richard Posner, "Im- 
portant Job, Impossible Position," New York Times, February 9, 
2005. 

7. Philip Shenon, "Next Round is Set to Push to Reorganize 
Intelligence: Turf Wars and Debates are Expected," New York 
Times, December 20, 2004; Philip Shenon, "The Beast That Feeds 



104 



on Boxes: Bureaucracy," New York Times, April 10, 2005; John 
Brennan, "Is This Intelligence? We Added Players But Lost Con- 
trol of the Ball," Washington Post, November 20, 2005. 

8. Richard H. Immerman, "A Brief History of the CIA," The 
Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny, Athan Theo- 
haris, et al., eds., Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 
2006, pp. 79-85; Richard H. Immerman, "Intelligence and Strat- 
egy: Historicizing Psychology, Politics, and Policy," Diplomatic 
History, Vol. 32, January 2008, pp. 1-23. 

9. See, for example, John R. Bolton, "The Flaws in the Iran 
Report," Washington Post, December 6, 2007; Henry Kissinger, 
"Misreading the Iran Report: Why Spying and Policymaking 
Don't Mix," Washington Post, December 13, 2007. For criticisms 
that target this author, see Gabriel Schoenfeld, "If Michael Moore 
Had a Security Clearance: How Did the Rabid Ideologue Richard 
Immerman Get Put in Charge of the 'Standards and Integrity' 
of the Intelligence Community?" Weekly Standard, March 3, 2008; 
Gabriel Schoenfeld, "The Real Bush Intelligence Failure," Wall 
Street Journal, April 3, 2008; Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Wash- 
ington Times, March 14, 2008; The Key Judgments of the NIE, 
"Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," November 2007, is 
available from wwzu.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf. 

10. Jack Devine, "An Intelligence Reform Reality Check," 
Washington Post, February 18, 2008. 

11. Mark M. Lowenthal, "The Real Intelligence Failure: 
Spineless Spies," Washington Post, May 25, 2008. See also Melvin 
A. Goodman, "The Colossal Failure of the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence," The Public Record, April 2, 2009, avail- 
able from www.pubrecord.org/commentary/811-the-colossal-failure- 
of-the-office-of-the-director-of-nationaTintelligence.html. 

12. Scott Shane, "In New Job, Spymaster Draws Bipartisan 
Criticism," New York Times, April 20, 2006; Mark Mazzetti, "Re- 
port Faults Pace of Intelligence Overhaul," New York Times, July 
28, 2006; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Office of 
the Inspector General, Critical Intelligence Community Management 
Challenges, November 12, 2008, available from www .glob alsecuri- 
ty.org/intell/library/reports/200S/081112-oig-intel-report.pdf. 



105 



13. Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge & Pow- 
er in American National Security, New York: Columbia, 2007, pp. 
19-52, 183-84. 

14. Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, 
JCS, and NSC, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. 

15. Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Ori- 
gins of 9/11, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 
59, 182. 

16. Equally affected by the initiatives, of course, are the Na- 
tional Counterterrorismand Counterproliferation Centers (NCTC 
and NCPC) and offices directly responsible to the DDNI/A such 
as the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and President's Daily 
Brief (PDB). Increasingly, moreover, Analytic Transformation is 
extending to the state, local, and tribal law enforcement commu- 
nities. 

17. Thomas Fingar, Preface to Analytic Transformation: Un- 
leashing the Potential of a Community of Analysts, September 1, 
2008, available from odni.gov/content/AT_Digital%2020080923.pdf, 
Fingar, "Remarks at the DNI's Information Sharing Conference." 

18. Executive Order (EO) 12333, "United States Intelligence 
Activities," December 4, 1981, available from www.archives.gov/ 
federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html, Part I. See 
also Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities 
(As amended by Executive Orders 13284 [2003], 13355 [2004] and 
13470 [2008]), July 30, 2008, available from www fas.org/irp/offdocs/ 
eoZeo-12333-2008.pdf . 

19. EO 12333, Part 1, 1.1(a). 

20. "Soviet Strategic Objectives, An Alternative View (Report 
of Team 'B')," December 1, 1976, available from www.faqs.org/cia/ 
docs/46/0000278531/SOVIET-STRATEGIC-OBJECTIVES-AN-AL- 
TERNATE-VIEW-(REPORT-OF-TEAM-%22B.html; Anne Kahn, 
Killing Detente: The Right Attacks the CIA, College Park: Pennsyl- 
vania State University Press, 1998; Gordon R. Mitchell, "Team 
B Intelligence Coups," Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 92, May 
2006, pp. 144-173. 



106 



21. Albeit without much success, fostering integration and 
collaboration had, in fact, been a chief priority of George Tenet 
prior to 9/11. See Douglas F. Garthoff, Directors of Central Intel- 
ligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005, 
Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007, pp. 256-64. 

22. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, New York: 
Norton, 2004, pp. 266-76; Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terror- 
ist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Washington, DC: The House Per- 
manent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, December 2002, pp. 315-24; 355-68, 
available from www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/fullreport_ 
errata.pdf; James Risen, "Failures on Terrorism Are Seen Shap- 
ing Tenet's Legacy," New York Times, June 4, 2004; Transcript of 
Remarks and Q&A by Thomas Fingar, Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco, CA, February 14, 2008 (author's possession). 

23. National Intelligence Estimate, Iraq's Continuing Pro- 
grams for Weapons of Mass Destruction, October 30, 2002, avail- 
able from www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd-nie.pdf. 

24. Fingar, Analytic Transformation, p. 16. 

25. Remarks of the Director of Central Intelligence, George 
J. Tenet, at the Dedication of the Sherman Kent School, May 4, 
2000, available from www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testi- 
mony/2000/dci_speech_05052000.html. 

26. Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell 
memorandum to the IC, September 22, 2008 (author's posses- 
sion). 

27. Memorandum from [name omitted] intelligence research 
specialist to the deputy director of his analytical center, January 
16, 2009, (author's permission, used by permission of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and the appropriate agen- 
cy). 

28. Michael Birmingham, "Analyze This," The Spotlight, Vol. 
28, December 10, 2008; Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 
203, Analytic Standards, effective June 21, 2007, available from 

www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf 



107 



29. There were, in fact five Analytic Standards: (1) objectiv- 
ity, (2) independent of political considerations, (3) timeliness, 
(4) based on all available sources of intelligence, and (5) exhibits 
proper standards of analytic tradecraft. ICD 203 broke this last 
standard into four, producing eight tradecraft standards. They 
formed the basis of Analysis 101. 

30. ICD 203, 2; Richard J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence, 
Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, pp. 
95-110; Richard J. Heuer, Jr., "Computer-Aided Analysis of Com- 
peting Hypotheses," in, Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, 
eds., Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008, pp. 251- 
65; Tim van Gelder, "What Is Argument Mapping," Blog, Febru- 
ary 17, 2009, available from timvangelder.com/2009/02/17/what-is- 
argument-mappingj . 

31. Intelligence Community Directive 206, Sourcing Require- 
ments/or Disseminated Analytic Products, effective October 17, 2007, 
available from www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD%20 
206,% 20Sourcing%20Requirements.pdf;BobDrogm,Curveball: Spies, 
Lies, and the Man Behind Them: How American Went to War in Iraq, 
New York: Random House, 2007. The data in the balance of this 
paragaph is also taken from Directive 206. 

32. The quotes in this paragraph are extracted from Michael 
Birmingham's "Analyze This." 

33. See ICD 203; and IRTPA, Sec. 1019 (b) (1) (A). On Rums- 
feld's expanded methodology and catch phrase, see John Dia- 
mond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the 
End of the Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq, Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 271-73. 

34. U.S. Intelligence Community, 500-Day Plan, Integration and 
Collaboration: Follow-up Report, January 16, 2009, available from 
www.dni.gov/500-day-plan/500%,20Day%,20Plan%,20Follow%20 
Up%>20Report%>20part%>201.pdf; James Marchio, email correspon- 
dence with author, June 1, 2009 (author's possession). 

35. See endnote 29. 



108 



36. The quotations are from the Office of the Inspector Gen- 
eral, Critical Intelligence Community Management Challenges, pp. 
3-4. 

37. Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 2007-200- 
2, Preparing Intelligence to Meet the Intelligence Community's "Re- 
sponsibility to Provide," effective December 11, 2007, available 
from www.fas.org/irp/dni/icpm/2007-200-2.pdf. 

38. Intelligence Community Directive 501, Discovery and Dis- 
semination or Retrieval of Information within the Intelligence Com- 
munity, effective January 21, 2009, available from www.dni.gov/ 
electronic_reading_roomfICD_50I.pdf. 

39. Office of the Inspector General, Critical Intelligence 
Community Management Challenges, p. 5; Shane Harris, "Intel- 
ligence Veteran Aims to Motivate Young Analysts," National 
Journal, September 24, 2007, available from www.govexec.com/ 
dailyfed/0907/092407njl.htm. 

40. Harris, "Intelligence Veteran." Wertheimer's office over- 
saw the production of the brochure Analytic Transformation, the 
subtitle of which is "Unleashing the Potential of a Community of 
Analysts." See n. 17 of the present chapter. 

41. IRTPA, section 1016. 

42. Analytic Transformation, pp. 7, 9. There is little information 
on the Library of National Intelligence accessible to the public. 

43. For example, Originator Controlled (ORCON) remains 
in effect throughout the IC and has in some cases been integral 
to binding agreements reached between individual agencies and 
foreign governments. Therefore, while agencies will not consent 
to disseminate data which originated with them and they accord- 
ingly control, they have designated A-Space to be an exception 
and waived this restriction with regard to sharing data on it. 

44. Scott Shane, "Logged in and Sharing Gossip, er, Intelli- 
gence," New York Times, September 2, 2007. 



109 



45. For the comments and views expressed by Fingar in this 
paragraph, see his "Remarks at the DNI's Information Sharing 
Conference." 

46. Intelligence Community Directive 204, Roles and Respon- 
sibilities of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework, effective 
September 13, 2007, available from www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd- 
204.pdf 

47. Intelligence Community Directive 207, National Intelli- 
gence Council, effective June 9, 2008, available from www.dni.gov/ 
electronic_reading_room/ICD _207.pdf 

48. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Cultural Revolution in In- 
telligence: Interim Report," Washington Quarterly, Spring 2008, 
pp. 47-61. 

49. Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of De- 
fense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986, available from 

https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php? CISOROOT=/ 
nduldpub&CISOPTR=674&CISOSHOW=587. 

50. Mark Mazzetti, "Turf Battles on Intelligence Pose Test 
for Spy Chiefs," New York Times, June 9, 2009; Pamela Hess, 
"CIA, Intel Director Locked in Spy Turf Battle," Federal News 
Radio, May 27, 2009, available from www.federalnewsra.dio. 

com/?nid=27&sid=1684040. 

51. Gregory F. Treverton, "Risks and Riddles," Smithsonian 
Magazine, June 2007, available from www.smithsonianmag.com/ 
people-places/presence jpuzzle .html; Robert Jervis, "The Politics and 
Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform," in James P. 
Pfiffner and Mark Phythian, eds., Intelligence and National Secu- 
rity Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives, Col- 
lege Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008, p. 167. See also 
Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence: 
Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2008. 

52. Intelligence Community Directive 205, Analytic Outreach, 
effective July 16, 2008, available from www.dni.gov/electronic_ 
reading_room/ICD %20205.pdf 



110 



CHAPTER 5 

REFORMING THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
PROCESS 
IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 

James Goldgeier 

For 4 decades, the U.S. national security appara- 
tus was geared toward the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union. Military planners worried about combating a 
Red Army onslaught, diplomats negotiated the tech- 
nical details of arms control agreements, and the intel- 
ligence community tried to discern Moscow's inten- 
tions and capabilities. 

Then it was all over. Soviet leader Mikhail Gor- 
bachev announced a significant unilateral reduction 
in military capabilities at the United Nations (UN) in 
December 1988; this was followed by the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989 
and then the stunning fall of the Berlin Wall later that 
year. Two years after communism collapsed in East- 
ern Europe, the Soviet Union itself imploded, leaving 
15 newly independent countries in its wake. 

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union coincided with the onset of globaliza- 
tion. In fact, it was the inability of the Soviet command 
economy to adapt to the information technology revo- 
lution that had played such a big role in Gorbachev's 
desperate efforts to save his country's system. 

Meanwhile, the United States now faced a new set 
of foreign policy challenges, ranging from the threat 
posed by "loose nukes" to worrying about failed 
states and ethnic conflict, terrorism, climate change, 
and pandemic diseases. Not least among the concerns 



ill 



was how to convince Americans who sacrificed so 
much blood and treasure containing the Soviet Union 
to remain engaged in the world now that the Cold 
War enemy was gone. 

As they looked out at the world in 1989-90, Ameri- 
cans worried that they had lost their economic edge, 
and some were arguing that Germany and Japan were 
the true winners of the Cold War. Those two na- 
tions, which the Allies had destroyed in World War II, 
emerged under the U.S. nuclear umbrella to become 
major economic powers. Meanwhile, the United 
States was becoming mired in recession. In 1987, Paul 
Kennedy's treatise Rise and Fall of the Great Powers had 
spent 34 weeks on the New York Times bestseller list; 
the title was widely viewed as a harbinger of what 
faced an America that had become overstretched mili- 
tarily and unproductive economically. 1 Against that 
backdrop, George H. W. Bush, who had seen his ap- 
proval ratings soar to 90 percent when he led an in- 
ternational coalition to reverse Iraq's 1990 invasion of 
Kuwait, became increasingly unpopular. Fearing for 
their economic future and no longer believing they 
needed a President with expertise in national security 
matters, the American public elected a young, untest- 
ed governor from Arkansas in November 1992. 

As he prepared to enter office, Bill Clinton believed 
that the old national security apparatus was ill-suited 
to the new world. In particular, he sought to raise 
the prominence of economic actors in foreign policy 
decisionmaking. During the campaign, Clinton had 
declared, "I will elevate economics in foreign policy, 
create an Economic Security Council similar to the 
National Security Council, and change the culture in 
the State Department so that economics is no longer a 
poor cousin to old school diplomacy." 2 



112 



In January 1993, Clinton did create the National 
Economic Council (NEC) as a body parallel to the 
National Security Council (NSC). While this reform 
appeared to solve what in fact was a long-standing 
national security problem (i.e., the failure to integrate 
economic and national security policies), it was not 
particularly successful in practice according to those 
who served on one or the other councils during the 
Clinton years. Probably the more important effort 
Clinton undertook was to raise the profile of his Trea- 
sury Secretary in foreign policy decisionmaking, but 
that was a function of his trust in the judgment of Rob- 
ert Rubin, who left his position as head of the NEC in 
late 1994 to become Secretary of the Treasury and was 
a dominant foreign policy figure for the bulk of the 
Clinton presidency. 

THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM 

During the Cold War, policymakers understood in 
principle that international trade and finance had im- 
plications for national security, but no one worried too 
much about whether the government was organized 
effectively to integrate economic decisionmaking and 
national security decisionmaking. Both scholars and 
government officials, in fact, distinguished between 
high politics (nuclear issues and crisis management) 
and low politics (economics and the environment). 
International trade and finance could certainly affect 
perceptions of how the country was doing, but it was 
the "old school diplomacy," as Clinton referred to it, 
that would determine whether we blew up the world. 

In fact, while Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyn- 
don Johnson had an NSC deputy oversee internation- 
al economic issues, Henry Kissinger, who, along with 



113 



George F. Kennan, was considered the greatest strate- 
gist of the post-World War II period, did not bother to 
have an economic deputy because the issues did not 
interest him. Richard Nixon created the Council on 
International Economic Policy (CIEP) in 1971, but it 
was effective only during the brief period in 1973-74 
when Treasury Secretary George Shultz chaired the 
CIEP as well. Gerald Ford's Economic Policy Board 
was generally regarded as highly effective, but Jimmy 
Carter's Economic Policy Group was less so. 3 

In the latter half of the Cold War, economic and 
national security policy remained largely uncoordi- 
nated, and close observers of the process complained. 
William Hyland, who had served in Kissinger's NSC, 
argued in 1980: 

... a bad defect in the [NSC] system is that it does 
not have any way of addressing international eco- 
nomic problems. The big economic agencies . . . are 
not in the NSC system, but obviously energy prob- 
lems, trade, and arms sales are foreign policy issues. 
Every Administration tries to drag them in, usually 
by means of some kind of a subcommittee or a sepa- 
rate committee. The committee eventually runs up 
against some other committee. There is friction, and 
policies are made on a very ad hoc basis by the prin- 
cipal cabinet officers. 4 

Twelve years later, Harvard Professor Ernest May 
spoke before Congress and made the following obser- 
vation: 

In the early 1980s, the greatest foreign threat was de- 
fault by Mexico and Brazil. That could have brought 
down the American banking system. Despite good 
CIA analysis and energetic efforts by some NSC 
staffers, the question did not get on the NSC agenda 
for more than two years. And then, the policy issues 



114 



did not get discussed. The agencies concerned with 
money and banking had no natural connection with 
either the NSC or the intelligence community. We 
have no reason to suppose that agencies concerned 
with the new policy issues will be any more recep- 
tive. 5 

FROM BUSH TO CLINTON 

That is where things stood as the Cold War ended. 
In the final year of the George H. W. Bush administra- 
tion, two competing visions of the threats facing Amer- 
ica emerged. The most well known is the 1992 Defense 
Planning Guidance (DPG), produced for Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney's Pentagon under the supervi- 
sion of Undersecretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz and 
leaked to the New York Times. Unsurprisingly, given 
its authorship at the Pentagon, the DPG focused on 
national security issues in a very traditional way. In 
an early draft, the DPG stated, 

Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence 
of a new rival, either on the territory of the for- 
mer Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat 
on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet 
Union. This is a dominant consideration underly- 
ing the new regional defense strategy and requires 
that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from 
dominating a region whose resources would, under 
consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global 
power. 6 

But the DPG expressed concern not just about a 
new Soviet Union (a challenge most people believed 
would come from a rising China), but also that Amer- 
ica's friends might strengthen and challenge the po- 
sition of the United States in Europe and Asia. "We 
must account sufficiently for the interests of the ad- 



115 



vanced industrial nations to discourage them from 
challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the 
established political and economic order." 7 

If that is how the U.S. Government was going to 
view the world, then no organizational changes or 
new thinking would be needed. We could just pre- 
pare for the new world with the same machinery used 
to make national security policy in the old. But others 
in the government were beginning to recognize that 
the new world would be different. 

Across the Potomac River at the Department of 
State, advisers to Acting Secretary Lawrence Eagle- 
burger developed an approach later in 1992 that 
was quite different from that expressed by their 
Pentagon colleagues. Compiled in a 22-page secret 
memorandum to incoming Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, Eagleburger's missive argued that the 
new security challenges were not rising powers but 
transnational threats. Powerful states were not the 
problem, wrote Eagleburger, it was disintegrating 
states that would now consume America's attention. 
"Alongside the globalization of the world economy," 
the memo read, "the international political system is 
tilting schizophrenically toward greater fragmenta- 
tion." Noting the civil war in the former Yugoslavia 
was raging, the transition memo asserted that "our 
basic stake is in peaceful processes of change rather 
than clinging blindly to old maps . . . this is going to 
confront us with the dilemma of whether to take part 
in limited military interventions in situations which 
do not directly threaten our interests . . . ." And most 
significantly, Eagleburger argued, "The most impor- 
tant global challenge we face is the emergence of an 
increasingly interdependent and competitive global 
economy." 8 



116 



This transition memo fed easily into the incoming 
Clinton team's worldview. One of Bill Clinton's core 
insights in his run for president was that in a globaliz- 
ing world, we could no longer pretend that there was 
a domestic economy along with a separate interna- 
tional economy. Clinton had been heavily influenced 
by the book The Work of Nations (1991), written by his 
Oxford and Yale classmate, Robert Reich. "We are liv- 
ing through a transformation that will rearrange the 
politics and economics of the coming century," Reich 
wrote. "There will no longer be national products or 
technologies, no national corporations, no national in- 
dustries. . . . Each nation's primary political task will 
be to cope with the centrifugal forces of the global 
economy which tear at the ties binding citizens togeth- 
er—bestowing even greater wealth on the most skilled 
and insightful, while consigning the less skilled to a 
declining standard of living." 9 

Looked at from this vantage point, foreign policy 
was now substantially about economic policy. The 
Department of the Treasury alone was not sufficient 
to deal with it. As Clinton had presaged in his August 
1992 speech in Los Angeles, the new President wanted 
an organization in the White House that would paral- 
lel the National Security Council and work alongside 
it to manage these cross-cutting issues. The National 
Economic Council, headed by Wall Street financier 
Robert Rubin, thus came into being. According to Ru- 
bin's deputy, Bowman Cutter, White House budget- 
ary pressures led to the idea of having an international 
economic staff that would report both to Rubin and to 
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. 10 

If having "dual-hatted" staff members reporting 
to both the Assistant to the President for Economic 
Policy and the Assistant to the President for National 



117 



Security Affairs was supposed to ensure coordinated 
policy, it did not play out that way in practice. Clinton 
himself later touted the creation of the NEC as one of 
his great accomplishments, saying in 2000, "I believe 
that no future President will be able to have a White 
House that doesn't have a National Economic Council 
that coordinates all the various parts of the govern- 
ment to deal with economics." 11 

Clinton was successful in developing an economic 
policy that created jobs and slashed the budget defi- 
cit. But he had not created an institution that worked 
smoothly with its national security counterpart. 
Samuel "Sandy" Berger, who had served as Deputy 
National Security Adviser and then National Security 
Adviser during the Clinton years, later said, "It was 
always a little bit difficult to mesh gears," adding, "I 
don't think the NSC-NEC process worked that well." 12 
Meanwhile, from the other side of the equation, Cutter 
complained that the international economic staff was 
"an orphan within the NSC" because the NSC never 
treated that group as a meaningful part of the staff. 13 

But Clinton's efforts involved more than just creat- 
ing the NEC. Again as he presaged in his campaign 
speech in Los Angeles, he also raised the Department 
of Treasury's prominence in the conduct of foreign 
policy. 

In the 1990s, it was not a hard sell to argue that 
economic issues should share the foreign policy stage 
with traditional national security policy. After all, 
it seemed that America had finally created a world 
without major national security threats. Wars would 
now be fought for purposes of humanitarian interven- 
tion, not to combat major world powers. Additionally, 
if the most important international challenge was, as 
Eagleburger had written to Christopher during the 



118 



transition, the interdependent global economy, then 
it would make sense that American economic policy 
should now lie at the core of the country's foreign and 
national security determinations. 

The economic team did play an enormous role in 
shaping foreign policy during the 1990s. In part, it 
was because of the tremendous respect the President 
had for Rubin and others on the economic side, such 
as Lawrence Summers, who by the mid-1990s became 
Rubin's deputy at the Treasury department and would 
later become Clinton's final Secretary of the Treasury 
(and still later Barack Obama's director of the National 
Economic Council). 

For some on the national security side, the eco- 
nomic team was, at times, too prominent, giving short 
shrift to national security considerations. In July 1997, 
a run on the Thai currency led to a massive crisis as 
that country's foreign exchange reserves dwindled. It 
appeared that Thailand would require a bailout, just 
as Mexico had two years earlier. The national security 
team— Berger, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 
and Secretary of Defense William Cohen — urged the 
President to provide assistance to Thailand, an Ameri- 
can military ally. But Rubin and Summers argued that 
the United States should allow the International Mon- 
etary Fund to take the lead, fearful of congressional 
opposition to bilateral assistance. 

Writing later, Clinton's second term deputy na- 
tional security adviser, James Steinberg, complained 
vociferously about what had occurred. "Many in 
Thailand — a U.S. treaty ally — and others in Asia ques- 
tioned what that decision said about America's com- 
mitment to its friends in the region," Steinberg argued 
on the pages of the Washington Post. "It was a decision 
made largely through the apparatus for international 



119 



economic policymaking with little input or attention 
being provided by the national security and foreign 
policy agencies." 14 

Thus if the concern in the Cold War had been that 
economics was the poor cousin of high-level diploma- 
cy, now economics was trumping national security. 
Coordination still eluded the top policymakers, who 
at least recognized the problem that they were trying 
to address in the 1990s. Unfortunately, the new team 
largely brought an old national security concept with 
them in 2001. 

ECONOMICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
AFTER 9/11 

The sense that economic issues were on par with 
national security issues ended (at least temporarily) 
on September 11, 2001 (9/11). In truth, the notion end- 
ed when the George W. Bush team took office. Vice 
President Cheney, a former Secretary of Defense, now 
came to dominate the process, with help from his old 
colleague, the new Secretary of Defense Donald Rums- 
feld. Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill was no Bush in- 
sider, and he was soon relegated to a background role, 
as was the NEC. Foreign policy was once again about 
traditional issues: the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
with Russia, the looming threat from China, and the 
need for regime change in Iraq. Then, of course, came 
the horrific events of 9/11. 

In response, the United States went to war in Af- 
ghanistan, and soon after launched a military cam- 
paign in Iraq. National security was again dominant 
as it had been during the Cold War. Yet by the end of 
the Bush years, it was clear that national security poli- 
cymaking alone was not sufficient to ensure America's 



120 



interests. Even with respect to the particular issue of 
counterterrorism, a core factor was the need to dis- 
rupt the financing of terrorist groups. Then came the 
financial crisis of 2008, threatening to create an eco- 
nomic meltdown that the United States had not seen 
since the 1930s. As Barack Obama prepared to assume 
the presidency, the question about the ability of the 
United States to coordinate its economic and national 
security policies had surfaced once again. 

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 

On March 18, 2009, National Security Adviser 
James Jones sent a memorandum to the heads of agen- 
cies serving on the National Security Council. As 
William Hyland might have argued in 1980, or Er- 
nest May in 1992, or James Steinberg in 2001, Jones 
suggested that "The United States must navigate an 
environment in which traditional organizations and 
means of response to global challenges may be inad- 
equate or deficient." The memo went on, "To succeed, 
the United States must integrate its ability to employ 
all elements of national power in a cohesive manner. 
In order to deal with the world as it is, rather than how 
we wish it were, the National Security Council must 
be transformed to meet the realities of the new centu- 
ry." In that memo, Jones prescribed that the agencies 
represented on the NSC would have a senior person 
in the front office whose job would be to communicate 
with the NSC staff. 15 

Another step by the Obama administration to re- 
configure the national security apparatus was the cre- 
ation of a "cyber-czar" who would report both to the 
NEC and NSC. Still another step was transforming the 
George W. Bush administration's Strategic Economic 



121 



Dialogue with China into a Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue, involving both the Secretary of the Treasury 
and the Secretary of State rather than just the former, 
as had been the case under Bush Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson. Obama also appointed as Deputy Na- 
tional Security Adviser for International Economic Af- 
fairs his law school classmate, Michael Froman, who 
reports both to the heads of the NSC and NEC, in an 
effort to improve upon the situation that existed in 
both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. 
In Steinberg's 2001 Washington Post article alluded 
to earlier, he made the case for the "increasing irrele- 
vance of trying to pigeonhole complex policy problems 
as solely 'economic' or 'national security' or Taw en- 
forcement'," complaining that "our decisionmaking 
apparatus fails to reflect that reality." His proposed 
solution was to create "a single international policy 
staff that spans the four basic areas: national securi- 
ty, international economics, international law enforce- 
ment, and science technology policy." In addition to a 
national security adviser and a science advisor, Stein- 
berg suggested that the President also name an assis- 
tant for international economic affairs as well as one 
for counterterrorism, infrastructure protection, and 
international crime. 16 We don't know whether Stein- 
berg suggested such a reorganization when he was 
part of the 2009 transition, but to date such reforms 
have not been made. Essentially, the system is struc- 
tured nearly as it was in the Clinton years. As it was 
then, and often still is, how well the structure works 
will depend on personalities. 



122 



WHAT CAN BE DONE? 

For decades, foreign policy elites have recognized 
that we need to think differently about foreign and 
national security policy, and particularly that we need 
to find a better way to integrate our economic poli- 
cymaking with our national security policymaking. 
One problem that immediately arises is staff capacity 
and attention span. When it comes to international 
economic issues, it is not just countries that matter, 
but also the various nonstate actors, both private and 
public. Even if the White House has its act together, it 
may not be able to perform all the coordination neces- 
sary to manage the issues. 

There is also a different type of capacity problem. 
The community of foreign policy experts tends not 
to have a lot of economic expertise. This became a 
huge problem in the Clinton efforts to bridge the gap. 
When a principal such as Rubin or Summers explained 
a policy prescription by emphasizing the nature of in- 
ternational markets, it was hard for those on the na- 
tional security side to counter those arguments — these 
national security actors did not have the economic lit- 
eracy (or reputation) to counter. 

We have seen in the Obama administration an ef- 
fort to address that problem by bringing people with 
such knowledge on board across the government. 
Vice President Biden created the new position of vice- 
presidential economic policy adviser and hired free- 
trade skeptic Jared Bernstein to fill it. Robert Hormats, 
who has decades of experience in Washington as well 
as the private sector, has been mentioned as the likely 
nominee to be Hillary Clinton's Undersecretary of 
State for Economics, Business, and Agricultural Af- 
fairs. These types of individuals can perform a useful 



123 



role in advising their principals when international 
economic issues are discussed in a national security 
context. 

Past administrations were well served when in- 
dividuals with a strong economics or business back- 
ground were named Secretary of State — e.g., George 
Shultz in the Reagan years and James Baker under 
George H. W. Bush had each served previously as 
Secretary of Treasury. But economic input and clout 
can become excessive. It would also be useful if those 
in the NEC and Treasury Department had a strong 
enough grounding in national security issues not to 
believe that all questions can be reduced to the issue 
of how markets are likely to respond. 

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 

Fifty years ago, Bernard Brodie published the im- 
portant work Strategy in the Missile Age. The central 
problem Brodie addressed was how did the nuclear 
age change strategic thinking? Previous strategists 
thought about how to fight and win wars. Brodie ar- 
gued that because a nuclear war was unwinnable (and 
a preventive war went against America's self-image), 
deterrence had to become the foundation of our na- 
tional security strategy. 17 

An all-out nuclear war is not a concern of today's 
strategists. National security strategists have to worry 
about a range of problems, from traditional balance- 
of-power questions such as the impact of the rise of 
Asia, to new security challenges, which include ter- 
rorism, the possession of weapons of mass destruction 
by failing states and nonstate actors, climate change, 
energy dependence, and cyber- warfare. 



124 



If Brodie were alive and writing today, would he 
be penning "Strategy in the Information Age"? If so, 
presumably he would notice that the government is 
still largely organized as it was during the Cold War. 
Steinberg recommended an international policy staff 
that could serve the President. 18 But we also require 
better interaction between the Departments of State 
and Treasury. Perhaps foreign service officers should 
be required to have stronger grounding in economics. 
Certainly the incentives in government should be re- 
structured so that those who can bridge economic and 
national security are rewarded, whether they initially 
come from the economic or national security side of 
the house. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5 

1. Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Poivrs, New York: 
Random House, 1987. 

2. Governor Bill Clinton, Speech before the Los Angeles 
World Affairs Council, August 13, 1992. 

3. Jonathan Orszag, Peter Orszag, and Laura Tyson, "The 
Process of Economic Policymaking During the Clinton Admin- 
istration," Paper prepared for the conference on "American Eco- 
nomic Policy in the 1990s," Center for Business and Government, 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
June 27-30, 2001. 

4. As quoted in Richard A. Best, Jr., "The National Security 
Council: An Organizational Assessment," Congressional Re- 
search Service Report for Congress, April 21, 2008. 

5. Ibid. 

6. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: 'Prevent the Re-Emer- 
gence of a New Rival'," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 14; 
Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals 
Develop," New York Times, March 8, 1992, p. 1. 



125 



7. Patrick E. Tyler, "Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for 
Critics," New York Times, March 10, 1992, p. A12; Patrick E. Tyler, 
"Senior U.S. Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy," New York 
Times, March 11, 1992, p. A6. 

8. Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier, America Between the 
Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11, New York: PublicAffairs, 2008, pp. 47-51. 

9. Robert Reich, The Work of Nations, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1991, p. 3. 

10. The National Security Council Project, Oral History 
Roundtables, "International Economic Policymaking and the Na- 
tional Security Council," February 11, 1999, College Park, MD: 
Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, and Wash- 
ington, DC: The Brookings Institution, moderated by Ivo Daalder 
and I. M. Destler. 

11. Michael Paterniti, "Bill Clinton: The Exit Interview," Es- 
quire Magazine, available from www.mega.nu:8080/ampp/clinter 
view.html. 

12. Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval 
Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents 
They Served — From JFK to George W. Bush, New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009, p. 244. 

13. The National Security Council Project, p. 34. 

14. James Steinberg, "Foreign Policy: Time to Regroup," 
Washington Post, January 2, 2001, p. A15. 

15. "The 21st Century Interagency Process," Memorandum 
from the National Security Adviser, March 18, 2009. 

16. Steinberg, p. A15. 

17. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1959. 

18. Steinberg, p. A15. 



126 



CHAPTER 6 

A FINE BALANCE: 

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL 

SECURITY ADVISER 

Andrew Preston 

Within the national security bureaucracy, no role 
is as pivotal as the National Security Adviser's. He or 
she alone stands at all the pivotal points in the poli- 
cymaking apparatus; it is no exaggeration to say that 
most information reaching the President will have first 
passed through the Adviser's hands. The National Se- 
curity Adviser also has a unique combination of func- 
tions as both policy manager and policymaker. He or 
she acts as a broker of views for other administration 
officials — often including cabinet secretaries — and as 
an advocate for his or her own views. Ideally the Na- 
tional Security Adviser should be an "honest broker," 
conveying the views and positions of other presiden- 
tial advisers objectively and accurately, uncolored by 
his own views of those of others. It is no coincidence 
that the term honest broker is usually used to describe 
the Adviser's ideal performance. Overall then, the 
National Security Adviser possesses an extraordinary 
and unrivalled authority over both policy and pro- 
cess in the making and implementing of U.S. foreign 
policy. 1 

The National Security Adviser's managerial au- 
thority stems from his or her role as the effective execu- 
tive secretary of the National Security Council (NSC). 
The Adviser's policymaking influence stems from his 
or her role as the President's foremost staff member 
on foreign policy. The Adviser's bureaucratic stature 



127 



is rooted in both of these roles, and is augmented by 
the fact that advisers have a policymaking staff of 
their own. As George Ball, Under Secretary of State 
in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, once 
put it, the NSC staff operates as a "foreign office in 
microcosm," because it is comprised of a small num- 
ber of policy experts with their own specialty issues 
(for example, arms control, terrorism, economics) or 
regions. 2 The NSC staff works directly for the Adviser 
and, through him or her, the President; staff members 
work for nobody else and cannot be drafted by any 
other department or agency, including the State or De- 
fense Departments. They are not even subject to con- 
gressional oversight. When the President names his 
Adviser, confirmation by the Senate is not required. 

Given the National Security Adviser's potent com- 
bination of tremendous power and independence, it 
is unsurprising that the position has been a source of 
controversy. Some advisers having used their dual 
role as a policy manager and formulator and have 
clearly not acted as honest brokers, instead using their 
influence and access to the President to force their 
own views on the national security bureaucracy, to 
include the secretaries of State and Defense. Others 
have marginalized the cabinet secretaries and their 
respective departments in the policymaking process. 
Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser to Rich- 
ard Nixon, often kept Secretary of State William Rog- 
ers completely in the dark about policymaking, even 
in areas that were clearly within the State Depart- 
ment's traditional or constitutional jurisdiction. Kiss- 
inger had more limited success in marginalizing the 
Secretaries of Defense with whom he worked, Melvin 
Laird, James Schlesinger, and Donald Rumsfeld, only 
because they were much savvier and tougher than 



128 



the hapless Rogers. 3 While no other Adviser has acted 
with as much independence or impudence as Kiss- 
inger, several have alienated their cabinet colleagues 
and even had a hand in their ouster. Walt Rostow, 
National Security Adviser to Lyndon Johnson, helped 
marginalize Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 
while Zbigniew Brzezinski, Jimmy Carter's Adviser, 
constantly — and in the end triumphantly — battled 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance for supremacy of the 
Carter administration's foreign policy. 4 

Such abuses have led many commentators to pro- 
pose a new set of rules for the NSC system. Calls for 
NSC reform— shorthand for reform of the National 
Security Adviser's role and the functions of the NSC 
staff —usually occur at the beginning of every new 
presidency, but they are particularly voluble follow- 
ing foreign policy disasters. Not coincidentally, the 
biggest drives for change came in 1980-81, after Brzez- 
inski's successful coup against Vance, and in 1987-89, 
after the Iran-Contra scandal. NSC reform did not 
emerge as a pressing issue following Vietnam, despite 
the culpability of National Security Advisers Mc- 
George Bundy and Walt Rostow in Vietnam policy- 
making, probably because their successor, Kissinger, 
was seen to have engineered U.S. withdrawal; more- 
over, Kissinger was one of the only Nixon administra- 
tion officials not to have been tainted by the Watergate 
scandal. 

In 2008-09, following the frustrations attending the 
U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, calls for NSC 
reform emerged yet again. President Barack Obama 
made it a central part of his national security propos- 
als. However, the problem this time was not an Ad- 
viser who had grasped too much power, but too little. 
Following an emerging consensus, Obama sought a 



129 



National Security Adviser who would prevent bu- 
reaucratic power struggles and ideological rifts from 
distracting policymakers from their proper tasks. Fail- 
ure to do so was thought to be Condoleezza Rice's 
cardinal sin as George W. Bush's Adviser. 5 Some ad- 
vocates of reform, moreover, called for congressional 
confirmation of White House officials, such as the Na- 
tional Security Adviser, a change that would almost 
certainly require a constitutional amendment. 6 

In an effort to address these perceived shortcom- 
ings, Obama chose James L. Jones as his National 
Security Adviser. 7 Jones was close to Republicans as 
well as Democrats, including Republican presidential 
candidate John McCain, and had earned widespread 
respect throughout Washington for his bipartisanship 
and his military service. As a four-star Marine Corps 
general, Jones possessed not only undoubted exper- 
tise, but also an air of gravitas that was bound to earn 
him the respect of foreign policymakers in the Obama 
administration and lawmakers on Capitol Hill. Previ- 
ous military commanders, such as Colin Powell and 
Brent Scowcroft, had enjoyed notable success as Na- 
tional Security Adviser. In short, Jones seemed to em- 
body all the qualities one would expect from an "hon- 
est broker." 

Yet thus far, neither Obama nor Jones, nor any- 
body else for that matter, has embarked upon serious, 
substantive NSC reform. Jones announced he would 
initiate a new policy of administration cooperation 
through interagency coordination, but as William 
Inboden — an NSC staffer in the George W. Bush ad- 
ministration—pointed out on his blog, this meant op- 
erating much as every Adviser had done since 1989. 8 
To observers of the NSC system, especially of the role 
of the National Security Adviser, this should come 



130 



as no surprise. Simply put, the system works. As it is 
currently set up, the NSC is strikingly similar to the 
original prototype, styled by McGeorge Bundy in the 
early 1960s. To be sure, the NSC system has changed 
since then— but not by much. When it has changed, as 
it did with Brent Scowcroft under President George 
H. W. Bush, reformers have simply refined the exist- 
ing system and returned it to the fundamentals first 
established by Bundy. This is as it should be, for with 
few exceptions, the National Security Adviser and 
NSC staff have generally served their Presidents well. 
Moreover, any changes beyond refinements of the ex- 
isting system will threaten to neutralize the Adviser's 
policymaking role. In a globalized world of complex, 
interconnected threats and interests, when the lines 
between domestic and foreign affairs are blurred, the 
President needs independent, flexible advice more 
than ever. It is the National Security Adviser and NSC 
staff who serve this role. 

The National Security Adviser is therefore a Cold 
War innovation that has proven adept at confronting 
the globalized challenges of the post-Cold War world. 
As a brief history of its evolution illustrates, the NSC 
system long ago reached a natural equilibrium that 
can be upset only by a lack of presidential oversight 
and involvement. A severe, destabilizing series of in- 
stitutional crises nearly crippled the NSC system from 
the late 1970s to the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986-87. 
Since then, despite two subsequent — though also less 
serious — crises of institutional authority in 1993-94 
and 2002-04, the system has performed to a high stan- 
dard. 

In January 1961, John F. Kennedy assumed the 
presidency determined to be his own Secretary of 
State. Reacting to perceived impediments under his 



131 



predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Kennedy want- 
ed to be free of two roadblocks obstructing presiden- 
tial control of foreign policy: a powerful Secretary of 
State, and a cumbersome bureaucracy. Regarding the 
former, the notion that Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles had really been in charge of Eisenhower's for- 
eign policy was, we now know, largely a myth, but 
at the time it was a powerful subtext accepted as fact. 
In choosing Dean Rusk as his own Secretary of State, 
Kennedy got precisely what he wanted: a loyal and 
pliant chief diplomat who would unquestioningly im- 
plement the White House's foreign policy, not Foggy 
Bottom's. 9 

However, the second problem— a large and un- 
wieldy bureaucracy centered mainly within the Na- 
tional Security Council (NSC) system — proved to be 
trickier, for Kennedy could not simply do away with 
all of Eisenhower's sprawling national security poli- 
cymaking structure. 10 Besides, Kennedy did not want 
to eliminate the NSC system entirely — instead, he 
wanted to make it more flexible and responsive to the 
President's needs. Kennedy's solution was to take the 
existing NSC staff, a purely administrative body that 
did not actually make or even propose foreign policy, 
and re-create it as a smaller, more agile policymaking 
group. Kennedy abolished the formal groups of the 
Eisenhower system, kept its basics — the NSC Special 
Assistant and his staff —and transformed them into a 
powerful, substantive unit. 

To fulfill this radical change in the mechanics of 
U.S. foreign policymaking — probably the most impor- 
tant and enduring since the passage of the National 
Security Act in 1947— President Kennedy turned to 
McGeorge Bundy, a professor of government and col- 
lege dean at Harvard. Bundy was an ideal choice: at 



132 



Harvard, he had functioned as both teacher and ad- 
ministrator—and by all accounts was supremely suc- 
cessful at both. He was both thinker and doer, intellec- 
tual and bureaucrat. When he moved from Cambridge 
to Washington, Bundy essentially became the dean of 
the White House, or at least of its foreign policy. He 
advised on policy matters and ensured they were im- 
plemented. He controlled information to and from the 
Oval Office and acted as President Kennedy's gate- 
keeper when people, both inside the administration 
and out, sought a presidential meeting. To assist him, 
Bundy empowered the NSC staff that worked for him, 
transforming members from mere clerks into dynamic 
policymakers. As President Kennedy observed, Bundy 
had built himself a powerful but flexible organization. 
He had created, with JFK's evident approval, a 'Tittle 
State Department." 11 Though previous Presidents had 
appointed NSC executive secretaries — awkwardly 
known as the Special Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs — Bundy in effect became the 
first National Security Adviser as we know it today. 
He was the first powerful Adviser, and the first to op- 
erate as both formulator and administrator of foreign 
policy. 

Bundy also continued serving as the NSC's — and 
thus as the President's — manager of the foreign pol- 
icy process. He marshaled views and policy options 
generated by the various executive departments and 
agencies and forwarded them to the President. He also 
acted as an intermediary between federal departments 
and agencies, disseminating information among them 
so that everyone knew where everyone else stood on a 
particular issue. He brought together high-level oppo- 
nents — usually at the principals level, but sometimes 
at the deputies level. This was the honest broker role, 



133 



and, by most accounts, Bundy played it well. He en- 
sured that Presidents Kennedy and Johnson received 
conflicting information and opinions, and heard intel- 
ligence that ran contrary to his own views. Not ev- 
eryone was satisfied with Bundy's performance. His 
abrasive manner and unwillingness to suffer fools — 
or anybody who fell short of his own formidable in- 
tellect, for that matter — caused some resentment. But 
even his adversaries on policy matters conceded that 
Bundy played fair. George Ball, the most prominent 
dove on Vietnam within the Johnson administration 
and a regular foil to Bundy, admitted that as National 
Security Adviser, Bundy played "a strong hand in 
formulating our foreign policy with only a minimum 
of friction with the State Department." 12 As described 
in a classic example from Leslie Gelb and Richard 
Betts's The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (1979), 
the Vietnam War disaster occurred not because of a 
failure of process, but because of a failure of policy. 
Poor and entirely preventable policy decisions based 
on bad judgment, rather than a dysfunctional process, 
led to war in Vietnam. 13 

But while Bundy retained the National Security 
Adviser's managerial functions from the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations, he was also responsible 
for three major, substantive innovations that continue 
to serve as the bases for the Adviser's policy impor- 
tance and bureaucratic clout. 14 First, though he con- 
tinued to manage policymaking as an honest broker, 
Bundy became a policy advocate as well. This re- 
quired a delicate balancing act, and on the whole Bun- 
dy pulled it off. Even on Vietnam, regarding which 
he held strong views against which there was a great 
deal of dissent, he mobilized vigorously against doves 
in the State Department, Congress, the news media, 



134 



and foreign governments openly but without deliber- 
ately distorting their views. 15 To be sure, he would of- 
ten present dissenting opinions to the President under 
a covering memo that took issue with those opinions. 
But he almost always acknowledged the existence of 
dissenting views and ensured that the President knew 
their substance. 

Bundy's second major innovation emerged from 
the first: since he was now a policy advocate, it was 
logical for him to become a policymaker. Bundy, then, 
did not merely advocate policy options proposed by 
others but devised them himself. He became an in- 
dependent source of policy advice for the President, 
and often sent such advice to the cabinet secretaries. 
Indeed, some of the most significant programs of the 
Vietnam War began under Bundy's charge in the NSC 
system, including the bombing program of "sustained 
reprisal" — soon to become famous under the code- 
name Operation ROLLING THUNDER. 16 Sometimes, 
he was even charged with helping to implement pol- 
icy. As such, he was the first National Security Ad- 
viser to travel alone on diplomatic missions abroad, 
or to lead an overseas mission. Relatedly, he was also 
the first to engage with the news media, often being 
quoted in major newspapers and appearing on televi- 
sion. He was even featured on the cover of Newsweek 
in 1963 and Time in 1965. 17 Such national and interna- 
tional visibility was a sharp contrast with the deliber- 
ate anonymity cultivated by Eisenhower's advisers. 

Bundy's third significant innovation was the cre- 
ation of a "foreign office in microcosm," JFK's prized 
"little State Department." Bundy was not the only 
new policy advocate on the national security scene. 
The NSC staff, previously mere clerks processing the 
paperwork of others, also began to generate their own 



135 



recommendations in 1961. Many NSC staffers during 
the Bundy era, such as Walt Rostow, Carl Kaysen, 
Michael Forrestal, Robert Komer, and Francis Bator, 
had direct access to the President, a privilege enjoyed 
by very few others outside the NSC. Bundy and the 
NSC essentially acted as the President's private for- 
eign policy think tank, offering him a source of ad- 
vice, reports, and recommendations independent of 
the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury. 
Bundy's group offered advice on military policy, too, 
at times arguing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and re- 
gional commanders about troop deployments, bomb- 
ing strategies, and even battlefield tactics. As Bundy 
reported to Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chair of the 
Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 
in September 1961: 

We have deliberately rubbed out the distinction 
between planning and operation which governed 
the administrative structure of the NSC staff in the 
last Administration. . . . [I]t seems to us best that the 
NSC staff, which is essentially a Presidential instru- 
ment, should be composed of men who can serve 
equally well in the process of planning and in that 
of operational follow up. 18 

Bundy told an interviewer: 

[Knowing exactly what the President wants is a job] 
only the White House staff can do. We're just going 
to know better than the guys in the [State] Depart- 
ment... what's on the President's mind, what kind 
of stuff he will like and what he doesn't like. That is 
what we do for a living, and they do a lot of other 
things for a living. 19 

When Bundy left Washington in March 1966 to 
head the Ford Foundation in New York, he reflected 



136 



on the changes he had wrought. "The NSC existed in 
some form before I got here, and it will exist in some 
form after I go," he told a reporter from Newsweek. "But 
whether we have written in water, sand, or stone, I re- 
ally can't say." 20 For once, the famously self-confident 
Bundy was being unduly modest. He had rewritten 
the rules mostly in stone — soft stone, to be sure, which 
his successors could shape in slightly different ways 
to suit their own needs and circumstances, but his in- 
novations became permanent nonetheless. Since 1966, 
virtually every National Security Adviser has func- 
tioned within the institutional parameters Bundy had 
established. 

Since Bundy left government service, every Presi- 
dent—including Lyndon Johnson, the President Bun- 
dy served when he resigned — has pledged to reform 
the NSC system. That same year, in fact, Johnson com- 
missioned Maxwell Taylor, a retired General and for- 
mer Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to report on ways 
the NSC could be improved. Taylor recommended 
curbing the National Security Adviser's powers, espe- 
cially those of the NSC staff, and augmenting those of 
the State Department by placing its officers in charge 
of interdepartmental agencies. 21 Johnson, however, 
ignored the Taylor Plan and instead appointed a suc- 
cessor to Bundy, Walt Rostow, who was very much in 
the same mold. 

Even Nixon and Kissinger, who radically cen- 
tralized policymaking in the White House — indeed, 
largely in their own hands — created an elaborate poli- 
cymaking structure within the NSC that was hierar- 
chical, orderly, and consensual. Like the Taylor Plan, 
Kissinger's new NSC system was supposed to foster 
cooperation by establishing interagency committees 
that would coordinate the administration's foreign 



137 



policy; at the top was the Washington Special Actions 
Group (WSAG). 22 But this was true only in theory, for 
not long afterwards Nixon and Kissinger decided to 
ignore WSAG. Though WSAG produced fine stud- 
ies of the various problems bedeviling U.S. foreign 
policy, Nixon and Kissinger disliked and distrusted 
such broad-based endeavors, and instead formulated 
national security policy largely on their own, with the 
connivance of a select few on the NSC staff. 

As Kissinger's actions demonstrated, the risk of 
granting the National Security Adviser flexibility and 
authority is that the federal departments charged 
with managing national security policy will become 
marginalized or ignored. In particular, the NSC's 
growth has come at the expense of the State Depart- 
ment, and at times the Adviser's stature has eclipsed 
even that of the Secretary of State. This was certainly 
the case when Kissinger was National Security Advis- 
er—that is, of course, until he himself was appointed 
Secretary of State, becoming the first and only indi- 
vidual ever to hold both posts simultaneously. It was 
also the case during the Carter administration, when 
National Security Adviser Brzezinski and Secretary of 
State Vance waged an intense bureaucratic civil war 
which Brzezinski eventually won. Vance resigned 
in 1980 in protest over Carter's decision to launch a 
military rescue mission to free American hostages in 
Tehran, a decision that Vance opposed but Brzezinski 
had approved behind the Secretary's back. The mis- 
sion failed, marking it as a failure of both process and 
policy. This aptly served as a symbol for Carter's for- 
eign policy in general. 23 

By 1980, most foreign policy observers, inside gov- 
ernment and out, felt that Brzezinski had gone too far, 
and that he exemplified all that was wrong with an 



138 



NSC system that had spun wildly out of control. In 
the 20 years since Bundy's re-creation of the position 
under Kennedy, the executive branch had seen four 
very powerful Advisers (Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, 
and Brzezinski) and four Secretaries of State who 
were either weak (Rusk and Rogers), outmaneuvered 
(Vance), or peripheral (Edmund Muskie, who served 
for the brief period between Vance's resignation and 
Carter's departure from office). Though Bundy was an 
effective manager, the only time the system seemed to 
work in true perfect harmony was the period between 
1973 and 1977, when Kissinger served as Secretary of 
State and was either National Security Adviser him- 
self or Secretary of State and thus powerful enough 
not to have to worry about a rival in the NSC. 

When Ronald Reagan became President in 1981, he 
vowed to clean up the foreign policymaking process 
by reducing the NSC's authority and appointing a very 
strong, autonomous person as Secretary of State, Alex- 
ander Haig. Reagan wanted to return to the principles 
of the Eisenhower administration, when the National 
Security Adviser managed the foreign policy paper 
trail, kept the President and the cabinet fully briefed, 
and maintained an eye on whether the President's 
decisions were being faithfully and efficiently imple- 
mented. Yet Reagan's best intentions only created an 
even greater nightmare of policymaking that nearly 
resulted in his impeachment. The problem was that 
Reagan was no Eisenhower: he was not familiar with 
a hierarchical decisionmaking structure, did not pos- 
sess a command mentality, and did not establish clear 
boundaries for his officials. Ironically, the internecine 
strife that had crippled the Carter administration's di- 
plomacy actually increased, and even intensified, in 
the Reagan administration. Six National Security Ad- 



139 



visers served under Reagan, easily a record; since 1961, 
the total for all other Presidents, including Obama, is 
only 11. This soft touch and long leash, reflecting an 
absence of authority, allowed a bitter feud between 
Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of De- 
fense Caspar Weinberger to rage wildly out of con- 
trol. Even more important, Reagan's lack of oversight 
and failure to provide direction emboldened two of 
his Advisers, Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, 
to secretly sell weapons to Iran and illegally supply 
weapons to anti-communist Nicaraguan rebels. When 
the plot, now known as Iran-Contra, came to light, 
several members of the NSC staff were convicted of 
breaking the law. Politically, Reagan was able to avoid 
impeachment proceedings only by claiming total ig- 
norance of the scheme, which only made him appear 
incompetent and out of touch. 24 

The totally dysfunctional nature of the Rea- 
gan administration's foreign policymaking process 
brought the NSC system to its knees. Yet few sug- 
gested getting rid of it completely. Instead, the system 
essentially corrected itself by pulling back from the 
brink of bureaucratic anarchy. It did so by returning 
to the best of Bundy's original principles and refining 
them to suit the modern presidency. The Tower Com- 
mission investigation of Iran-Contra, led by former 
Senator John Tower, contributed some of the ideas for 
modest reform. Leading the way in their implementa- 
tion were the next three National Security Advisers. 
Two of them, Frank Carlucci and Colin Powell, each 
served for roughly a year and restored a balance be- 
tween policy management and policymaking. They 
positioned themselves as pivots of the Reagan admin- 
istration, with information flowing to and from the 
White House through them. They remained policy ad- 



140 



vocates but did less implementation and none of the 
freewheeling common to earlier periods of the Reagan 
presidency. 25 

But it was their successor, under President George 
H. W. Bush, who solidified the return to normalcy and 
enhanced the NSC system by instituting sensible re- 
forms of his own. Historians of the NSC are virtually 
unanimous in their praise of Brent Scowcroft's tenure 
as National Security Adviser. It helped that Scowcroft 
was personally close to Bush; when Scowcroft spoke, 
few doubted that he also spoke for the President. It 
also helped that Scowcroft knew the NSC system 
intimately — after all, he had already been National 
Security Adviser, under President Gerald Ford, and 
had served on the Tower Commission. Scowcroft also 
established a good working relationship with Secre- 
tary of State James A. Baker and Secretary of Defense 
Dick Cheney. Scowcroft was generally fair in acting 
as the President's gatekeeper on foreign policy, yet he 
also possessed strong views of his own and at times, 
such as during Operations DESERT SHIELD and 
DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf, acted as an es- 
pecially committed policy advocate. Most important, 
Scowcroft smoothed relations among departments 
and agencies by instituting several interagency work- 
ing groups that would keep lines of communication 
open and forestall bureaucratic turf wars that resulted 
from the hoarding of information. Chief among these 
groups were the Principals Committee, which Scow- 
croft himself chaired, and the Deputies Committee, 
which his own deputy, Robert Gates, chaired. Overall, 
though his system did not always function smoothly, 
Scowcroft acted as an effective manager and advocate 
by integrating his own views within a larger, more co- 
ordinated network. 26 



141 



Since 1993, when Bush left office, the basics of the 
Scowcroft operation have remained a constant feature 
of the NSC. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, 
and Barack Obama and their Advisers have tinkered 
with the NSC system at the margins but left its basic 
features unaltered. There have been two periods when 
the balance between management and advocacy tilted 
too strongly to one side or the other, and in both cases 
the President and the National Security Adviser recog- 
nized the fault and moved to restore a proper working 
equilibrium. In 1993, to take one example, Anthony 
Lake focused too narrowly on management of the pro- 
cess at the expense of advocacy or implementation, 
and Clinton's foreign policy floundered aimlessly as 
a result. 27 To take another example, between 2002 and 
2004 Condoleezza Rice concentrated on policy advo- 
cacy—acting especially as the President's advocate — 
and even engaged in partisan political campaigning. 
The result of her neglect of process was an absence 
of authority or oversight at the center of the Bush ad- 
ministration, allowing other principal players — Vice 
President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld in particular — to dominate the process and 
enforce their own views. It was only after the disas- 
trous consequences of the occupation of Iraq had be- 
come fully apparent that Bush, Rice, and her succes- 
sor Stephen Hadley — one of the Tower Commission's 
lawyers — brought the emphasis between advocacy 
and process back into a proper balance. 28 

It is obvious why Presidents Reagan, Clinton, and 
George W. Bush changed their approach to the NSC: 
when it did not function well, their foreign policy suf- 
fered, and with it their presidency; when it functioned 
well, foreign policy performed well and ceased to be 
a source of crippling controversy. It was thus in the 



142 



President's own best interest to maintain a smoothly 
working NSC. 

The question, however, remains: does the NSC 
system need renewed reformation? There is no doubt 
that the National Security Adviser is an important po- 
sition and should remain in the structure. In the recent 
past, some observers have called for a return to the 
Eisenhower NSC system, in which the National Se- 
curity Adviser acted as the NSC's executive secretary 
and did not advocate, let alone make, foreign policy. 29 
It was indeed an ideal system for a widely revered 
and respected five-star general who had orchestrated 
the Normandy invasion in World War II and was 
accustomed to strict organizational hierarchies. Yet 
even if we grant that the Eisenhower NSC system is, 
in theory, the ideal system, it is implausible to make 
it the standard in the post-Bundy age. Eisenhower's 
time has simply passed. 

Bundy showed what was possible under a power- 
ful National Security Adviser; and most of his succes- 
sors, especially Scowcroft, have demonstrated their 
utility in a world of increasing complexity and inter- 
connectedness. Moreover, officials in Washington, 
from Congress to the White House to the State and 
Defense Departments, have grown comfortable with 
the degree of Adviser authority enabling the incum- 
bent to make policy as well as manage it. Expecting 
Presidents to return to the more orderly structure of 
the Eisenhower era is thus as unwise as it is unfea- 
sible. Tellingly, on assuming office, Adviser James 
Jones promised to do less policymaking and more 
policy managing. Instead, he experienced irrelevance 
and marginalization — and, in some quarters, deri- 
sion — as it became clear that his more managerial ap- 
proach had only excluded him from the inner circles 
of foreign policymaking. 30 



143 



Trouble has generally occurred under two particu- 
lar situations: (1) when the President has delegated 
excessive authority to the National Security Adviser, 
as Nixon did with Kissinger, and Carter with Brzez- 
inski; and (2) when the President has failed to im- 
pose his authority on the foreign policy process at all, 
which occurred under Reagan and George W. Bush. 
Though both scenarios are problematic, the second — 
a lack of any presidential authority or direction— has 
been much more damaging, for it created conditions 
of anarchy and confusion within the executive. The 
Iran-Contra scandal and the failings of the occupation 
of Iraq were direct results of an absence of presidential 
control. Problems arise when the President vests too 
much power in the NSC, but such problems can part- 
ly—or sometimes totally— be compensated for if the 
National Security Adviser pursues and implements a 
successful foreign policy, as Kissinger did under Nix- 
on. Such instances of success with a too powerful NSC 
are rare, and even in Kissinger's case serious problems 
arose that generated controversy and, completely 
apart from the Watergate scandal, raised profound 
questions of whether the Nixon administration — that 
is, President Nixon and Advisor Kissinger — acted un- 
constitutionally. At several moments under Presidents 
Nixon and Carter, the State Department in particular 
suffered from an overweeningly ambitious National 
Security Adviser and staff. 

The solution, then, lies not in an excessive delega- 
tion of presidential power to (or appropriation of pow- 
er by) the National Security Adviser, but a sensible dif- 
fusion of power within a presidency that positions the 
Adviser at the center of managing foreign policy on 
the President's behalf. Among National Security Ad- 
visers, the most successful managers of foreign policy 



144 



have followed this course, from McGeorge Bundy to 
Stephen Hadley to Brent Scowcroft, unquestionably 
the most effective Adviser ever to hold the position. 

Yet efforts to reform the NSC remain, especially 
temptations to more narrowly define the National 
Security Adviser's role. If would-be reformers within 
Congress decide that statutory changes to the NSC 
system are necessary, they should keep in mind that 
the role of the National Security Adviser has evolved 
naturally over time, since 1961, in response to both 
success and failure. It has discarded its worst abuses 
and excesses and enhanced its best features. More- 
over, it has persevered in an exceedingly hostile and 
notoriously unforgiving bureaucratic environment to 
become an indispensable instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy, and it will continue to evolve, as it should. 
However, it should be left to do so largely without a 
Congress that legislatively imposes rigid structures or 
practices upon a system that thrives on flexibility. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6 

1. See, for example, John P. Burke, Honest Broker? The National 
Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making, College Station: 
Texas A&M University Press, 2009. 

2. George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs, New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1982, p. 172. 

3. A vast number of books and articles have been written 
about Kissinger's diplomacy — much of it by Kissinger himself. 
For an excellent portrait of his role as National Security Adviser, 
see Jussi Hanhimaki, The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and 
American Foreign Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004. 

4. On Rostow, see David Milne, America's Rasputin: Walt Ros- 
tow and the Vietnam War, New York: Hill and Wang, 2008. On 



145 



Brzezinski, see Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos, Kissinger and 
Brzezinski: The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Se- 
curity Policy, London, UK: Macmillan, 1991. 

5. Gordon Adams, "Obama's Test: Bringing Order to the Na- 
tional Security Policy Process," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
January 26, 2009, available from www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/ 
columnists/gordon-adams/obamas-test-bringing-order-to-the-national- 
security-policy-proce; and Karen DeYoung, "Obama's NSC Will 
Get New Power," Washington Post, February 8, 2009, p. Al. 

6. Bruce Ackerman, "A Role for Congress to Reclaim," Wash- 
ington Post, March 11, 2009, p. A15. 

7. Helene Cooper, "National Security Pick: From a Marine to 
a Mediator," New York Times, November 29, 2008. 

8. Will Inboden, "James Jones Fires a Shot Over the Bow," 
February 10, 2009, available from shadow. foreign-policy. com/ 
posts/2009/02/10/james_iones_fires_a_shot_over_the_bozv. 

9. For the classic assessment of Eisenhower as the chief poli- 
cymaker of the 1950s, and not Dulles or anyone else, see Fred 
I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, 
New York: Basic Books, 1982. On Rusk, see Thomas W. Zeiler, 
Dean Rusk: Defending the American Mission Abroad, Wilmington, 
DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999. 

10. On the Eisenhower administration's policymaking struc- 
ture, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging 
Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 83-95. 

11. Kennedy, quoted in Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy, New 
York: Doubleday, 1966, p. 68. On these changes and their impor- 
tance, see Andrew Preston, "The Little State Department: Mc- 
George Bundy and the National Security Council Staff, 1961-65," 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2001, pp. 
635-659. On Bundy's performance as National Security Advis- 
er, see Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William 
Bundy — Brothers in Arms, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998; 
Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and 



146 



Vietnam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; and 
Gordon Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the 
Path to War in Vietnam, New York: Times Books, 2008. 

12. Ball, pp. 172-73. 

13. Leslie H. Gelb, with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: 
The System Worked, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 
1979.' 

14. Except where noted, the three changes discussed in the 
following paragraphs are examined in greater detail in Preston, 
"The Little State Department." 

15. This is a central theme of Preston, The War Council. 

16. Ibid., pp. 167-190. 

17. "JFK's McGeorge Bundy: Cool Head for the Cold War," 
Newsweek, March 4, 1963; "The Crucial Choice: U.S. Foreign Poli- 
cy in Action," Time, June 25, 1965. 

18. Quoted in Preston, "The Little State Department," p. 645. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Quoted in Preston, The War Council, p. 247. 

21.CodyM.Brown,TheNational Security Council: ALegalHisto- 
ryofthe President's Most Powerful Advisers, Washington, DC: Project 
on National Security Reform, 2008, pp. 30-31, available from www. 
pnsr.org/data/images/the%20national%20security%20council.pdf. 

22. Asaf Siniver, Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Mak- 
ing: The Machinery of Crisis, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 2008, pp. 64-70. 

23. On the Brzezinski-Vance feud and its effects, see John 
Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Coun- 
cil from Truman to Bush, New York: Morrow, 1991, pp. 379-445. 

24. For an excellent account, see Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. 



147 



Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Se- 
curity Advisers and the Presidents They Served — From JFK to George 
W. Bush, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009, pp. 127-162. 

25. Ibid., pp. 162-167. 

26. David Rothkopf, Running the World: The Inside Story of the 
National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, New 
York: PublicAffairs, 2005, pp. 266-269. 

27. Daalder and Destler, pp. 214-235. 

28. On the loss of balance under Rice, see Bob Woodward, 
Plan of Attack, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, pp. 414-415; 
and Elisabeth Bumiller, Condoleezza Rice: An American Life, New 
York: Random House, 2007, pp. 217-223. On its restoration under 
Hadley, see Daalder and Destler, pp. 292-298. 

29. Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, "Effective 
National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Lega- 
cy," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 
335-345. 

30. Helene Cooper, "National Security Adviser Tries Quieter 
Approach," New York Times, May 7, 2009; Jonathan Miller and Ben 
Smith, "Reporters Have a Jones for NSC Profiles," Politico, May 
8, 2009, available from www.folitico.com/news/stories/0509/2225I. 
html. 



148 



CHAPTER 7 

LEADING THE NEXT PHASE 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE: 

PROVIDING BETTER DEFINITIONS, ROLES, 

AND PROTECTIONS 

Geoffrey S. French 1 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), 
exposed major gaps in the collection, exchange, and 
synthesis of intelligence that may otherwise have 
prevented them. In its assessment of that intelligence 
failure, the National Commission on Terrorist At- 
tacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) 
referred not to a breakdown in foreign intelligence 
or domestic intelligence, but to a void that existed 
between the two spheres. 2 This sense of a void rather 
than a simple malfunction of an existing apparatus 
partially explains the sheer number of security infor- 
mation-sharing initiatives that have been launched 
since 2001 . Indeed, reform of government intelligence 
and security activities, authorities, and organizations 
has been constant from 2001 to the present, typically 
driven by a sense of urgency derived from the initial 
shock of the attacks. Major legislation has included: 

• The Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 

• Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

• Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA), and 

• Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Act. 



149 



Other reforms included the establishment of the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the 
Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC), later re- 
named the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 
and the addition of resources to existing counterter- 
rorism missions in the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) and civilian agencies. The state and local levels 
of government, as well as institutions, shifted resourc- 
es to the counterterrorism efforts as well. 

The first phase of reform, in other words, sought to 
fill the void in the generation and exchange of intel- 
ligence pertinent to homeland security by a number 
of means; in retrospect, filling it seems to have been 
a higher priority than creating a coherent approach 
to address the issue of homeland security intelligence 
(HSINT). Kate Martin, director of the Center for Na- 
tional Security Studies, summarized the situation 
succinctly in her testimony before Congress in 2009: 
"There has also been a proliferation of agencies and 
entities with domestic intelligence responsibilities, 
although it is not clear that such arrangement was a 
deliberate effort to create redundancy or just an ac- 
cident resulting from so many different initiatives by 
different actors." 3 

A change in administration is an artificial mark- 
er of the passing of time, but it does often provide a 
useful occasion to pause and reexamine governmen- 
tal approaches and the need for reform. The issue of 
HSINT is certainly in need of such a review. Even a 
basic review, in this case, reveals an inability to define 
HSINT, leading to obvious problematic implications 
for the information-sharing activities surrounding 
it. More importantly, collecting intelligence without 
protecting it from the very adversaries it is meant to 
address creates a critical vulnerability that threatens 



150 



to destabilize the partnerships established to date. A 
thorough review exposes an emerging need for a new 
discipline: counterintelligence for homeland security. 

DEFINING HOMELAND SECURITY 
INTELLIGENCE 

Given the importance imputed to homeland se- 
curity since 2001 and the crucial role of information 
exchange in the success of the many organizations in- 
volved in the spectrum of homeland security-related 
activities, one would think that finding the definition 
of HSINT is easy. Indeed, there have been multiple 
attempts to find a definition for HSINT over the past 
few months. In 2009, the Congressional Research Ser- 
vice published a thorough review of perspectives on 
HSINT, highlighting the areas of agreement and dif- 
ference, and Congress has held hearings on its roles 
and limitations, Yet, no single authoritative definition 
or consensus has been found. 4 

The first potential source for such a definition is 
from DHS itself. DHS does not have a formal defini- 
tion, however. The most recent Chief Intelligence Of- 
ficer for DHS, Charles Allen, testified on the topic of 
HSINT on several occasions, describing it succinctly 
(if informally): the "essence of what constitutes home- 
land security intelligence is a simple concept— threats 
to the U.S. Homeland." HSINT, in this view, is the 
"unique mission" of DHS in support of the "Secretary 
and the Department; [its] partners at the state, local, 
and tribal levels, and in the private sector; and in the 
Intelligence Community." 5 Although one can argue 
whether HSINT belongs uniquely to DHS, the depart- 
ment and its mission are a focal point for HSINT activ- 
ities and therefore a useful starting point for framing 
the definition. 



151 



Unfortunately, the legal foundation for DHS also 
lacks a formal definition. The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, (Public Law 107-296, November 23, 2002) de- 
fines homeland security information as: 

Any information that relates to the threat of terror- 
ist activity and the ability to prevent it, as well as 
information that would improve the response to ter- 
rorist activity or the identification or investigation of 
a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization. 

If DHS can be considered a microcosm of the 
homeland security effort, however, this definition 
does not capture the other major threats that the de- 
partment faces, such as organized criminal groups, 
drug-trafficking organizations, transnational gangs, 
and alien-smuggling rings. Terrorism — although the 
primary impetus for the creation of DHS and the basis 
of HSINT — does not suffice to define the boundaries 
of HSINT. 

Similarly, the term "domestic intelligence" does 
not adequately bound the issues of homeland secu- 
rity. Although DHS's focus is on the application of 
intelligence to domestic issues, the intelligence itself 
focuses more often than not on transnational entities. 
There are certainly domestic terrorist groups that war- 
rant observation by the law enforcement community, 
but international terrorist groups, criminal organiza- 
tions, and transnational gangs require the fusion of 
domestic intelligence with foreign intelligence. 

This complexity highlights the inherent differ- 
ence between the traditional role of the intelligence 
community and the new role required of DHS and 
the HSINT community. For military intelligence, the 
military is both a collector and the primary consumer. 



152 



Foreign intelligence has many more applications and 
consumers, but there is still a relatively limited group 
needing to receive intelligence reports or analysis, 
and there are clear rules for how to share and pro- 
tect such information. In contrast, potential HSINT 
consumers include: the law enforcement community; 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments; owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure; and the public. 
Similarly, those very same consumers may also be col- 
lectors. Citizens or operators of critical infrastructure 
may be in a position to observe and report suspicious 
activity or other anomalous behavior that is pertinent 
to combating a criminal organization, a gang, or a ter- 
rorist group. This is not to argue for a police state men- 
tality, with citizens expected to inform on neighbors 
and friends. It is merely to note that important tips 
about criminal and terrorist groups often come from 
ordinary citizens and organizations and not from for- 
mal intelligence collection activities. (Some have even 
argued that the private sector can contribute to the 
entire intelligence cycle, including the generation of 
intelligence requirements. 6 ) HSINT, in other words, is 
unique in that its success depends not on retaining the 
information within a small, closed community, but 
rather sharing it with very broad segments of society. 
The challenge, therefore, is to draw proper bound- 
aries, if any, for the concept of HSINT. The HSINT 
community has not overcome this obstacle yet. For 
lack of a formal definition, the term "homeland secu- 
rity intelligence" as used in this chapter is understood 
to mean intelligence applied to protect against domes- 
tic and transnational threats to critical infrastructure 
and urban security. 



153 



NEW FRAMEWORKS FOR INFORMATION 
SHARING 

The erstwhile lack of a definition for HSINT has 
led directly to other ambiguities that prevent the 
HSINT community from effectively collecting, shar- 
ing, and analyzing information. First, it confines the 
definition of the HSINT community so as to exclude 
the assemblage of federal agencies, state and local law 
enforcement, and private partners that participate on 
a consistent or ad hoc basis. It thereby prevents true 
scope and clarity, for example, on the role of DHS in 
comparison with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
which has outreach programs to the private sector, 
including critical infrastructure, and a lead role in 
law enforcement and counterintelligence — or with 
NCTC, which is intended to centralize analysis of in- 
ternational terrorism and has some outreach to state 
and local law enforcement. In some ways, the sheer 
number of federal entities, information-sharing part- 
nerships, systems, and databases testifies not to the 
effectiveness of the current combined effort, but to its 
incoherence. 

Second, the lack of definition prevents a true 
evaluation of the effectiveness of HSINT. When the 
goal of information sharing itself cannot be identi- 
fied, the only possible metrics are the availability of 
information-sharing mechanisms or technologies, 
or meaningless counts of the number of reports or 
megabytes of data exchanged. In the DHS 5-year re- 
port on progress in implementing recommendations 
from the 9/11 Commission, for example, it discusses 
information-sharing explicitly only in terms of the 
easily quantifiable numbers of state and local fusion 
centers, the dollar amount of grant allocations to 



154 



support information-sharing, and the increasing 
availability of certain information-sharing networks. 7 
A survey published in 2009, reveals the effects of 
such a statistics-based approach, concluding that the 
measurement of information sharing through the 
examination of the availability of systems leads to a 
neglect of focus on the true goals of information shar- 
ing, whether in mission effectiveness or community 
preparedness. 8 Similarly, the March 2009 hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Informa- 
tion Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the 
Committee on Homeland Security revealed problems 
not with the means of sharing information, but rather 
with the HSINT activities themselves: confusion over 
the DHS advisory system, questions over priority of 
security issues, and dissatisfaction with the ability to 
analyze suspicious activity reports. 9 The emphasis on 
sharing information without clear definitions of what 
that information is, with whom it should be shared, 
and common goals inevitably leads to poor decisions, 
investments, and outcomes. 

There is a general need, therefore, for one or more 
frameworks that would help focus the goals of infor- 
mation sharing. Two such frameworks are immedi- 
ately available. The first is an emphasis on threat in- 
formation that supports risk-based decisionmaking. 
When tactical threat analysis — such as the identifi- 
cation of a specific terrorist cell or an active plot— is 
available, its application is relatively straightforward. 
Most HSINT, however, is more strategic in nature, 
providing indications of an adversary's capability or 
intent to pursue a course of action. Additionally, it 
tends to have some degree of uncertainty, often due 
to unreliability of the source, staleness of the informa- 
tion, or credibility problems. The challenge, therefore, 
is not typically how to share the information; fusion 



155 



centers, for example, allow a city or region to integrate 
information from federal agencies with its own law 
enforcement information and reports of suspicious 
activity from local operators of critical infrastructure. 
Instead, the challenge is how to use strategic HSINT. 
A single report of adversary capability may indeed be 
valid in a vacuum, but it is not a compelling case for 
action without the context provided by risk analysis 
which aligns the threat with the vulnerability to and 
consequence of the adversary's actions. By using a risk 
framework as the basis for collecting, sharing, and re- 
porting threat information, fusion centers will have 
a way to integrate the various reports into consistent 
and comparative threat levels for region-specific sce- 
narios. A report from George Mason University de- 
scribes one such approach used for an assessment of 
the National Capital Region, 10 which may be useful as 
a model for other regions in that it delivered the type 
of information reported to be useful in community 
preparedness: geographically-specific intelligence 
about specific adversaries. 11 

The direct threat to a city or region, however, is 
only one aspect of the counterterrorism and broader 
homeland security mission. A terrorist group or 
gang may use one region to raise money or acquire 
weapons, another to recruit members, and another 
for communication. In this sense, an adversary can be 
seen as being in competition with the homeland se- 
curity community as a whole; obtaining the resources 
it needs to continue to operate puts it in confronta- 
tion with immigration, customs, or other law enforce- 
ment. To adopt a military term, the various regions 
of the country constitute the domestic battlespace in 
which the adversary operates. Capitalizing on this 
perspective, the second analytic framework that could 



156 



help focus the goals of HSINT is the U.S. military's 
methodology for Intelligence Preparation of the Bat- 
tlespace (IPB). 12 IPB requires analysts to understand 
the political, social, and economic factors affecting an 
adversary's operations, thus allowing the analysts to 
view the adversary as a dynamic actor with needs and 
dependencies as well as goals and objectives. It builds 
to an assessment of the adversary's potential courses 
of action and facilitates effects-based outcomes to 
gain a high-level perspective of how an adversary 
may react. If fusion centers had a better understand- 
ing of how an adversary operates in their regions, the 
participating agencies could more effectively counter 
the adversary's actions. If DHS had insight into every 
fusion center's activities, it would be in a position to 
coordinate across regions and minimize unintended 
consequences. In this way, the IPB methodology could 
help support decisionmaking at all levels and help pri- 
oritize and coordinate action by focusing it on specific 
desired effects on the adversary. 

INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 

Despite the absence of formal definitions, common 
frameworks, clear roles, and delineated responsibili- 
ties for HSINT, many government agencies are invest- 
ing heavily in time and resources to share information 
from investigations, interviews, informants, other hu- 
man intelligence, signals intelligence, and other in- 
telligence disciplines. This activity may have limited 
value due to the hindrances discussed above, but the 
continued engagement of state, local, and tribal gov- 
ernments—as well as the private sector — indicates 
that there is some value. A second indicator of the 
value of the HSINT community's information and in- 



157 



formation-sharing systems is that various adversaries 
have begun to exploit them. 

In October 2008, for example, press reports re- 
vealed that the Sinaloa drug cartel had an informant 
in the U.S. embassy in Mexico City with access to in- 
formation on DEA operations. 13 One such insider was 
able to gain information shared between the U.S. and 
Mexican governments on operations against orga- 
nized criminal groups and drug-trafficking organiza- 
tions and passed it on to the cartel. Similarly, in 2005, 
the target of a U.S. terrorism investigation duped 
Weiss Rasool, a sergeant with the Fairfax County Po- 
lice, into using Rasool's access to FBI information to 
identify the surveillance vehicles. The target provided 
Rasool with the license plate numbers from cars that 
the target suspected were following him, which Ra- 
sool ran through an FBI database. Rasool saw that the 
vehicles were not registered to individuals but to a 
leasing company and thus likely were used for fed- 
eral law enforcement. He relayed this information to 
the target of the investigation, tipping him to the fed- 
eral surveillance and undermining the investigation. 14 
This new, ill-defined, and nontraditional type of in- 
telligence has value, in other words, not only to the 
HSINT community, but also to the very adversaries it 
is meant to combat. 

As local law enforcement organizations consoli- 
date intelligence from informants, interviews, and 
observations, 15 they create the possibility that a single 
point of vulnerability could compromise all of their 
informants. If they share information across regions, 
then one city's intelligence could be spoiled by its be- 
ing compromised by another city's intelligence center. 
If a regional intelligence center fuses local intelligence 
with national intelligence, a local vulnerability could 



158 



lead to a compromise of the sources or methods from 
signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, or human 
intelligence. A recent incident illustrates the vul- 
nerability introduced by efforts to fuse information 
among different levels of government. In California, 
two intelligence analysts have pleaded guilty to mis- 
handling classified material by providing it to a local 
law enforcement organization. Larry Richards, a de- 
tective with the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Depart- 
ment and a reserve colonel in the Marine Corps, al- 
legedly recruited Gary Maziarz and Eric. L. Froboese 
to provide terrorism-related intelligence that they had 
access to in their official positions at Camp Pendleton. 
Richards requested information about terrorist or sus- 
pected terrorist cases in Southern California — some 
classified Top Secret— which Maziarz and Froboese 
retrieved and transmitted. Maziarz testified that he 
felt he was helping overcome the obstacles that pre- 
vent information-sharing among military and civilian 
government agencies. 16 

If this incident is indicative of prevailing pressures 
to share information, it sets up the participants to be 
vulnerable to multiple types of technical or operation- 
al exploitation. Often, the urgency to share informa- 
tion—especially when coupled with incompatible or 
inconvenient communications systems — causes par- 
ties to share information outside secure channels or 
to fall prey to ruses, deception, or other stratagems 
leading to inadvertent revelation of information to ad- 
versaries. 

To address the risk of loss of shared intelligence 
to gangs, criminal groups, terrorist groups, or foreign 
intelligence, the HSINT community needs to take 
several actions, beginning with defining the protec- 
tive measures that ensure the confidentiality of the 



159 



information and information-sharing systems. Secu- 
rity alone will not suffice, however. Well-financed or 
sophisticated adversaries have the means to recruit 
or infiltrate organizations with access to information, 
or engage in espionage by technological exploitation. 
Counterintelligence — the discipline of identifying, 
penetrating, and neutralizing adversaries' attempts to 
collect and analyze friendly intelligence — is a neces- 
sary component. If gangs, organized criminal groups, 
and terrorist groups are collecting information on 
homeland security and law enforcement operations, 
there are established steps that can be taken to detect 
and manipulate that collection. If criminal or terrorist 
groups (or their affiliates) have operational assets — 
recruited, coerced, or infiltrated insiders — there are 
standard proven methods to detect and turn them. 
Just as HSINT is an inchoate art that differs from the 
work the intelligence community has traditionally 
done, counterintelligence for homeland security will 
require novel approaches to counter the intelligence 
collection efforts of transnational groups as opposed 
to foreign intelligence services. 

Unfortunately, the HSINT community has not ex- 
plored these concepts to any depth, 17 and the difficul- 
ties of implementing counterintelligence are daunt- 
ing, given that information-sharing systems have 
already been established and are operational. Since 
the HSINT community is highly diffuse, a centralized 
approach would leave major vulnerabilities at every 
fringe node of the network. A strong counterintel- 
ligence program at one fusion center may simply re- 
direct the adversary to another region. Although the 
challenges in creating an effective counterintelligence 
program to protect HSINT are formidable, the high 
stakes demand that we succeed. If an adversary has 



160 



insight into homeland security or law enforcement 
operations, he can undermine, negate, or manipu- 
late them. If trust begins to break down within the 
HSINT community, the entire information-sharing 
apparatus may collapse. There is an urgent need for 
counterintelligence analysis and operations to sup- 
port the HSINT community. This support may begin 
with awareness training, risk assessments, and im- 
plementation of strict Operations Security (OPSEC), 
but it must ultimately be a nationwide effort coor- 
dinated by DHS as the primary steward of HSINT. 
Without such a high-level effort, all HSINT collection 
and analysis are at risk. 

CONCLUSION 

After 9/11, the need for reform became clear. The 
counterterrorism effort had several gaps, including 
poor connections among federal agencies; minimal 
information exchange between federal government 
agencies and state, local, and tribal governments; and 
negligible information exchange between the public 
and private sectors. The first phase of HSINT reform 
was to institute a number of processes to help fill 
the void between domestic and foreign intelligence. 
The HSINT community and its infrastructure are far 
from complete, however. The second phase of HSINT 
reform must provide (1) clearer mechanisms for col- 
lection and processing, (2) better communication for 
risk-based decisions, and (3) stronger counterintelli- 
gence support of homeland security operations. 

Government reform is easiest in the wake of a high- 
ly publicized failure of an agency or activity. Publicly 
visible failures make a strong case for reform because 
they create general agreement on the nature of the 



161 



breakdown and the changes that will address them. 
In some cases, especially when the cause is a lack of 
an organization to perform a task rather than a mal- 
function of an existing organization, the urgency to 
implement reform can mask and prolong the under- 
lying problem rather than addressing it satisfactori- 
ly. In the case of HSINT, the failure was real, and the 
urgency to address it was valid. The activities put into 
place as a result, however, have only incrementally 
addressed the problem due to inattention to clear defi- 
nitions, roles, and responsibilities. One can argue over 
the value of HSINT as currently constructed, but argu- 
ment on either side leads to the same basic need for 
reform. If current information collection and exchange 
do not have value, then reform is required to ensure 
that the nation is not wasting time, resources, and tal- 
ent. If it does have value, then reform is required to 
ensure that the collection and exchanges are properly 
protected from adversaries who can also benefit from 
their value. 

Government reform absent a failure is more dif- 
ficult, requiring leadership to identify the issues and 
persuade others of their importance and urgency. 
Given the investments in HSINT and the serious re- 
percussions of another failure, the Obama adminis- 
tration needs to review the situation and address the 
foundational issues that threaten to compromise the 
entire endeavor. 



162 



ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7 

1. The views expressed here belong solely to the author and 
do not reflect positions of the U.S. Government or CENTRA 
Technology, Inc. 

2. U.S. Congress, "National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States," The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Re- 
port of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004, 
p. 263. 

3. House Committee on Homeland Security, "Homeland Se- 
curity Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations," Hearing be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and 
Terrorism Risk Assessment of the Committee on Homeland Se- 
curity, Washington, DC: 111th Cong., 1st Sess., March 18, 2009, p. 
3. 

4. Mark A. Randol, Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, 
Statutory Definitions, and Approaches, RL 33616, Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, January 2009. 

5. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Re- 
form and Homeland Security Intelligence, Hearing before the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC: 110th 
Cong, 1st Sess., January 25, 2007, pp. 4-5. 

6. Alex Martin and Peter Wilson, "The Value of Non-Govern- 
mental Intelligence: Widening the Field," Intelligence and National 
Security Vol. 23, No. 6, December 2008, pp. 767-776. 

7. Progress in Implementing 9/11 Commission Recom-men- 
dations, Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 
July 22, 2009, p. 11. 

8. Hamilton Bean, "Exploring the Relationship between 
Homeland Security Information Sharing and Local Emergency 
Preparedness," Homeland Security Affairs, Vol V, No. 2, May 2009. 

9. See for example, the testimony of John W. Gaissert, Doug- 
las C. Gillespie, and Joan T. McNamara before the Subcommittee 



163 



on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assess- 
ment of the Committee on Homeland Security, March 18, 2009. 

10. Elizabeth Jackson, William L. McGill, and Christopher 
Geldart, "Regional Risk Analysis: A Coordinated Effort," Wash- 
ington, DC: George Mason University, April 2009. 

11. Bean, p. 10. 

12. Jin Kim and William M. Allard, "Intelligence Preparation 
of the Battlespace: A Methodology for Homeland Security Intel- 
ligence Analysis," SAIS Review, Vol XXVIII, No. 1, Winter-Spring 
2008. 

13. Associated Press, "U.S. Embassy Agent: I Spied for Mexi- 
can Cartel," October 27, 2008. 

14. Tom Jackman, "Fairfax Officer Admits Misusing Com- 
puters; Plea Entered in Illegal License Checks," Washington Post, 
February 1, 2008, p. Bl; Department of Justice, Press Release, 
"Fairfax County Police Sergeant Pleads Guilty to Unauthorized 
Computer Access," January 31, 2008. 

15. For one discussion of the collection and use of intelligence 
for law enforcement, see Stephen G. Serrao, "Intelligence-Led 
Policing," Law Officer, Vol. 5, Issue 7, July 1, 2009, p. 10. 

16. Rick Rogers, "Marine Took Files as Part of Spy Ring," 
San Diego Union-Tribune, October 6, 2007; Tony Perry, "Marine 
Reservist Pleads Guilty to Leaking Intelligence Documents," Los 
Angeles Times, June 12, 2009. 

17. For one discussion of the need for counterintelligence 
support of infrastructure protection, see John MacGaffin, "Coun- 
terintelligence and Infrastructure Protection," Security in the In- 
formation Age: New Challenges, New Strategies, Washington, DC: 
Joint Economic Committee, May 2002. 



164 



CHAPTER 8 

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS: 
FROM SLOGAN TO LEADERSHIP STRATEGY 

Todd L. Pittinsky 

A consensus is emerging from many different cor- 
ners that winning hearts and minds is necessary to 
achieve goals such as stamping out world terrorism, 
replacing dictatorships with democracies, and con- 
trolling global warming. But can we say we know how 
to do it? 

The term "winning hearts and minds" has been 
in use at least since the 1950s, when the British colo- 
nial authorities in Malaya took steps to win the trust 
and loyalty of rural Malayans so that they would not 
support the army of the Malayan Communist Party. 
The approach itself —one variety of what Joseph Nye 
termed "soft power" 1 — is far older; the imperial Ro- 
mans were successful not only in conquering oth- 
ers, but in inspiring them to want to be Romans. The 
United States, the Soviet Union, and China — the three 
most powerful countries of the last 65 years — each sig- 
nificantly augmented its power by winning hearts and 
minds, as well as by using coercion and brute force. 

Yet this indispensible approach to international 
relations is far from being a well-established strategy. 
Many of the efforts carried out by private, govern- 
ment, and third-sector players can be seen as overly 
simplistic — a little like King Kong clumsily wooing 
Fay Wray after wreaking havoc on New York City. 
As a social scientist, I cannot help noticing that, at 
least in the literature and most likely in the field too, 
many of these efforts are poorly defined. Perhaps 



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more troubling, they have a patchwork quality of sim- 
ply trying things that seem logical, such as economic 
aid or variations on brand marketing, with too little 
guidance from theory and empirical research. Would 
we develop a new weapon without a solid scientific 
basis? Would we develop a new weapon with only a 
vague, metaphorical description of what it will do? Of 
course not. Yet we have been racing ahead with efforts 
to win hearts and minds without a clear definition of 
what winning hearts and minds actually means and 
without scientific inquiry into how it works. 

As a result, winning hearts and minds is still more 
of a slogan than a comprehensive strategy. The goal of 
this chapter is to unravel some of the confusion over 
what winning hearts and minds really can do, who 
can do it, and when it can be done. 

A FUNDAMENTAL LEADERSHIP TASK 

Leadership, at its core, is typically conceived and 
taught as the skill of guiding a group of people — for 
whom one has some formal or at least acknowledged 
responsibility and over whom one has some formal or 
at least acknowledged authority — to accomplish a de- 
sired goal. Yet accomplishing the goal often requires 
the cooperation and even the active participation of 
people who are not in any sense the leader's followers 
and may even be opponents. 2 A military commander, 
for example, may be pursuing a goal which cannot be 
achieved without the cooperation of a local popula- 
tion which is indifferent, afraid, or even actively hos- 
tile. If one achieves military victory, one acquires yet 
another problematic constituency — one's defeated 
enemies. For a vivid demonstration that "leading" 
one's defeated enemies can be managed in better or 



166 



worse ways, compare the outcomes of World War I 
and World War II. Somehow, German and Japanese 
hearts and minds were significantly won over after 
World War II in a way that German hearts and minds 
were not won over after World War I. 

What all this means is that winning hearts and 
minds is a. fundamental leadership task. It is not an extra 
task on top of the real tasks — delegated to the "hearts 
and minds department" and expendable if push 
comes to shove — but a natural and necessary part of 
such leadership mandates as making the United States 
safe from terrorist attacks and catalyzing international 
cooperation on global warming. It is certainly part of 
the lofty ambition of moving closer to the day when 
all the nations of the world work together on shared 
goals in a spirit of positive — rather than grudging or 
strategic — interdependence. 

Furthermore, winning hearts and minds is a lead- 
ership task because it is inherently forward-looking. 
Management is often seen as dealing with the ups and 
downs of the status quo while leadership is seen as 
envisioning a future and mobilizing followers to cre- 
ate it. While specific short-term political, economic, or 
military goals often seem to call for timely and effec- 
tive management, leaders always need to recognize 
and seize the opportunity to win hearts and minds, 
even when that long-term goal clashes with important 
short-term goals. The alternative to seizing the oppor- 
tunity may not simply be losing the opportunity, but 
losing those same hearts and minds. The American 
and British leaders of the 2003 invasion of Iraq (March 
20 to May 1) had specific short-term goals: "To dis- 
arm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), to 
end Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and to 
free the Iraqi people." 3 Winning hearts and minds was 



167 



neither explicitly nor implicitly part of the plan. But, 
as we all learned, ignoring hearts and minds was not 
truly an option. Failing to win over hearts and minds, 
we seriously hardened them, which in turn made the 
military, political, and economic objectives that much 
harder to achieve. 

We are increasingly conscious of the importance 
of winning hearts and minds and we are more com- 
mitted to it, but the efforts are still sporadic and un- 
anchored. A theatrical speech by President Obama in 
Cairo, a bold commitment to stepped-up diplomacy 
by Secretary of State Clinton (even while the position 
of undersecretary for public diplomacy and global af- 
fairs remained empty) — are these the proper steps? 
What should be guiding these efforts? Where should 
leaders look for wisdom? 

TAPPING THE UNTAPPED REALM OF 
ALLOPHILIA 

One can think of winning hearts and minds as an 
area of applied social science. Like the social sciences, 
our current discourse on winning hearts and minds 
suffers from a bias — a tilt toward the negative. For 
historical reasons, the social sciences have focused a 
lot of attention over the last 50 years on the nature, 
causes, and reversal of generalized negative attitudes 
about groups (hate prejudices), ranging from the 
white prejudices against African Americans and the 
anti-Semitism in Europe which erupted in the Holo- 
caust (the two which sparked much of this research) 
to a more recent interest in the prejudices which many 
Westerners and Arabs have about each other. Lost in 
the research shuffle — and the interventions that the 
research has sparked— was the fact that people can 



168 



and do have generalized positive as well as negative 
feelings about members of different groups. We have 
invested in understanding how to get groups to hate 
each other less; we have sorely underinvested in un- 
derstanding how to get groups to like each other more. 

Winning hearts and minds, while not inherently 
focused on situations characterized initially by ill will, 
suffers from the same negative bias. Winning hearts 
and minds tends to get attention when the negative 
feelings (ranging from distaste to hatred) of another 
group stand in the way of one's own group achieving 
a goal. For example, the United States is negotiating 
with Colombia for access to seven Colombian military 
bases; this has met with resistance from other Latin 
American countries with historical reasons to fear U.S. 
bullying. 

While a focus on the negative — on undoing bad 
feelings and hatred — seems perfectly sensible, it is, 
in fact, one of the obstacles to making winning hearts 
and minds more reliably effective. It is simply too one- 
sided, like a science of medicine that has much to say 
about illness but nothing to say about health. 

Recent social science research into allophilia — posi- 
tive attitudes toward a group different from one's 
own— may hold keys to more successful strategies for 
winning hearts and minds. A key finding is that al- 
lophilia is not simply the opposite of prejudice. Posi- 
tive and negative feelings about a group are distinct 
phenomena, largely (though not entirely) indepen- 
dent of each other, and quite able to coexist. Think, 
for example, of income and debt. High debt is not the 
same thing as lack of income; high income is not the 
same thing as lack of debt. Changing one's debt does 
not change one's income. Changing one's income may 
or may not change one's debt, and it will always be 



169 



best if one can increase income and reduce debt. In 
the same way, to achieve a healthy balance sheet of 
cross-national attitudes, our interactions with other 
countries must reduce prejudice but also engender al- 
lophilia. 

If prejudice and allophilia are not simply the op- 
posites of each other, it would follow — and research 
shows — that they have causes which are not simply 
the opposites of each other. For example, competition 
for employment or for majority status in a neighbor- 
hood can be a cause of prejudice between groups. But 
alleviating such competition, while it may reduce the 
prejudice, will not be a cause of allophilia between 
the groups. Prejudice and allophilia also have effects 
which are not simply the opposites of each other. For 
example, allophilia studies have found that reducing 
prejudice toward a particular group will reduce hostile 
acts against that group; obviously an important step. 
It will not, however, make people more actively sup- 
portive and helpful towards members of that group. 
Increasing allophilia, on the other hand, can have just 
that effect. 

What all of this means for winning hearts and 
minds is that there is a promising leadership path 
which is rarely taken. It is not enough to try to coun- 
teract prejudices. One must also actively promote al- 
lophilia. Granted, that is an "extra" task, but one that 
can provide benefits that the reduction of hatred — 
even the complete reduction of prejudice — can never 
provide. 

Research is revealing more about this path of 
promoting allophilia. For example, sympathy for a 
group — feeling unhappy in response to that group's 
suffering and despair — is far more helpful for reduc- 
ing prejudice than for increasing allophilia. Symhedo- 



170 



nia for a group — feeling joy in response to that group's 
success and good fortune — is more helpful for increas- 
ing allophilia than for reducing prejudice. 4 Yet we con- 
tinue to commit an empathy error: We work harder to 
evoke sympathy than to evoke symhedonia. 5 Compare 
how much attention is devoted in the news media and 
in educational programs to encouraging Whites to 
feel sorry for what Blacks suffered from slavery and 
segregation, with how little is devoted to encourag- 
ing Whites to feel joyful for Blacks who never thought 
they would live to see a black President. 

We are also learning more about the different ef- 
fects of different ways of displaying group pride. 
A group can increase prejudice against itself with 
displays of group pride that seem arrogant, such as 
American soldiers toppling the statue of Saddam 
Hussein or Palestinians rejoicing in the street after the 
9/11 attacks. A group can increase allophilia towards 
itself with more genuine displays of pride, such as 
vowing to go to the moon and then pulling it off. In 
much the same way that individuals are attracted to 
others who seem confident, groups feel allophilia for 
other groups that seem to have healthy pride without 
the excesses of narcissism and arrogance. 6 

How valuable is allophilia? American allophilia for 
England, the "mother country," was a decisive ben- 
efit for that ally during World War II. Allophilia for 
America has brought an untold number of immigrants 
who, collectively, have made a tremendous contribu- 
tion to our economic and cultural successes. Seeing 
how valuable an asset this feeling is suggests that we 
should not leave its evolution entirely to historical 
chance or word of mouth, but learn more about how 
to acquire and maintain it deliberately. What we need 
now is to extend our basic research on cross-national 



171 



relations to the point where we can develop a reli- 
ably effective practice of winning hearts and minds by 
promoting cross-national allophilia, not just reducing 
cross-national hatred. 

UNRAVELING SOME KNOTS 

In the first decades of the 20th century, a handful 
of thinkers realized that humans could travel in space. 
Their physics was quite correct, but too many of the 
necessary technical and organizational tools had still 
to be invented. 7 The practice of winning hearts and 
minds is at a similar juncture: rich with a promise 
that is being acknowledged as never before, but not as 
sophisticated as it needs to be. I turn now to address 
some of the guidelines which, if followed, will allow 
allophilia to take its place as a reliable leadership 
strategy. Specifically, I offer six principles for promot- 
ing both a richer understanding and a more effective 
practice of winning hearts and minds. 

Do Not Wait Until Hearts and Minds Have Already 
Been Lost. 

One hallmark of good leadership is that it prepares 
followers for possible futures which the leader can see 
coming even if his or her followers cannot — or do not 
want to. We seem to take winning hearts and minds 
most seriously when conflicts erupt and we need help 
from a group that is not inclined to give it. But there 
is nothing about winning hearts and minds that is in- 
herently remedial. In social science terms, promoting 
allophilia is not the same as reducing prejudice and it 
can — indeed should — be promoted even when there 
is no prejudice to reduce. Winning hearts and minds 



172 



can be carried out any time and, in fact, should be car- 
ried out all the time, recognizing that conflicts will 
arise and that, when they do, friends will be able to 
work through them better than strangers or enemies. 
Friends are more likely than strangers or enemies to 
forgive each other's trespasses. 

Winning hearts and minds as a consistent strategy 
will be much more effective, not to mention moral, 
than repeatedly trying to win hearts and minds to 
patch up a bad spell in foreign relations. Margarita 
Krochik and Tom Tyler point out, for the context in 
which a leader's followers are divided into disharmo- 
nious subgroups, that one way to lead is to reward 
each subgroup for its cooperation. But the researchers 
recognize that this is a vulnerable strategy: "Leaders 
cannot always deliver rewards. ... In fact, they are 
especially unlikely to be able to do so during times of 
crisis or change, when member support is most need- 
ed." 8 Consistently treating others fairly, the authors 
conclude, is a more sustainable leadership strategy, a 
more reliable way of winning hearts and minds "for 
a rainy day." It is also a more sustainable strategy for 
winning and keeping hearts and minds; more opportu- 
nistic strategies for doing so are likely to break down 
when most needed. 

The more each country's well-being depends on 
what the people and governments of other countries 
think of it— a hallmark of the modern age — the more 
that winning hearts and minds should be seen as a 
crucial form of national security and a crucial diplo- 
matic resource, standard operating procedure in good 
weather and bad. 



173 



Think Beyond "Guns and Butter." 

For some, winning hearts and minds begins and 
ends with economic aid. But as its very name implies, 
winning hearts and minds needs to address more 
than people's material needs. In the long run, the 
stomach — even a full stomach— is not the way to the 
heart. People whom America has helped materially 
can still have very negative attitudes toward America 
and Americans. America helped arm Muslims fight- 
ing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, 
but some of those same Muslims were as opposed to 
the infidel West as they were to godless Communism. 9 

Economic aid typically addresses the lowest levels 
of Maslow's hierarchy of needs — physical survival and 
safety — but not the higher levels — love and belonging, 
esteem, and self-actualization. 10 Let us consider just 
one of the many possible forms of self-actualization— 
the satisfaction of curiosity. Few government incen- 
tives have been developed to send people to the Web 
for information about and contact with other coun- 
tries. On the contrary, some governments have tried 
mightily to stifle this form of self-actualization. Yet, 
in the last decade, we have seen global confirmation 
of this "need" in the ever-growing use of the Internet 
to reach out to the world. An economic or educational 
aid policy that ignored the popular wish to be con- 
nected to the rest of the world (or that perhaps stifled 
the wish in cahoots with the recipient nation's less- 
than-democratic government) would not be likely to 
win hearts and minds, however materially generous 
the program was. 

To understand the power of needs other than ma- 
terial needs, think of your attachment to your own 
country. Most Americans would balk at the suggestion 



174 



that they love their country merely because different 
levels of government provide safety from crime, fire, 
starvation, polio, food poisoning, mineshaft collapse, 
and so on. They would point to freedom and opportu- 
nity (however loosely and variously defined), to jazz 
and country music, to skateboarding and baseball, 
to Broadway and Hollywood. Any other country or 
people will also have such a list. 

In much the same way, our positive attachments to 
other nations are based on more than material needs 
being sated. Is the American feeling for the United 
Kingdom (UK) based on its exports? (How many can 
you even name beyond the Beatles?) Americans tend 
to have positive feelings about Canada, but not on ac- 
count of any material benefit we get from our relation- 
ship with that country. 

Count the Government In. 

The phrase "winning hearts and minds" is typi- 
cally associated with government actions, yet there 
is some understandable feeling that any government 
campaign to win another group's hearts and minds 
will be tainted from the start— mere propaganda. Even 
if it is not propaganda, the recipients may assume that 
it is and will not be receptive to it. For these reasons, 
many believe that attempts to win hearts and minds 
will be carried out most effectively by nongovernmen- 
tal organizations (NGOs). 

But are we to conclude that governments should 
stay out of the business of winning hearts and minds? 
Or rather that governments must take care to do a 
proper job of it? Governments undertake economic, 
military, medical, and other kinds of aid — sometimes 
accomplishing much good — despite the fact that their 



175 



motives can be, and indeed often are, misconstrued. 

Propaganda itself turns out to be rather hard to 
define. Is propaganda defined by false information 
or by self-serving intentions? Thousands of people 
come into the United States every year — legally and 
illegally — because they can find better-paying jobs in 
the United States than they can at home. But if the U.S. 
Government tried, for its own self-serving reasons, to 
convince people that they can get better-paying jobs 
in the United States than they can at home, would that 
make it propaganda? If a government has good reason 
to believe that it has something valuable to offer oth- 
ers, is it wrong to try to convince others of it? We do 
not object when our government tries to convince peo- 
ple around the world to use more productive farming 
techniques or to adopt practices which would prevent 
tapeworm. Yet many shy away from the idea of our 
government trying to convince people to adopt a po- 
litical system that most of us believe really is better 
than dictatorship, oligarchy, and theocracy. Some of 
us are more comfortable when our government kills 
people in a war than when it tries to persuade them 
how to live. 

I am not proposing here that our government 
should or should not try to change people's minds 
about how they live and how they are governed. I am 
proposing that we make a disciplined effort to dis- 
tinguish between gut reactions and reasoned object- 
ions to government involvement in winning hearts 
and minds, so that we can make more rational choices 
about when it would or would not be good for a gov- 
ernment to try to do so. 

In any case, government will not find winning 
hearts and minds easy. President George W. Bush had 
the idea of appointing a marketing person to repair 



176 



America's image in the Middle East. During Bush's 
8-year tenure, that position was held by four people 
whose individual and collective efforts are generally 
seen to have had little success. But that does not mean 
Bush's impulse to improve America's public diploma- 
cy was a mistake. Many rockets fizzled (or blew up) 
before one made it to the moon. 

While the United States has to be careful not be 
bombastic, it should not be unrealistically humble, ei- 
ther. There is too much that we should be rightly proud 
to share with the world. What we need is enough re- 
search and understanding to know which voices can 
be heard most clearly under which circumstances. In 
other words, we need to know what our choices are, 
and how to choose among them. We need practical 
research aimed at clarifying both the efficacy and the 
ethics of government efforts to win hearts and minds. 

Set More Precise Goals. 

Campaigns to win hearts and minds are often 
saddled with rather vague goals. We want "them" to 
"like" us, but what does that mean? It is not hard to 
find foreigners who wear Michael Jackson tee shirts, 
gulp down Coke and McDonalds' fries, and treat 
American visitors with great kindness, yet turn out in 
the streets to protest American foreign policy. Do such 
people "like" us or not? What do we actually need to 
"win" from them? 

Here, the aforementioned work on allophilia pro- 
vides some guideposts. Research on allophilia has 
identified its five specific constituents — affection, 
engagement, kinship, comfort, and enthusiasm. 11 
These are measureable (using the Allophilia Scale), 12 
enabling us to stipulate more precisely the goals that 



177 



add up to winning hearts and minds. Moreover, we 
are enabled to evaluate which methods will accom- 
plish one or another of those goals. 

The fact that positive and negative feelings about 
another group are largely independent means that 
it is not good enough to say "they like us" or "they 
don't like us," or even to say, "they like/ dislike us this 
much." A more precise science of winning hearts and 
minds will say (ideally): "With this much negative 
feeling, we can expect these particular kinds of behav- 
ior which may be obstacles to our present or future 
goals. At the same time, with this much of various 
kinds of positive feeling, we can expect these particu- 
lar kinds of behavior which may be helpful in achiev- 
ing our present or future goals." The helpful behavior 
might be joining the United States in an international 
treaty, or voting with the United States on a United 
Nations (UN) resolution, or contributing to a peace- 
keeping force or a military action. 

Engage Two Ways. 

Helena Finn, a senior American diplomat who 
recently served as a fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, underscores in Foreign Affairs (2003) that 
"diplomacy is a two-way street." 13 Some efforts to 
win hearts and minds have fallen flat because they 
were not two-way enough — or at all. In 2003, the U.S. 
Department of State launched Hi magazine, aimed at 
winning the hearts and minds of Middle Eastern and 
Muslim youth. Publication was suspended after 21/2 
years. Hi did not seem to have achieved any popular- 
ity with its intended audience, partly because it pre- 
sented a superficially "light" 14 view of American life, 
while ignoring the contentious political issues that 



178 



cause Arabs to have negative attitudes about America. 
A hearts and minds campaign called "Shared Values" 
seems to have made the same mistake. As an Indone- 
sian economics student put it after watching one of 
the "Shared Values" TV ads: "We know that there's 
religious freedom in America, and we like that. What 
we're angry about is the arrogant behavior of the U.S. 
in the rest of the world." 15 In both cases, the engage- 
ment was not two-way (and therefore, not really en- 
gagement at all). The message seemed to be: We'll tell 
you what you should know about us and never mind 
about anything else. 

In contrast, a Pakistani broadcaster, Aqeel Malik, 
launched a radio station in the Swat region specifi- 
cally to win the local people's hearts and minds away 
from the Taliban, which had its own popular station, 
and toward the Pakistani military, which was trying 
to drive the Taliban out. Despite violent threats from 
the Taliban, Malik invited Taliban members to take 
part in phone-in discussions on the air. He wanted 
his audience to hear the two opposing views in full 
so that they would conclude for themselves that the 
Pakistani state would be better for them than the Tal- 
iban. 16 While we will not know for years whether his 
approach worked, it clearly engaged the "other" and 
did not seem to arouse the cynicism and suspicion 
that Hi did. 

Invest in Building the Science. 

The phrase "winning hearts and minds" is only 
a metaphor and rather hard to pin down. We use it 
because it has currency in the field, clearly refers to 
something important, and is inspiring, but we would 
benefit from a more precise formulation. While a mili- 



179 



tary force might adopt an evocative mission statement 
such as "pushing the enemy into the sea," you can be 
sure the good commanders would have a more pre- 
cise set of goals and strategies, too. 

Ideas, intuitions, and suspicions about what wins 
hearts and minds must be subject to empirical valida- 
tion. What we learn may surprise us. During the inva- 
sion of Iraq, for example, we often heard from foreign 
pundits around the globe that people in their coun- 
try like Americans, it's America — that is, the actions 
of the American government or of American busi- 
nesses—they strongly dislike. This is neat rhetoric but 
scientifically dubious; it is not clear that the human 
brain maintains such rigid categories as government 
and people. There is some experimental evidence, for 
example, that negative feelings about a leader (a na- 
tion's president, for example) will engender negative 
feelings about the leader's followers (the rest of us). 17 

A more complete commitment to winning hearts 
and minds must therefore support practical research 
on the basic processes and pathways by which it oc- 
curs. Such research must certainly be interdisciplin- 
ary. Currently international relations discourse is 
dominated by economists and political scientists, who 
too often defer to the traditional economic axiom that 
human beings are rational actors, despite the growing 
importance of nonrational actor theories. In a similar 
vein, a self-interest model looms over the study and 
practice of negotiation. A whole generation of policy 
students has been taught normative models of nego- 
tiation in which one should take into account the well- 
being of the "other," but strictly as a way of advancing 
one's own interests. But such models cannot explain 
how Tibetans, for example, have won American hearts 
and minds to the extent they have. Americans have 



180 



no rational self-interest in Tibetan independence and 
much rational self-interest in good relations with Chi- 
na. Clearly, winning hearts and minds is not simply a 
matter of exploiting joint gains for self-gain. 

A multidisciplinary approach is also needed to 
balance efficacy with appropriateness. While some 
disciplines may be better equipped to help us learn 
what will work and to understand why it does, other 
disciplines will be better equipped to wrestle through 
the thorny questions of what should and should not be 
done, irrespective of its efficacy. 

GETTING STARTED: A FOUR-POINT ACTION 
PLAN FOR WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS 

I asked in the opening paragraph: "Can we say we 
know how to do it?" Although we need much more 
research and a much greater commitment to act on the 
knowledge we already have, we do know enough to 
get started. Here are four ways the United States can 
win hearts and minds by steadily building and main- 
taining allophilia. 

Citizen Diplomacy Through Social Networking 
Media. 

It is time for citizen-to-citizen diplomacy to take 
advantage of the technological fact that ordinary 
Americans can be directly connected to people in oth- 
er countries through social networking media. When 
the New York Philharmonic performed in North Ko- 
rea, it was only 100 or so musicians performing for 
a very select audience. Even if broadcast to a wider 
North Korean audience, the concert was literally and 
figuratively a staged event and perhaps a bit too for- 



181 



mal to effectively win hearts and minds. Whatever 
positive effect it had could be achieved many times 
over by letting anyone in the world with an Internet 
connection sit in on local American concerts, sports 
events, city council meetings, school plays, and so on. 
Imagine taking a group of ordinary Saudis, or Rus- 
sians, or Colombians on an interactive visit to the lo- 
cal pizza parlor where they could chat with the staff 
and customers and maybe order up some pizzas to be 
delivered to a local senior center. 18 This is already pos- 
sible, so the time to do it is now. 

Global Citizen-Science. 

The three main U.S. agencies concerned with win- 
ning hearts and minds — the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) — along with 
other agencies, such as the Department of Education 
and the National Science Foundation, could promote 
allophilia for the United States by launching a global 
citizen-science network which allowed ordinary peo- 
ple around the world to participate in scientific re- 
search that would benefit mankind in general. 19 Medi- 
cal and environmental research would be obvious 
examples. Such a network might be particularly ef- 
fective in generating allophilia by showing the United 
States in the role of "servant leadership" — that is, pro- 
viding moral leadership to others by being of service 
to them. The tools would not have to be elaborate; the 
longest-running citizen-science project currently ac- 
tive is probably the Audubon Society's very low- tech 
Christmas bird count. While the bird count operates 
only in the Americas, World Water Monitoring Day 
operates "from Indonesia to Arkansas" and involves 
only "a simple test kit" which even children can use. 20 



182 



Virtual Visitor Centers. 

Not every foreigner has a chance to get on a plane 
to visit the United States — nor, perhaps, should they 
be emitting the carbons that a flight would produce. 
But the United States can certainly create movable 
green (solar-powered) visitor centers, roughly the size 
of a movable house, that would travel around in oth- 
er countries — public kiosks of a sort. Inside, visitors 
would be automatically linked to boxes in the United 
States so that the traveling visitor center in, say, Bo- 
livia would become a virtual visitor center in Times 
Square, on the Mall in Washington, on a main street in 
Omaha, or on the beach in Hawaii. Webcams would 
show the local scene, and there would be interactive 
access to all sorts of other views and information. 

Teaching English Online. 

You can learn a lot about another culture using 
materials available in your own language, but can- 
not fully know that culture without knowing its own 
language. We would like people to know our culture 
and value its best aspects as highly as we do. People 
all over the world want to learn English anyway. So 
why not build allophilia by helping them do it? It is 
amazing that, in 2009, there is no U.S. Government- 
sponsored Web destination which people anywhere 
in the world can visit to learn American English (and 
American history and culture) through contact with 
the full diversity of American citizens. 

All four of these suggestions can be put into ac- 
tion all over the world all the time (unless banned by 
another government). In this way, they address the 
need to build and maintain allophilia as a regular vital 



183 



function of foreign policy rather than as a response to 
a crisis. These techniques and others like them could 
be the international relations equivalent of the healthy 
diet and exercise which reduce the likelihood of an 
ambulance ride to the emergency room. 

CONCLUSION 

Winning hearts and minds is a worthy, inspiring, 
and indeed critical goal. We are at a turning point, 
having learned a good deal about what makes people 
think well of others rather than ill. We thus can feel 
confident that knowing a lot more would equip our 
leaders with much better ways to reach for that goal. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8 

1. Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead, New York: Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 2008; Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature 
of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990. 

2. Todd L. Pittinsky. "Intergroup Leadership: What it Is, Why 
it Matters, and How it Is Done," in Todd Pittinsky, ed., Crossing 
the Divide: Intergroup Leadership in a World of Difference, Boston, 
MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation, 2009. 

3. Office of the White House, "President Discusses Beginning 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom" President's Radio, Address of the 
Press Secretary, March 22, 2003. 

4. Todd L. Pittinsky and R. M. Montoya, "Symhedonia in 
Intergroup Relations: The Relationship of Empathic Joy to Preju- 
dice and Allophilia," Psicologia Sociale, forthcoming. 

5. Todd L. Pittinsky, Why Hate Wins, Cambridge, MA: Har- 
vard Business Press, manuscript in preparation. 



184 



6. J. J. Ratcliff, Todd L. Pittinsky, and S. Simon, "The Contrast- 
ing Influence of Perceived Hubristic — And Authentic — Pride on 
Intergroup Relations," Poster session presented at the 10th an- 
nual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychol- 
ogy, Tampa, FL, February 2009. 

7. Frank Winter, Prelude to the Space Age: The Rocket Societies, 
1924-1940, Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1983. 

8. Margarita Krochik and Tom R. Tyler, "United Pluralism: 
Balancing Subgroup Identification and Superordinate Group Co- 
operation," in Todd L. Pittinsky, ed., Crossing the Divide: Inter- 
group Leadership in a World of Difference. 

9. Wikipedia, "Islamic mujahid movement," available from 

en.wikipedia.org/zuiki/Islamic_muiahid_movement. 

10. Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 
Psychological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1943, pp. 370-396. 

11. Todd L. Pittinsky, S. A. Rosenthal, and R. M. Montoya, 
"Measuring Positive Attitudes Toward Outgroups: Develop- 
ment and Validation of the Allophilia Scale," in L. Tropp and 
R. Mallett, eds., Beyond Prejudice Reduction: Pathways to Positive 
Intergroup Relations, Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association, 2009. 

12. Todd L. Pittinsky, "A Two-Dimensional Theory of In- 
tergroup Leadership: The Case of National Diversity," American 
Psychologist, forthcoming. 

13. H. K. Finn, "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging 
Foreign Audiences," Foreign Affairs, November/ December 2003. 

14. A. Soble, "The Business Brand of America," The Yale Glo- 
balist, 2009, available from tyglobalist.org/index.php/20090404186/ 
Focus/The-Business-of-Brarid- America.html. 

15. P. L. Plaisance, "The Propaganda War on Terrorism: An 
Analysis of the United States' 'Shared Values' Public Diplomacy 
Campaign After September 11, 2001," Journal of Mass Media Eth- 
ics, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, pp. 250-268. 



185 



16. P. Reeves (Reporter), "Pakistan's Military Wins Swat Val- 
ley Radio War" [Radio series episode], E. McDonnell (Executive 
Producer), Morning Edition, Washington, DC: National Public 
Radio, August 31, 2009. 

17. Todd L. Pittinsky, R. M. Montoya, L. R. Tropp, and A. 
Chen, "How and When Leader Behavior Affects Intergroup Lik- 
ing: Affect, Approval, and Allophilia," in B. Mannix, M. Neale, 
and C. Anderson, eds., Research on Managing Groups and Teams: 
Affect & Groups, Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science Press, 2007, pp. 
125-144. 

18. Pittinsky, Why Hate Wins. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Wikipedia, "World Water Monitoring Day," available 
from en.zuikipedia.org/wiki/World_Water_Monitoring_Day. 



186 



CHAPTER 9 

CHANGE IS HARD . . . BUT EVEN SMALL STEPS 

MATTER 

Jeffrey A. Engel 

The history of the short generation between 1989 
and 2001 matters in contemporary debates over re- 
forming America's national security system. It matters 
as well to the present collection of articles, developed 
in 2009 while a new presidential administration was 
making its initial mark on the international system. 
This history matters because the national security bu- 
reaucracies and structures first developed to wage and 
win the Cold War not only survived the Cold War's 
demise, but more importantly largely retain their sa- 
lience and structure even as the ensuing Global War 
on Terror approaches its 10th year. Any current or 
future effort to reform such a massive and long-lived 
system therefore confronts entrenched interests and 
almost unfathomable bureaucratic inertia. Meaning- 
ful reform will surely be difficult given the weight of 
this history. It might well be impossible. 

Few would have predicted a generation ago the 
place America's national security system would cur- 
rently occupy. Remarkable change occurred in 1989. 
The Cold War, that bipolar world system that had 
largely governed international relations since the 
close of World War II, began to crumble. The Berlin 
Wall fell. Protestors roiled China's Tiananmen Square, 
and more successfully fomented wholesale change 
through Eastern Europe. Within 2 years, even the So- 
viet Union would be no more. 

These were golden days for American policymak- 



187 



ers. Their Cold War "victory" — and they did perceive 
it as a victory— seemingly validated all that Ameri- 
cans had long held to be true. Never mind that, as is 
more common in Europe, the Cold War's end was 
seen simply as a communist capitulation prompted by 
exhaustion. For triumphalists, freedom was a univer- 
sally beloved value; the unfettered market could out- 
produce state-run economies; and the future world, 
filled with democracies, would find conflict rare but 
American power in abundance. Because past success 
was seen as indicative of future returns, the future 
for Washington and for the world it intended to lead 
looked bright indeed. 

We now know that such optimism was short-sight- 
ed. History did not end after communism's collapse. 
The 1990s were filled with small and brutal conflicts. 
Some, such as in Yugoslavia and Somalia, ultimately 
demanded American engagement, despite great reluc- 
tance within American policymaking circles to enter 
into military operations with no clear allies or mark- 
ers of victory save the reestablishment of order. Some 
like Iraq demanded ongoing American vigilance and 
eventually large-scale military engagement. Other 
simmering regions of unrest, most notably Afghan- 
istan, proved impervious to the powers of democrati- 
zation and the market — the very foundations of West- 
ern progress long preached by American strategists. 
Afghanistan in time became not only a chaotic safe- 
haven for those content to live beyond the American 
sphere of influence, but also the launching point for 
attacks against the very heart of American power. The 
terrifying tragedy of September 11, 2001 (9/11), was 
not only the tragic result of chaos run amuck, but the 
final deathblow to post-Cold War optimism. 

America's national security structure and posture 



188 



have already changed since 2001. Most notably, the 
omnibus reforms developed in the immediate heat of 
the 9/11 attacks produced from scratch a Department 
of Homeland Security and expanded federal powers 
designed to thwart and destroy international agents of 
terror. As any reader of this collection well knows, 
expansion of such powers has not been without 
controversy. After-shocks of this initial spasm of 
national security reform spawned a Director of Na- 
tional Intelligence some years later, and then by 
2007, implementation of many of the primary recom- 
mendations offered by the 9/11 Commission. Within 
its first months in office, the new Obama administration 
even joined together the National Security and Home- 
land Security Councils under the seemingly more inte- 
grated umbrella of a new National Security staff. 

The continuities present in today's national secu- 
rity structure, reaching back into the first decades of 
the Cold War, far exceed in salience any post-9/11 
changes. The Department of Defense (DoD) remains 
the largest security and military organization in the 
world. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), despite 
its public relations difficulties following 9/11 and the 
Iraq War, remains the most public face for the Ameri- 
can intelligence community (IC). The Department of 
Energy (DoE) has emerged as a prominent agency for 
investigating and thwarting potential nuclear threats, 
just as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stal- 
wartly maintains its role as the primary counter to ter- 
rorism on American soil. 

More important than the mere continued existence 
of this alphabet soup of national security agencies is 
the fact that each has expanded its ranks and its bud- 
get since 2001. The CIA, for example, embarked on a 
well-publicized hiring expansion designed to bolster 



189 



its ranks by greater than 50 percent. By the close of the 
George W. Bush administration, more than 100,000 
federal employees worked for one of the 16 entities 
overseen by the Directorate of National Intelligence. 
Their aggregate annual budget, based on publicly an- 
nounced figures, exceeded $50 billion. Estimates sug- 
gest that a similar number work as private contractors 
for the intelligence agencies. These are hardly incon- 
sequential figures. 

America's national security bureaucracy has ex- 
panded, both in size and scope, since 2001, and, more 
to the point, it has expanded largely based upon com- 
ponents that existed in 1989. As James Locher notes 
in Chapter 2 of this volume, "the U.S. national secu- 
rity system is arguably the largest organizational de- 
cisionmaking system in the world." 1 It is, however, 
still designed mainly "to overcome post-World War 
II threats." 2 

Reforming such a gargantuan system will surely 
be no easy task. Bureaucracies rarely change graceful- 
ly. Moreover, as several of our authors note, in a Wash- 
ington where money so easily equates with power, 
political infighters not only take their own agency's 
agenda to heart, but come to consider the battle for re- 
sources a zero-sum game. If any meaningful effort at 
reform attempts to improve the national security field 
by piecemeal or targeted cuts, the resulting pressures 
will surely only exacerbate what Locher terms "inter- 
agency fratricide." 3 

Organizational theory suggests that bureaucracies 
typically perceive such reforms as outside imposi- 
tions. They resist such change almost by nature. As 
Richard Immerman notes in Chapter 4 of this anthol- 
ogy, "Change is particularly hard, especially if [the] 
organization is large and its culture entrenched." 4 It 



190 



would be difficult to find organizations that better fit 
the words "large" and "entrenched" than those that 
comprise America's national security apparatus. As 
already noted, many of its most powerful entities date 
to the 1940s. That is institutional memory aplenty to 
resist and ultimately thwart change. 

The consensus of authors in this anthology is not 
therefore in favor of wholesale change, which might 
well be beyond current capabilities or desires. Taken as 
a whole, these contributors (excepting Locher) instead 
suggest smaller — though clearly important— path- 
ways for improving the tenor, efficiency, interagency 
cooperation, and leadership within the intelligence 
field. The following pages of this chapter highlight 
several of the collection's key findings, best under- 
stood as suggestions on the margins of national securi- 
ty reform — margins, that is, as distinct from wholesale 
or whole of government reform. While laudable and, 
according to such recent findings as those by Locher's 
Project on National Security Reform, quite necessary, 
wholesale change appears beyond present capabilities 
and political realities. This is especially true given a 
President bent on domestic rather than national se- 
curity reform, a Democratic Party long considered 
weaker on security issues than its main rival, and the 
lingering international threats still at hand, including 
the omnipresent potential for further terrorist attacks 
at home and abroad. 

Washington's principal national security organ- 
izations survived the end of the very Cold War they 
were designed to win. They expanded after 9/11. They 
are unlikely to be reduced while a war on terror (or 
long war, or period of persistent conflict, or whatever 
term one prefers) continues. No matter the name, no 
end is currently in sight for that conflict. Changes at 



191 



the margins of the American national security system, 
better described as improvements, are therefore all 
that is reasonably possible in the political environ- 
ment for as far as the eye can currently see. Such im- 
provements can and must matter, as the chapters in 
this book uniformly suggest. 

This is not to deny that recipes for wholesale 
change exist. One will be handily offered to any politi- 
cal leader wise enough or foolish enough — but either 
way, brave enough— to accept the supremely high 
risks, even with their potentially high rewards. 

Yes, reform is hard, and particularly so, given the 
emotions and dangers at play whenever national se- 
curity is at stake. Contributors to this anthology agree 
on this point, but almost universally note that a sig- 
nificant roadblock to reform is the existence of numer- 
ous semi-autonomous agencies and organizations, the 
overarching umbrella of national security. The very 
fact that different agencies exist, with mandates that 
intentionally overlap, leads inevitably to interagency 
competition and tension. 

Some argue that such tension is productive, im- 
proving efficiency while ensuring, as the nation's 
founders would have desired, that no single politi- 
cal entity garners too much power at the expense of 
others or, more fundamentally, of liberty. In a pas- 
sage noted in Immerman s chapter from Amy Zegart, 
such bureaucratic infighting has a long pedigree. He 
writes, "The pathologies that afflicted the [Intelligence 
Community], . . . inherent organizational defects, bu- 
reaucratic self-interest, and fragmentation most prom- 
inently, were unaffected by the Cold War's termina- 
tion." 5 

Recognizing the impossibility of eliminating inter- 
agency tension wholesale, several authors within this 



192 



volume offer suggestions for limiting it in order to im- 
prove the system's overall efficiency. Geoffrey French 
(Chapter 7), for example, suggests ways to improve 
information sharing and simultaneously enhance 
counterintelligence capabilities across the spectrum of 
current agencies. "There is an urgent need for coun- 
terintelligence analysis and operations to support 
the [Homeland Security Intelligence] community," 
he writes. "This may begin with awareness training, 
risk assessments, and support to Operations Security 
(OPSEC), but it must ultimately be a nation-wide ef- 
fort coordinated by DHS as the primary steward of 
HSINT." 6 

Immerman similarly notes the power of reforming 
the IC through development (and ultimately, the im- 
position) of shared values, language, and standards. 
He participated in one such reform effort. The exper- 
ience left him, by his own admission, truly surprised 
by its possibilities. "I argued at that time [before join- 
ing the IC] and subsequently that the problems that 
afflicted the U.S. intelligence community were so per- 
vasive, and reflected such an array of dynamics — po- 
litical, psychological, and cultural — that they were all 
but impervious to institutional reforms." 7 

Immerman now thinks differently, offering an 
example of how reform can be realized by dedicated 
individuals devoted to a common goal. Analysts and 
employees from disparate agencies will better inte- 
grate their work and thus meet their shared goals if 
jointly trained in a shared language. "The culture of 
distinctiveness (which is often almost mythic) and 
competition among the elements remains pervasive, 
and often defiant," he writes. "The consequences are 
extremely detrimental for information sharing, espe- 
cially when juxtaposed with a reflexive disposition 



193 



toward secretiveness and the widespread belief that 
secrets are the key ingredients of power." 8 Change can 
overcome such obstacles, he notes, only incremental- 
ly. But it can come. "Even if not perfect," he concludes 
of the reform movement he participated in, "there is 
greater collaboration and integration throughout the 
IC." 9 Such reforms can be a model for others. 

Other authors within this collection reach similar 
conclusions. James Goldgeier, for example, a scholar 
particularly versed in the evolution of American na- 
tional security strategy since 1989, suggests several 
potential improvements of his own in Chapter 5. These 
include reinforcing the current administration's em- 
phasis on economic issues (several notches above the 
level reached by its predecessors), but also improving 
the overall economic sophistication of security policy- 
makers whose principal areas of responsibility did not 
in the past typically touch the economic sphere. "The 
community of foreign policy experts tends not to have 
a lot of economic expertise," he writes. "This became a 
huge problem in the Clinton efforts to bridge the gap. 
When a principal such as Robert Rubin or Lawrence 
Summers explained a policy prescription by empha- 
sizing the nature of international markets, it was hard 
for those on the national security side to counter those 
arguments; the national security types didn't have the 
economic knowledge (or reputation) to counter." 10 

Economic concerns are quite unlikely to diminish 
in importance in the future, given current financial un- 
certainty and the ever-quickening pace of globaliza- 
tion. Thus Goldgeier suggests expanding the Obama 
administration's recent economics push across the 
span of the national security field. At the same time, 
he wisely notes, "We should not just think of this as a 
one-way street. It would also be useful if those in the 



194 



NEC and Treasury Department had a strong enough 
grounding in national security issues not to believe 
that all questions can be reduced to the issue of how 
markets are likely to respond." 11 

Whereas Immerman, French, and Goldgeier sug- 
gest an improved common vocabulary as a means of 
reforming national security — be that language one of 
intelligence standards or economics— James Locher 
seeks improvement through an alteration of the bu- 
reaucracy's very structure. His suggestions for reform 
are the most far-reaching found within this collection. 
Still, they are best considered as reforms of the current 
system rather than institution of something wholly 
different. Chief among his suggestions is creation of 
"A cadre of National Security Executives (NSEs) ap- 
pointed by the president [who] would have formal 
authority over interagency teams. The NSEs should be 
highly respected individuals who are experts in their 
specialty areas and known for their leadership abili- 
ties. A National Security Professional Corps should be 
created to recruit and retain qualified personnel." 12 

Locher contends that this new cadre of NSEs would 
help streamline the flow of information and thus en- 
hance the effectiveness of national security organiza- 
tions. Even more to the point, they would be able to do 
much the same for the interagency process as well. In 
the final analysis, such a program holds the promise 
of a better system, though not altogether a new and 
different one. Locher makes a point of achieving prog- 
ress by improving on current practice. "The existing 
National Security Education Consortium (established 
by Executive Order 13434) should serve as the founda- 
tion for developing a comprehensive professional edu- 
cation and training program. This program will focus 
on nurturing skills and a positive culture throughout 
the system." 13 



195 



It should be noted that Locher, and the Project on 
National Security Reform he represents, aspires to 
more fundamental changes than those treated above. 
"The 9/11 Commission report noted," he wrote, that 
"'Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc 
adjustments to a system designed generations ago for 
a world that no longer exists.' We at PNSR definitely 
agree!" 14 It is emblematic of the size of the problems 
facing any proponent of fundamental reform, and in- 
dicative of the experience-based wisdom that Locher 
brings to this debate (including major reform efforts in 
the U.S. military's special operations and joint organi- 
zations, as well as in Bosnia's defense ministry), that 
his call for wholesale reform is best understood not as 
an overhaul of the system but rather as a tune-up. 

Alongside suggestions for reforming the system's 
structure are suggestions for improving its intent as 
well. Joel Rosenthal (Chapter 3) has such a suggestion, 
designed to enhance the ethical training and thus con- 
sciousness of national security policymakers and those 
they oversee, in order to produce not only a more ef- 
ficient system, but a fairer and wiser one as well. He 
notes in particular that ethical training can produce 
otherwise overlooked solutions to seemingly insolu- 
able problems. "Ethics expands the range of choices 
we have in front of us," he writes. "It is about creating 
new possibilities." 15 

Rosenthal's suggestion should not be dismissed 
lightly, given the divisive debates over American na- 
tional security policy since 2001, which question not 
only the aims of such policy but more fundamentally 
the justifications policymakers have employed on be- 
half of certain decisions made under the banner of pre- 
serving security. The ongoing debate over torture and 
indefinite internment are good examples. Lawyers, 



196 



doctors, accountants, and even university professors 
routinely undertake ethical training throughout the 
length of their careers. Should we demand no less 
of those in the national security community (not just 
within the military) charged with preserving our se- 
curity, and, even more profoundly, with maintaining 
and deploying the vast arsenal of power the United 
States today wields in defense of its interests at home 
and overseas? 

Rosenthal is no doubt correct in his claim that any 
meaningful reform of the nation's national security in- 
stitutions must include further attention to ethics. Ac- 
cepting his contention that ethical training illuminates 
heretofore unseen options, and coupling that with the 
general thrust of this collection that whole of govern- 
ment change is perhaps beyond present capabilities, 
Rosenthal's most valuable contribution may well be 
his contention that ethics can help point an individual 
or an organization in the correct direction. Indeed, 
the best heading might merely be a slight adjustment 
or tweak to the current course, if only we possessed 
the proper knowledge of our ultimate destination, in- 
formed by more discriminating ethical consideration. 

Our contributors, much like the majority of those 
who write in the field of ethics, are concerned with im- 
proving the effectiveness and efficiency of the current 
national security system. They speak in terms of inter- 
agency cooperation and streamlining process. Broad- 
based ethical training can help diminish the drag of 
bureaucratic inertia, including preoccupation with 
institutional self-interest and a tendency to confine 
thinking within mental silos. Ethical training achieves 
such improvements by helping organizational mem- 
bers better appreciate the real meaning of their duties 
and jobs in terms of the old-fashioned but noble ideals 



197 



of providing public service and promoting national 
interests. The ultimate goal of all CIA, FBI, and DoD 
employees is not, in the final analysis, to increase their 
organization's status, power, or abilities. It is not even 
to help their organization meet their stated missions. 
It is, instead, to improve the lives of Americans; to 
protect and enhance their security; and by extension 
to improve peace and security throughout the world. 
Further ethical training might well help national secu- 
rity operatives and workers keep that goal at the fore- 
front of their thinking whenever a request for infor- 
mation or assistance arrives from another (competing) 
agency. With their shared national goals in mind, op- 
erational streamlining, information sharing, and, yes, 
reform might well occur without the need for radical 
systemic change. 

At the least, such training in ethics might well in- 
form American image-enhancing initiatives, such as 
offered by Todd Pittinsky in his provocative essay in 
Chapter 8, aimed at improving American security by 
improving the country's standing and regard through- 
out the world. "Winning the hearts and minds" of an 
adversary and, of equal import, of allies and neutrals 
throughout the world, is a national aim with a long 
and, as Pittinsky well notes, dubious pedigree. It was 
a fundamental maxim of American policy in the Viet- 
nam War, for example. That war casts a long shadow 
over any contemporary use of the slogan. Yet the goal 
remains no less valid today than in the 1960s. It re- 
mains as much a slogan as a workable platform, how- 
ever. To make it a credible and realizable goal, Pittin- 
sky offers four suggestions designed to spark debate 
on imaginative, research-based programs for funda- 
mentally improving America's standing in the world. 
As he argues, recent such efforts have been marked 



198 



by "a patchwork quality of simply 'trying things' that 
seem logical, such as economic aid or variations on 
brand marketing, with too little guidance from theory 
and empirical research." 16 Bringing more social sci- 
ence and empirical thinking into the mix might well 
produce better results, or at the least results more in 
line with stated goals. This is yet another example of 
change and reform that can alter the system's effec- 
tiveness without a top-to-bottom overhaul. 

Some suggestions for reform, while holding po- 
tential, would be hard to implement and, no doubt, 
harder for Congress to regulate. Among these are An- 
drew Preston's keen observations (Chapter 6) on the 
importance of thoughtful solidarity among occupants 
of an administration's key posts, particularly the po- 
sition of national security adviser, typically the gate- 
keeper for issues presented to the President. "The 
National Security Adviser possesses an extraordinary 
and unrivalled authority over both policy and process 
in the making and implementing of U.S. foreign pol- 
icy," he writes. "Ideally the National Security Adviser 
should be an 'honest broker,' and it is no coincidence 
that this term is usually used to describe the Adviser's 
ideal performance." 17 Preston, an authority on the first 
truly "modern" national security adviser, McGeorge 
Bundy, who served under John Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson, notes that successive occupants have tried to 
duplicate Bundy' s political acumen, intelligence, and 
knowledge not only of the security field, but of the 
President himself. Bundy was expert in both. He well 
knew that the National Security Adviser, appointed 
without senate confirmation, had a constituency of 
one. He knew Kennedy well, and considered his role 
to be confined to serving the President alone. He 
never reached as complete a relationship with Lyn- 



199 



don Johnson, and arguably his effort to win Johnson's 
trust— something he enjoyed in spades with Kenne- 
dy — led him to advise what he believed the new Presi- 
dent desired to hear, rather than what he should hear. 
Of all those who have tried their hand at this sensi- 
tive yet crucial post, Preston notes, Brent Scowcroft is 
generally regarded as the most successful: 

Historians of the NSC are virtually unanimous in 
their praise of Brent Scowcroft's tenure as National 
Security Adviser. It helped that Scowcroft was per- 
sonally close to Bush; when Scowcroft spoke, few 
doubted that he also spoke for the President. It 
also helped that Scowcroft knew the NSC system 
intimately — after all, he had already been National 
Security Adviser, under President Gerald Ford, and 
he had served on the Tower Commission. Scowcroft 
also established a good working relationship with 
Secretary of State James A. Baker and Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney. Scowcroft was generally fair 
in acting as the President's gatekeeper on foreign 
policy, yet he also possessed strong views of his 
own and at times, such as during Operations DES- 
ERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian 
Gulf, acted as an especially committed policy advo- 
cate. Most important, Scowcroft smoothed relations 
among departments and agencies by instituting sev- 
eral interagency working groups that would keep 
lines of communication open and forestall bureau- 
cratic turf wars that resulted from the hoarding of 
information. Chief among these were the Principals 
Committee, which Scowcroft himself chaired, and 
the Deputies Committee, which his own deputy, 
Robert Gates, chaired. Overall, though his system 
did not always function smoothly, Scowcroft acted 
as an effective manager and advocate by integrat- 
ing his own views within a larger, more coordinated 
network. 18 



200 



Moreover, Preston praises the significant role 
Scowcroft played as the administration's "honest bro- 
ker." 19 Despite having strong opinions of their own, 
ideal national security advisers, according to Preston, 
manage the security team without prejudice, even 
while acting as players in their own right. For the na- 
tional security system to function best, he concludes, 
it must have not just a beating heart — a President 
interested in keeping the system functioning— but a 
proper pacemaker as well, a role played by the Na- 
tional Security Adviser. 

How to ensure that the right person rises to the po- 
sition is, of course, problematic. The President alone 
selects this most intimate of advisers. One can only 
hope that current and future occupants of this im- 
portant position are versed in economics as well as 
security (as Goldgeier would require); trained in the 
language and standards of intelligence (Immerman 
and French); capable as a manager of highly motivated 
people and effective, integrated organizations (Locher); 
but also trained in ethics in order to put all this knowl- 
edge to the proper use (Rosenthal). Oh, yes, it is best if 
he or she is also a personal intimate of the President, 
but possessed of remarkably little ego (Preston). 

In the final analysis, Preston's hard-to-match cri- 
teria matter all the more, given the overall thrust of 
this collection that fundamental change lies beyond 
the ken of the presently possible. This is so because 
the keystone position of national security adviser is, 
as is so much of our security structure, the product of 
an earlier era. Would we create the position anew if it 
did not already exist? Probably. But can we hope to 
instill in an existing position the authority to synthe- 
size, organize, and ultimately manage the President's 
entire national security agenda, given the precedents 
now established as fact? That is a far less likely pros- 



201 



pect. "The National Security Adviser is ... a Cold War 
innovation," Preston argues, "that has proven adept 
at confronting the globalized challenges of the post- 
Cold War world." 20 It is a position that has always 
been in flux, and thus more open to change than most 
within Washington. It might well be the position from 
which real change can in the future spring, so long as 
the President chooses its occupant wisely. One is re- 
minded, however, when considering its potential role 
as catalyst for change, of the famous dictum offered as 
an epigraph to Dean Acheson's magisterial memoir. 
"If I had been present at the creation," King Alphonso 
X of Spain declared, "I would have given some use- 
ful hints for the better ordering of the universe." 21 It is 
crucial to note Alphonso's implicit recognition that a 
world already in existence cannot be altered as easily 
as one still being formed. We inherit a world, a na- 
tional security bureaucracy, and, yes, even a national 
security adviser. It is too late to form an optimal sys- 
tem based on hindsight. Rather, all that remains is to 
move forward at the best speed possible. 

For all their myriad suggestions, intermingled 
disciplinary approaches, and rich experience, the con- 
tributors to this collection arrive at a common funda- 
mental point: while surely difficult, change is indeed 
necessary. It is best and most likely accomplished in 
the current political environment at the margins of the 
system, by making the current national security sys- 
tem (itself still hostage to its Cold War origins) more 
efficient, more responsive to interagency needs and 
requirements, more ethical, more mindful of the eco- 
nomic dimension of international relations, and more 
in line with desired outcomes. Such reforms are bet- 
ter classified as fine-tuning improvements rather than 
seismic shifts. But small improvements are not to be 



202 



minimized. They are needed for a truly efficient sys- 
tem of national security to emerge. As the old maxim 
suggests, every journey, no matter how long, begins 
with a single step. The suggestions offered in the pre- 
ceding chapters would make for significant first steps 
indeed. 

But what if we truly wanted to overhaul the sys- 
tem, to change its fundamentals, not simply improve 
it at the margins? Then yet a different maxim might 
be in order. George Marshall, chief strategist of the 
American military effort in World War II and later 
Secretary of State, was fond throughout his career of 
a wise saying attributed to many before and since: the 
first rule of holes is, when in one, stop digging. 

Marshall's maxim suggests two potential means 
of achieving true reform of the national security sys- 
tem during the first term of this new administration 
and after. First, stop digging. The Cold War system 
that remains largely in place even today needs no new 
elements. It needs no new bureaucracies, nor more 
levels within the bureaucracies. To date, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment spends more on defense than the rest of the 
world combined spends on its defense. Its national 
security apparatus dwarfs any similar national struc- 
ture throughout the world. Given the amorphous na- 
ture of Washington's adversaries in the War on Terror 
in particular, current American resources devoted to 
halting terrorism and other transnational agents of an- 
archy are surely disproportional to the mischief that 
potential terrorist organizations can inflict. More than 
200,000 federal employees and private contractors 
contribute to the American intelligence community. 
Far more than that, in and out of uniform, work for the 
defense community. Al Qaeda's supporters might ex- 
ceed these numbers. Surely, however, even the most 



203 



frightening estimate of the organization's actual ranks 
does not. 

We do not need to mobilize more counters to such 
threats. On the contrary, our authors suggest that the 
current system needs streamlining, more information 
sharing, better interagency integration, and a better 
means of defeating Washington's real national securi- 
ty foe: its own bureaucratic inertia. Neither new agen- 
cies, new security czars, nor new funded mandates 
will necessarily make the system more responsive or 
more capable of meeting post-Cold War transnational 
threats. "More" will in all likelihood not make Amer- 
ica safer, but instead will only make the hole we find 
ourselves in deeper still. 

How then to begin climbing out of the hole we 
presently occupy? One simple solution would be to 
make our current security agencies do more with less. 
Given that their parochial interests will, by the very 
nature of organizations and bureaucracies, inspire 
them to fight the least nano-cut to their resources, pay- 
rolls, and missions, a viable solution might be across- 
the-board cuts. If the entire national security appara- 
tus was slashed by 20 percent across the board, each 
agency would be forced to do with less. But if forced 
to do the same job with fewer resources, they would of 
necessity be forced to cooperate, to share across agen- 
cies, to eliminate mission overlap and redundancy, to 
improve their efficiency. Because we know the trained 
and dedicated men and women charged with defend- 
ing and enhancing American security will not consider 
failure an option, they will find a way to do with less. 
Such a suggestion for reform and improvement would 
be enhanced by incentives — not so much the positive 
incentive of the carrot, but the negative incentive of 
the stick. The stick, in the form of diminished budgets 



204 



and resources, would bring change by necessity, if not 
by virtue. 

This model of enhancing efficiency and improving 
effectiveness through resource starvation without a 
precipitous decline in performance is harsh, but also 
market tested. Many American businesses in the 1990s 
and after, through times of recession and prosperity 
alike, employed new technologies and new methods 
of information sharing to cut payrolls without hinder- 
ing outputs. Efficiency was the mantra of the era for 
business. Why do we expect less of government em- 
ployees and the legions of contractors who presently 
complement their work, than we would of profit-seek- 
ing firms? Are national security operatives, analysts, 
and agents less inclined to succeed than their fellow 
citizens in the private sector? If true change is desired, 
the first rule of holes is to stop digging. But the second 
rule is that everyone in the hole should work together 
to get out. Rather than demanding new shovels, rather 
than suggesting new plans for constructing a ladder, 
rather even than digging in different places, the cur- 
rent national security legions should simply stop dig- 
ging, and start getting out. That would be real reform. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9 

1. James R. Locher, Chapter 2, "Leadership, National Se- 
curity, and the Whole of Government Reforms: The Project on 
National Security Reform (PNSR) Perspective," in Joseph R. Ce- 
rami and Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole 
of Government" 'National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and 
Prospects, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, pp. 29-47, 
p. 34. 

2. Ibid., p. 30. 

3. Ibid., p. 33. 



205 



4. Richard Immerman, Chapter 4, "Transforming Intelligence 
Analysis: 'The Tail that Wags the Dog'," in Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Govern- 
ment" 'National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 
Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, pp. 73-110, p. 73. 

5. Ibid., p. 77. 

6. Geoffrey French, Chapter 7, "Leading the Next Phase of 
Homeland Security Intelligence: Providing Better Definitions, 
Roles, and Protections," in Joseph R. Cerami and Jeffrey A. Engel, 
eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Government" National Se- 
curity Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, Carlisle, PA, Stra- 
tegic Studies Institute, 2010, p. 149-163, p. 161. 

7. Immerman, p. 75. 

8. Ibid., p. 101. 

9. Ibid., p. 103. 

10. James Goldgeier, Chapter 5, "Reforming the National Se- 
curity Process in a Globalizing World," in Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Govern- 
ment" National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 
Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, p. 111-125, p. 123. 

11. Ibid., p. 124. 

12. Locher, p. 44. 

13. Ibid., p. 45. 

14. Ibid., p. 45. 

15. Joel H. Rosenthal, Chapter 3, "Leadership as Practical 
Ethics," in Joseph R. Cerami and Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethink- 
ing Leadership and "Whole of Government" National Security Reform: 
Problems, Progress, and Prospects, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2010, pp. 49-71, p. 56. 



206 



16. Todd L. Pittinsky, Chapter 8, "Winning Hearts and Minds: 
From Slogan to Leadership Strategy," in Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Govern- 
ment" 'National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 
Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, pp. 165-185, p. 166. 

17. Andrew Preston, Chapter 6, "A Fine Balance: The Evolu- 
tion of the National Security Adviser," in Joseph R. Cerami and 
Jeffrey A. Engel, eds., Rethinking Leadership and "Whole of Govern- 
ment" 'National Security Reform: Problems, Progress, and Prospects, 
Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010, pp. 127-147, p. 127. 

18. Ibid., p. 141. 

19. Ibid., p. 127. 

20. Ibid., p. 131. 

21. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the 
State Department, New York: W. W. Norton, 1969, epigraph and 
p. xviii. 



207 



ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 

JOSEPH R. CERAMI is a Senior Lecturer in Nation- 
al Security Policy and Director of the Public Service 
Leadership Program for the Bush School of Govern- 
ment and Public Service, Texas A&M University. His 
last U.S. Army assignment was as the Chairman of 
the Department of National Security and Strategy at 
the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 
from 1998 to 2001. From 1993 to 1998, he served on 
the faculty there as Director of International Security 
Studies. He was Assistant Professor of Political Sci- 
ence at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New 
York, where he taught International Relations, and 
Politics and Government. Along with Colonel (Ret.) 
James F. Holcomb, Jr., Dr. Cerami is coeditor of the U. 
S.Army War College Guide to Strategy. He is also the co- 
editor of The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare 
(2007) and Leadership and National Security Reform: The 
Next President's Agenda (2008), both published by the 
Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Cerami holds a B.S. in 
engineering from the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point, an MA. in government from the University of 
Texas at Austin, an MMAS in theater operations from 
the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leav- 
enworth, Kansas, and a Ph.D. in public administration 
from the Penn State School of Public Affairs. He is a 
graduate of the Army War College. In 1995 he was 
awarded a certificate from the John F. Kennedy School 
of Government, Harvard University, Program for Se- 
nior Officials in National Security. 

JEFFREY A. ENGEL is an Associate Professor and 
Verlin and Howard Kruse '52 Founders Professor and 
the Director of Programming, Scowcroft Institute of 



209 



International Affairs at the Bush School of Texas A&M 
University. Before coming to the Bush School, he was 
an Olin Postdoctoral Fellow at Yale University, and 
a lecturer in history and international relations at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Engel is the author of 
Cold War at 30,000 Feet: The Anglo-American Fight for 
Aviation Supremacy (Harvard University Press, 2007, 
awarded the 2008 Paul Birdsall Prize by the American 
Historical Association), and edited Local Consequences 
of the Global Cold War (Stanford University Press, 2008); 
The China Diary of George H. W. Bush: The Making of 
a Global President (Princeton University Press, 2008); 
and The Fall of the Berlin Wall: The Revolutionary Legacy 
of 1989 (Oxford University Press, 2009). A member 
of the editorial board of Diplomatic History and of the 
Executive Council of the Transatlantic Studies Asso- 
ciation, he is currently writing Seeking Monsters to De- 
stroy: Language and War from Thomas Jefferson to George 
W. Bush (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Dr. 
Engel is a graduate of Cornell University, studied at 
St. Catherine's College, Oxford University, and holds 
a Ph.D. in American history from the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. 

JAMES R. LOCHER III, has worked in the White 
House, Pentagon, and Senate. He served as the senior 
staff member on the Senate Armed Services Commit- 
tee for the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganiza- 
tion Act and later for the Cohen-Nunn Amendment 
that created the U.S. Special Operations Command. In 
the first Bush and early Clinton administrations, Mr. 
Locher served as the assistant secretary of defense for 
special operations and low-intensity conflict. In 2003- 
04, he chaired the Defense Reform Commission in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that successfully merged the 
three warring factions into a single military establish- 



210 



merit and began the move toward a single army. Cur- 
rently, he is the executive director of the nonpartisan 
Project on National Security Reform, which was es- 
tablished to assist the nation in reforming its national 
security system to meet the challenges of the 21st cen- 
tury. Mr. Locher is a graduate of West Point (Class of 
1968) and Harvard Business School. 

GEOFFREY S. FRENCH is the Analytic Director for 
Security Risk at CENTRA Technology, Inc., and cur- 
rently supports a number of programs for the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Mr. French 
has worked in counterintelligence and in the critical 
infrastructure protection community since the 1990s, 
supporting government agencies such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Department of 
Defense. Mr. French has designed a number of risk 
methodologies for DHS, including tools for assessing 
the terrorism risk to infrastructure, the security risk 
to special events, and all-hazards risk to a region. In 
addition to overseeing risk methodological develop- 
ment, he provides subject matter expertise in cyber 
counterintelligence, especially in policy and guid- 
ance. He is a founding member of the Security Analy- 
sis and Risk Management Association. Mr. French 
has written a number of papers on threat and risk 
assessment and spoken at numerous conferences and 
academic settings. Some recent examples include: 
"Threat-Based Approach to Risk," presented to the 
Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland De- 
fense and Security, June 2008; "Intelligence Analysis 
for Strategic Risk Assessments," in the December 2007 
George Mason School of Law monograph Elements of 
Risk; "The Coming Counterrevolution in Military Af- 
fairs," presented to the International Security Studies 



211 



Program, Yale University, March 2003; and "The Ter- 
rorist Threat to the Information Infrastructure," Pre- 
sentation to the National Academy of Sciences' Com- 
mittee on the Internet Under Crisis Conditions, 2002. 
Mr. French holds a B.A. in history from Wichita State 
University and an M.A. in national security studies 
from Georgetown University. 

JAMES GOLDGEIER is a senior fellow at the Council 
on Foreign Relations and a professor of political science 
and international affairs at George Washington Uni- 
versity, where he has taught since 1994. Additionally, 
he served as a visiting fellow at Stanford University's 
Center for International Security and Cooperation 
and an assistant professor of government at Cornell 
University. In 1995-96, he was a Council on Foreign 
Relations International Affairs Fellow serving at the 
State Department and on the National Security Coun- 
cil staff. He has held appointments as a visiting fellow 
at the Brookings Institution, Whitney H. Shepardson 
Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Henry 
A. Kissinger scholar in foreign policy and internation- 
al relations at the Library of Congress, a public policy 
scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Cen- 
ter for Scholars, and a W. Glenn Campbell and Rita 
Ricardo-Campbell National Fellow and the Edward 
Teller National Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Dr. 
Goldgeier is the author of Leadership Style and Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Johns Hopkins, 1994, which received 
the Edgar Furniss book award in national and inter- 
national security); and Not Whether But When: The 
U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Brookings, 1999). He 
coauthored (with Michael McFaul) Power and Purpose: 
U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (Brookings, 
2003, which received the 2004 Lepgold Prize for the 



212 



best book on international relations). His most recent 
book (co-authored with Derek Chollet) is America Be- 
tween the Wars: From 11/9 to 9/11 (Public Affairs 2008, 
named "a best book of 2008" by Slate and "a favorite 
book of 2008" by The Daily Beast). Dr. Goldgeier holds 
a Ph.D. from the University of California-Berkeley. 

RICHARD H. IMMERMAN is Professor of History 
at Temple University and Director of its Center for 
the Study of Force and Diplomacy. The recipient of 
the Society for Historians of American Foreign Rela- 
tions' Bernath Book Prize in 1983 and its Bernath Lec- 
ture Prize in 1990, he served as SHAFR's president in 
2007. He received the Board of Regents Excellence in 
Research Award from the University of Hawaii and 
the Paul W. Eberman Faculty Research Award from 
Temple University. In 2004, he was named Temple's 
Edward J. Buthusiem Family Distinguished Faculty 
Fellow in History. Professor Immerman has published 
The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention; 
Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold 
War Strategy (with Robert R. Bowie); and John Foster 
Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign 
Policy. His American Empire for Liberty? is currently in 
press. From September 2007 to December 2008, Pro- 
fessor Immerman served as Assistant Deputy Direc- 
tor of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and 
Standards and Analytic Ombudsman for the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence. 

TODD L. PITTINSKY is an Associate Professor of 
Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, and 
serves as Research Director of Harvard's Center for 
Public Leadership. His recent research includes the 
edited volume Crossing the Divide: Inter group Leader- 



213 



ship in a World of Difference (Harvard Business School 
Press, 2009). Through the Allophilia Project, he inves- 
tigates positive intergroup attitudes, the conditions 
under which they develop, and how they shape the 
ways we think, feel, and behave. Dr. Pittinsky's cur- 
rent research focuses on intergroup leadership. Dr. 
Pittinsky holds an A.B. in psychology from Yale, an 
M.A. in psychology, and a Ph.D. in organizational be- 
havior from Harvard. 

ANDREW PRESTON is a Senior Lecturer in History 
and Fellow of Clare College at Cambridge University. 
He is also a Fellow at the Cold War Studies Centre at 
the London School of Economics, and has previously 
held professorships in history and international stud- 
ies at Yale University; the University of Victoria, Can- 
ada; and The Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, Geneva. In addition to several 
journal articles and book chapters, Mr. Preston is the 
author of The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, 
and Vietnam (Harvard University Press, 2006) and co- 
editor, with Fredrik Logevall, of Nixon in the World: 
American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977 (Oxford Univer- 
sity Press, 2008). He is currently writing a book on the 
religious influence on American war and diplomacy 
from the colonial era to the present, to be published 
by Knopf. 

JOEL H. ROSENTHAL is President of the Carnegie 
Council for Ethics in International Affairs. The Coun- 
cil is one of Andrew Carnegie's original peace endow- 
ments. It was founded in 1914 to promote the prin- 
ciples of pluralism and peace. Under Dr. Rosenthal's 
direction, the Council sponsors educational programs 
for worldwide audiences. The Council's lectures, 



214 



publications, and educational programs focus on is- 
sues relating to ethics and war, the global economy, 
and cultural difference. He also serves as Senior Fel- 
low, Stockdale Center, U.S. Naval Academy; Adjunct 
Professor, New York University; and Chairman of the 
Bard College Globalization and International Affairs 
Program in New York City. Dr. Rosenthal is editor- 
in-chief of the journal Ethics & International Affairs and 
the author of Righteous Realists. He has coedited sever- 
al collections of articles and written numerous articles 
of his own including "Ethics" in Bruce W. Jentleson 
et ah, Encyclopedia of US Foreign Relations. His work in 
progress includes How Moral Can We Get? Essays on 
the Moral Nation. Dr. Rosenthal holds a B.A. from Har- 
vard University and a Ph.D. from Yale University. 

J. ETHAN BENNETT is a current student at the Bush 
School of Government and Public Service at Texas 
A&M University. Mr. Bennett's focus on Latin America 
brought him to South America, where he twice served 
as an English teacher to Chilean high school students 
in Valparaiso and Quilpue, Chile. He is currently pur- 
suing a master's degree in international affairs, and 
has concentrations in national Security studies and in- 
ternational economics. Mr. Bennett has a triple major 
in Spanish, Latin American studies, and international 
economics from the University of Kentucky. 



215 



THE GEORGE BUSH SCHOOL OF 
GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE, 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 

The George Bush School of Government and Public 
Service, Texas A&M University, educates principled 
leaders in public and international affairs, conducts re- 
search, and performs service. Both the Master of Pub- 
lic Service and Administration (MPSA) and Master's 
Program in International Affairs (MPIA) are full-time 
graduate degree programs that provide a professional 
education for individuals seeking careers in the public 
or nonprofit sectors, or for activities in the private sec- 
tor that have a governmental focus. 

The MPSA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, 
combines 11 courses in public management, policy 
analysis, economics, and research methods with five 
electives. Students select an elective concentration 
in one of the following areas: nonprofit organiza- 
tions; state and local policy and management; natu- 
ral resources, environment, and technology policy 
and administration; security, energy, and technology 
policy; and health policy and management. A profes- 
sional internship is completed in the first summer ses- 
sion. 

The MPIA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program, 
offers tracks in National Security Affairs and In- 
ternational Economics and Development. Students 
construct a program of study based on two or more 
concentrations or clusters of related courses such as 
economic development, diplomacy in world affairs, 
intelligence in statecraft, national security, or regional 
studies. Satisfactory completion of a foreign language 
exam is required to graduate. At the end of their first 
year of study, students will participate in either an 



217 



internationally oriented internship or a foreign lan- 
guage immersion course. 

The Certificate in Advanced International Affairs 
(CAIA) program is a focused curriculum offered via 
distance education or through in-residence study. 
The program consists of 12-15 credit hours of gradu- 
ate courses designed for those with limited time but a 
strong desire to upgrade specific dimensions of their 
international relations background. In addition, the 
School offers certificate programs in Homeland Secu- 
rity (online), China Studies (in-residence), Nonprofit 
Management (online or in-residence), and National 
Security (executive education). 

More information on the Bush School is available 
from bush.tamu.edu/. 

THE SCOWCROFT INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs 
(SUA) is a research institute housed in the Bush School 
of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M Uni- 
versity. The Institute is named in honor of Lieutenant 
General Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.), whose long and 
distinguished career in public service included serv- 
ing as National Security Advisor for Presidents Ger- 
ald Ford and George H. W. Bush. The Institute's core 
mission is to foster and disseminate policy-oriented 
research on international affairs by supporting faculty 
and student research, hosting international speakers 
and major scholarly conferences, and providing grants 
to outside researchers to use the holdings of the Bush 
Library. 



218 



THE STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S. 
Army's center for geostrategic and national security 
research and analysis. SSI conducts strategic research 
and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College 
curriculum, provides direct analysis for Army and 
Department of Defense (DoD) leadership, and serves 
as a bridge to the wider strategic community. 

SSI is composed of civilian research profes- 
sors, uniformed military officers, and a profes- 
sional support staff. All have extensive creden- 
tials and experience. SSI is divided into three 
components: the Strategic Research and Analysis 
Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and 
functional issues, particularly those dealing with 
Army transformation; the Regional Strategy De- 
partment focuses on regional strategic issues; and 
the Academic Engagement Program creates and 
sustains partnerships with the global strategic com- 
munity. In addition to its organic resources, SSI has 
a web of partnerships with strategic analysts around 
the world, including the foremost thinkers in the field 
of security and military strategy. In most years, about 
half of SSI's publications are written by these external 
partners. 

SSI documents are published by the Institute and 
distributed to key strategic leaders in the Army and 
the DoD, the military educational system, Congress, 
the news media, other think tanks and defense insti- 
tutes, and major colleges and universities. SSI pub- 
lications use history and current political, economic, 
and military factors to develop strategic recommen- 
dations. 



219 



• Books - SSI publishes about 3-5 books per 
year consisting of authored works or edited 
compilations. 

• Monographs - Policy-oriented reports provide 
recommendations. They are usually 25-90 
pages in length. 

• Carlisle Papers - The best of the student papers 
submitted in compliance with requirements for 
graduation from the U.S. Army War College 
are highlighted. 

• LeTort Papers - Essays, retrospectives, or 
speeches of interest to the defense academic 
community comprise this category. 

• Colloquium Reports - For larger conferences, 
SSI may produce a report on the proceedings. 

• Colloquium Briefs - These 2 to 4-page briefs 
are produced after the colloquia with which 
SSI has co-sponsored or helped to fund. 

At the request of the Army leadership, SSI some- 
times provides shorter analytical reports on pressing 
strategic issues. The distribution of these is usually 
limited. 

Additionally, every year SSI compiles a Key Stra- 
tegic Issues List (KSIL) based on input from the U.S. 
Army War College faculty, the Army Staff, the Joint 
Staff, the unified and specified commands, and other 
Army organizations. This is designed to guide the re- 
search of SSI, the U.S. Army War College, and other 
Army-related strategic analysts. 

SSI analysts publish widely outside of the In- 
stitute's own products. They have written books for 
Cambridge University Press, Princeton University 
Press, University Press of Kansas, Duke University 
Press, Praeger, Frank Cass, Rowman and Littlefield, 



220 



and Brassey's. They have contributed chapters to many 
other books including publications from the Brookings 
Institution, Jane's Defence Group, and the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. SSI analysts have 
written articles for such journals as Foreign Affairs, 
International Security, Survival, Washington Quarterly, 
Orbis, The National Interest, Current History, Political 
Science Quarterly, Joint Force Quarterly, Parameters, The 
Journal of Politics, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Jane's Intelligence Review, Occasional Papers of the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, Contemporary Security Policy, 
Defense Analysis, Military Operations Research, Strategic 
Review, Military Review, National Security Studies Quar- 
terly, Journal of Military History, War in History, War & 
Society, The Historian, Infantry Magazine, The World and 
I, Aerospace Historian, Central Asian Security, Asian Sur- 
vey, SAIS Review, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 
Special Warfare, Comparative Strategy, Korean Journal of 
Defense Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies, World Af- 
fairs, Problems of Post-Communism, Conflict, Diplomatic 
History, Airpower Journal, Low Intensity Conflict and Law 
Enforcement, Politique Etranger, Allgemeine Schweizeri- 
sche Militarzeitschrift, and African Security Review. 

SSI also co-sponsors academic conferences to ex- 
amine issues of importance to the Army, collaborating 
with some of the leading universities in the country. 
Recent partners include Georgetown, Princeton, Har- 
vard, MIT, Columbia, University of Chicago, Univer- 
sity of Miami, Stanford, Georgia Tech, Johns Hopkins, 
and the Bush School of Government and Public Ser- 
vice at Texas A&M University. 



221 



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 



Major General Robert M. Williams 
Commandant 



STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Director 
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. 

Director of Research 
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II 

Editors 

Dr. Joseph R. Cerami 

Dr. Jeffrey A. Engel 

Director of Publications 
Dr. James G. Pierce 

Publications Assistant 
Ms. Rita A. Rummel 



Composition 
Helen Musser